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Chapter 1 
 
 
 
Presentation of the book 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction to Public-Private Partnership (PPP) 
 
In most countries, the government, combined with the agencies it 
controls, is the biggest purchaser of goods of all kinds, ranging from 
basic commodities to high-technology equipment. In light of this, the 
political pressure to favour domestic suppliers over their foreign 
competitors can be very strong. Traditionally, the focus of 
international trade agreements has been on market access but many 
developing countries have opposed the launch of negotiations to 
extend the principle of nondiscrimination to procurement.  
PPPs have a long history in the EU as well as in China, and today, 
PPPs have received a boost in various countries undergoing processes 
of significant economic growth. By using PPP it is possible to: 
provide additional capital; set up alternative management procedures 
and implementation skills; provide added value to the citizens and the 
public area; and provide better identification of needs and optimal use 
of resources.1
The market for PPP, and co-operation between the public and 
private sectors for the development and operation of infrastructure for 
a wide range of economic activities has increased. Years ago, PPP 
arrangements were only driven by limitations in public funds to cover 
investments needs, but today PPP is also driven by the interest of 
increasing the quality and efficiency of public services in general. 
 
                                                          
1 See European Commission, Guidelines for Successful Public-Private 
Partnerships (March 2003), p. 4. 
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Neither national legislation2
 
 nor the EU or WTO has legal rules 
that specifically cover the PPP arrangement in regard to public 
contracts rules. 
 
2. Purpose of the PPP book 
 
The PPP book will provide a resource for teaching and research in the 
area of PPP and public infrastructures in an UN/WTO, EU and 
Chinese context.  
The purpose of the PPP book is to analyse and describe the 
UN/WTO, EU and Asian regulations concerning PPP, and to discuss 
the economic and regulatory purpose of PPP and the potential conflict 
between EC procurement rules and PPP. It further aims to describe the 
background of PPP in an international perspective and in an EU and 
Asian perspective, and assess the economic reasoning behind PPP.  
The first part of the book will provide a framework for analysing 
PPP and explain the purpose of PPP. The PPP projects are often based 
on an economic foundation. One purpose of PPP is to provide a new 
and more efficient model of providing infrastructure to the citizens. 
This is based on the idea that taking advantage of private sector 
experience with infrastructure projects will create the best and the 
economically most efficient model for the Member State. This will 
also be addressed, discussed and analysed in part I of the PPP book.  
This book will also conduct three legal analyses of PPP. There 
will be analysis and explanation of: the WTO and GPA provisions 
concerning PPP from an international perspective; the EU 
procurement regulation concerning PPP (national court cases from the 
UK and EU court cases will be used in this legal analysis); and the 
procurement regulation in China in regard to PPP and concessions.  
The need for legal analysis concerning PPP in an international, 
European and Asian perspective is significant. First, because the 
experience of the international and European legal systems can be 
drawn upon in the future development of Asian procurement rules; 
and secondly, because PPP is still a newly developed concept in many 
                                                          
2 A few countries have enacted specific national rules covering PPP: Brazil enacted 
a PPP act in December 2004, designed to encourage investments for crucially 
needed infrastructure projects. See Law No. 11.078, D.O.U.31 Dec., 2004 and also 
C.V. Filho and J.B.Lee, ‘Brazil’s New Public-Private Partnership Law: One Step 
forward, Two Step Back’(2005) 22(5) Journal of International Arbitration 419426. 
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European Countries and so the need for information and clarification 
on the subject is high. Additionally, nations, governments, 
organisations and companies will be interested in the international 
perspective due to globalisation and the ongoing growth of 
international trade. Part II of the book will explore this issue. 
Finally, this book compares the legal aspects of PPP with the 
political and economic situation in Europe and Asia from an 
international perspective. The use of PPP can develop societies; 
ensure infrastructure, buildings, hospitals; etc. It is therefore necessary 
to investigate if the legal provisions restrict or advance the use and 
development of PPP.  
The conflict between the general procurement rules and the 
economically based PPPs will be discussed and analysed from a legal 
standpoint. It will be a problem if the procurement rules are being 
interpreted too strictly because the PPPs may no longer be 
economically efficient. the concessions as an alternative to PPP will 
also be discussed. 
The final part of this book (Part III) will discuss the PPP law and 
regulation, and the PPP and procurement policy making, a discussion 
which will be useful to national and EU policy makers, lawyers, 
procurement officials and suppliers.  
Thus, this book will describe how PPPs can present a number of 
advantages to both the industry and countries in general. The book 
will introduce and present the rules governing PPP in the EU and 
China and countries using the WTO and GPA concerning PPP. Both 
government and industry can profit from the advantages of PPP by 
enhancing their understanding of PPP arrangements. The book will 
seek to provide legal, economic and managerial skills to optimise the 
use and understanding of PPP. 
 
 
3. Asia link collaboration 
 
The PPP book is part of a research project that is establishing an EU-
Asia inter-university network for teaching and research in public 
procurement regulation.The project consists of the University of 
Nottingham in the UK and the Copenhagen Business School in 
Denmark, the Central University of Finance and Economics (CUFE), 
Xinjiang University in China and the University of Malaya.  
The aim of the research project between these universities is 
directly relevant to ensuring high-quality infrastructure; securing 
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adequate public services in areas such as health, utilities and 
sanitation; and fighting corruption. Effective procurement regulation 
and understanding of the benefits of PPP can integrate environmental 
policies into procurement; facilitate development of competitive 
markets (particularly important for transition economies); promote 
electronic commerce; and achieve equality between citizens (race, 
gender, etc).  
The research project will create a sustainable pool of expertise on 
procurement regulation in Asia and in Europe. This will provide a 
multi-level training, research and dissemination infrastructure in 
which the primary target groups of academic staff and postgraduates 
act as disseminators to the broader group of the government 
procurement community. This community will participate through 
conferences, as readers of journals and other publications, and from 
direct academic input into policy-making. The PPP book is part of the 
effort towards creating expertise in regard to public procurement 
regulation. 
Christina D. Tvarnø, Associate Professor, PhD, Law Department, 
Copenhagen Business School, holds the editorial responsibility for the 
PPP book. The PPP book is produced in collaboration between 
researchers from Copenhagen Business School (Christina D. Tvarnø 
and Henrik Andersen, Post.doc, PhD), Nottingham University (Ping 
Wang, Lecturer, and PhD) and CUFE (Fuguo Cao, Professor, PhD). 
 
 
4. Structure of the book 
 
The book contains three parts: Part I – Introduction, Part II –Legal 
analysis and Part III – Discussion. 
Chapter 1 presents the scope of the book, beginning with a brief 
presentation of the purpose, structure and methods used in the book. 
The chapter is written by Christina D. Tvarnø. 
Chapter 2 presents the PPP concept and describes the background 
of PPP. The chapter also discusses the difference between a traditional 
public project and a PPP. A PPP project is based on an economic 
foundation alternative to what is traditionally seen in public 
procurement projects. One purpose of PPPs is to provide a new and 
more efficient model of providing infrastructure to the citizens. The 
PPP is based on the idea that the experience from the private sector 
used in infrastructure projects will create the best and economically 
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most efficient model for the governments. The chapter is written by 
Christina D. Tvarnø. 
In Chapter 3, the WTO and the GTA agreements are analysed and 
discussed. The chapter is written by Henrik Andersen. 
Chapter 4 describes the EU and the British procurement 
regulation. PPP projects within the European Union will typically fall 
under these procurement rules and in this chapter the EC procurement 
rules and their influence on, and implications for, the PPP will be 
introduced and analysed. The chapter is written by Ping Wang. 
In Chapter 5, the Chinese rules concerning PPPs are introduced 
and analysed. The UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Private Finance 
in Infrastructure Projects will be explored in a Chinese context.  The 
chapter is written by Fuguo Cao. 
Chapter 6 discusses PPPs in an international legal, economic and 
political perspective. In this chapter, the purpose of PPPs in an 
economic perspective will be discussed in relation to the aim of the 
legal purpose. The chapter discusses how the national regulation, EU 
law and international law could support the economic idea of PPP and 
the need for economically valid and efficient solutions to create 
infrastructure. The chapter is written by Christina D. Tvarnø. 
 
 
5. Teaching and research  
 
The PPP book will provide a resource for teaching and research in the 
area of PPP and public infrastructures from an international, European 
and Asian procurement perspective.  
The PPP book is to be used by the participating institutions in 
their teaching modules. Students in other EU Member States and in 
other Asian countries may also benefit from this book. The PPP book 
will be a valuable, basic international resource for academics and PhD 
students. It provides an important international tool for both 
academics and companies interested in the PPP rules. The economic 
and political explanations may be beneficial to parties and countries 
that use or consider using PPP.  
The PPP book will present different legal systems by the method 
used in this regard.  
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5.1 The legal analysis of the EU rules 
 
Most of the national procurement legislation in the Member States is 
derived from EU law, from both the EC Treaty and the procurement 
directives. The EC procurement law is based on the common market 
and the elimination of barriers to trade in goods and to movement in 
business, labour and capital between Member States. The political and 
economic reasoning behind the common market is based on the 
economic theory of comparative advantages.3
The purpose of the EC Procurement law is to ensure an opening 
up of the public procurement market.
  
4 The EC public procurement 
rules apply to purchases by public bodies which are above set 
monetary thresholds. They cover all EU Member States and, as a 
result of international agreements, their benefits also extend to several 
other countries worldwide.5
The EC procurement Directives set out the legal framework for 
public procurement. The Directives apply when public authorities and 
utilities seek to acquire goods, services, civil engineering or building 
works. Importantly when considering PPP, the principles in the EC 
   
                                                          
3 See P. Krugman and M. Obstfeld, International Economics, Theory and Policy, 
(6th ed., Boston: AddisonWesley, 2003), part I. 
4 S. Arrowsmith, The Law of Public and Utilities Procurement, (2nd ed., London: 
Sweet & Maxwell, 2005), p. 121. See also S. Arrowsmith, ‘Public Private 
Partnerships and the European Procurement Rules: EU Policies in Conflict?’ 
(2000) 37 Common Market Law Review 709-737, p. 709; S. Arrowsmith, The Law 
of Public and Utilities Procurement, (2nd ed., London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2005); 
M. Burnett, Public-Private-Partnerships (PPP) – A Decision Maker’s Guide 
(Maastricht: Institut Européen d’Administration Publique, 2008); S. E. Hjelmborg, 
P. S. Jakobsen and S. T. Poulsen, Public procurement law – the EU Directive on 
public contracts (Copenhagen: Djøf, 2006); R. Nielsen, Udbud af offentlige 
kontrakter (Copenhagen: Jurist- og Økonomforbundets Forlag, 2005); and M. 
Steinicke and L. Groesmeyer,  EU’s udbudsdirektiver (Copenhagen: Jurist- og 
Økonomforbundets Forlag, 2008). 
5 Where the Regulations apply, contracts must be advertised in the Official Journal 
of the European Union (OJEU), and there are other detailed rules that must be 
followed. The rules are enforced through the courts, including the European Court 
of Justice (ECJ). Even when a tender process is not required under the Directives, 
for example because the estimated value of a contract falls below the relevant 
threshold, EU Treaty-based principles of non-discrimination, equal treatment, 
transparency, mutual recognition and proportionality apply, and some degree of 
advertising, appropriate to the scale of the contract, are likely to be necessary to 
demonstrate transparency. 
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Treaty and the procurement rules in the procurement Directives set out 
rules and procedures which must be followed before awarding a 
contract of a value that exceeds set thresholds. The EC rules do not lay 
down any specific rules in regard only to PPP.6
There are several positive elements in the EC procurement rules. 
One is the possibility to eliminate a corrupt governmental practice; 
another is that effective public procurement is essential for good 
public services and good government. The procurement rules ensure 
that the government applies the highest professional standards when it 
spends money on behalf of taxpayers.  This procedure helps to ensure 
competition as the cornerstone of public sector procurement and to 
maintain market interest – particularly where a well-established and 
competitive market does not already exist.  
 
In markets with no or limited competition, the procurement rules 
can undertake market soundings, be prepared to adapt the 
requirements to the capacity and capabilities of the marketplace, and 
advertise and market contracting opportunities as broadly as possible.  
The objectives of the specific EC public procurement Directives 
are to ensure fairness and equal treatment and better procurement 
practices, open up the competition, and lower the overall prices. The 
basic principles to obtain these goals are transparency, non-
discrimination, equal treatment, proportionality and competition.  
The EC procurement law is not only used by the 27 EU Member 
States. The EU public procurement rules also apply to a number of 
other countries because of an international agreement negotiated by 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO) titled the Government 
Procurement Agreement (GPA).7
 
 With regards to PPP, the legal 
situation in all Member States is that PPP is a public contract falling 
within the scope of the public procurement law. 
 
                                                          
6 C. H. Bovis, EU Public Procurement Law (Cheltenham: Elgar European Law, 
2007), p. 52. 
7 These are Aruba, Canada, Hong Kong, China, Iceland, Israel, Japan, Republic of 
Korea, Liechtenstein, Norway, Singapore, Switzerland and USA.  
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5.2 The legal analysis of WTO 
 
The WTO’s Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA)8 is the 
only legally binding agreement in the WTO focusing on the subject of 
government procurement to date. Its present version was negotiated in 
parallel with the Uruguay Round in 1994, and it entered into force on 
January 1st 1996.9 It is a plurilateral treaty administered by a 
Committee on Government Procurement, which includes the WTO 
Members that are parties to the GPA and thus have rights and 
obligations under the Agreement.10 Apart from procurement rules, the 
GPA enforces rules guaranteeing fair and non-discriminatory 
conditions of international competition.11
Under WTO law, there is no legal definition of PPP
  
12 even though 
several WTO Member States resort to PPP in e.g. infrastructure 
projects.13 The importance of legal instruments in regard to 
encouraging PPP has been recognised in the WTO.14
                                                          
8 At present the GPA is therefore the only international agreement on Public 
Procurement in force. 
 The GPA is 
9 An Agreement on Government Procurement was first negotiated during the 
Tokyo Round and entered into force on 1 January, 1981. Its purpose is to open up 
as much of this business as possible to international competition. It was designed to 
make laws, regulations, procedures and practices regarding government 
procurement more transparent and to ensure that they do not protect domestic 
products or suppliers, or discriminate against foreign products or suppliers. 
10 Government procurement is an important aspect of international trade, given the 
considerable size of the procurement market (often 10 to 15 percent of GDP) and 
the benefits for domestic and foreign stakeholders in terms of increased 
competition. Many WTO Members use their purchasing decisions to achieve 
domestic policy goals, such as the promotion of specific local industry sectors or 
social groups. Open, transparent and non-discriminatory procurement is generally 
considered to be the best tool to achieve 'value for money‘, as it optimises 
competition among suppliers. 
11 For example, governments will be required to put in place domestic procedures 
by which aggrieved private bidders can challenge procurement decisions and 
obtain redress in the event such decisions were made inconsistently with the rules 
of the agreement. 
12 See paper by H. Andersen, Global Telecommunication Services and WTO Law, 
at: <www.cbs.dk/law> accessed 30 November 2010. 
13 See for instance Brazil, Trade Policy Review, WT/TPR/G/140 of 1st November, 
2004, point 102; India, Trade Policy Review (revised), WT/TPR/S/182/rev. 1 of 
24th July, 2007, point IV.5,58,132 and 179; Singapore, Trade Policy Review, 
WT/TPR/S/202 of 9th June, 2008, IV.25. 
14 See Report of the Working Group on Trade and Transfer of Technology to the 
General Council, WT/WGTTT/9, report of 12th December, 2007, point 9. 
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based on transparency and non-discrimination principles.15
Thus, the GPA is based on similar rules and principles as the EU 
public procurement law presented above in section 2. Contrary to the 
EC public procurement Directive, however, the GPA does not consist 
of procurement procedure rules similar to the competitive dialogue. 
This means that the special need for co-operation in a PPP and 
negotiation between the parties with regard to define the needs of the 
public sector will not be possible within the scope of the GPA.
 All 
suppliers should have the opportunity to apply for procurement of a 
PPP or other types of public contracts. In accordance with the GPA, 
the Government must ensure that public contracts are awarded in a 
non-arbitrary way.  
16
 
 
 
5.3 The legal analyses of UK and EU law 
 
The analysis in chapter 4 regards both the EU public procurement law 
and the British public procurement law and the impact these rules 
have on PPP. There is a difference in the legal framework in Great 
Britain and in the  EU and the chapter will focus on the British legal 
model and draw some parallels with, and differences to, the EU law. 
 
 
5.4 The legal analysis of Chinese law 
 
This chapter is based on the research behind an article written by  
Fuguo Cao, ‘Regulating Procurement of Privately Financed 
Infrastructure in China: a Review of the Recent Legislative Initiatives 
and the Emerging Regulatory Framework’.17
The development of the private sector in China has been gaining 
momentum following a series of encouraging political and policy 
initiatives issued at central level in the past years. This chapter 
analyses, among other issues, how the private sector can use PPP in 
sectors traditionally monopolised by government or state-owned 
 
                                                          
15 Art. III of the GPA. 
16 See paper by H. Andersen, Global Telecommunication Services and WTO Law, 
at: <www.cbs.dk/law>  accessed 30 November 2010. 
17 C Fuguo, ’Regulating Procurement on Privately Financed Infrastructure in 
China: A Review of the Recent Legislative Initiatives and the Emerging 
Regulatory Framework’ (2007) 16 (3) Public Procurement Law Review 147-173. 
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enterprises (SOEs) in China, and also the development of Chinese 
public procurement reform and regulation. 
The chapter also consists of several analyses and references to the 
1994 UNCITRAL Model Law on Procurement of Goods, 
Construction and Services, with Guide to Enactment, which was 
adopted by UNCITRAL on June 15th,
The UNCITRAL Model Law is not a binding legal instrument, but 
rather an instrument for national governments to use when 
implementing public procurement legislation. Public procurement 
constitutes a large portion of public expenditure in most states and 
PPP will often fall under such legislation. Also, the UNCITRAL 
Model Law is a model for legislative provisions on procurement of 
goods, constructions and services, which are all parts in a PPP project. 
 1994. The Model Law 
recognises that certain aspects of the procurement of services are 
governed by different considerations from those applicable to the 
procurement of goods and construction.  
The objective behind the UNCITRAL Model Law is to establish 
procedures designed to foster integrity, confidence, fairness and 
transparency in the procurement process and also to promote 
efficiency and competition in procurement, and thus lead to increased 
economic development. The establishment of model legislative 
provisions on procurement of services that are acceptable to States 
with different legal, social and economic systems aims to contribute to 
the development of harmonious international economic relations.18
The UNCITRAL Model Law on public procurement does not 
contain any rules directly concerning PPP, and nor does it define PPP. 
   
 
 
5.5. Economic and policy perspective  
 
Chapter 6 analyses the legal challenges faced with regards to PPP and 
the legal systems. One challenge is that the EU and the WTO do not 
recognise the need for special PPP rules and definitions for the 
purposes of decreasing the transaction cost and increasing the level of 
legal information. For example, the EC Commission has stated19
                                                          
18 See the notes to the preamble in The 1994 UNCITRAL Model Law on 
Procurement of Goods, Construction and Services, with Guide to Enactment was 
adopted by UNCITRAL on June 15th 1994. 
 that 
19 Commission (EC), ‘Communication on Public-Private Partnerships and 
Community Law on Public Procurement and Concessions’ (Communication) COM 
(2005) 569 final, 15th November 2005. Based on the analysis in Commission (EC), 
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there will be no new PPP rules or Directives within the EU in the near 
future.  
The Commission does not take into account that some EU 
Member States have very limited experiences in PPP and that the 
general lack of transparency and definitions of PPP can result in fewer 
PPPs. Today, PPP is used in many countries; in the near future, other 
countries will also use PPP, but the lack of a uniform award procedure 
designed for public procurement of PPP projects may result in some 
nervousness from the public sector. In some situations it may be easier 
not to use PPP because the level of uncertainty and the transaction 
costs, as well as the risk of claims, are simply too high. This scenario 
could pose a future problem for the use of PPP. In Chapter 6, it is 
discussed whether the EU and the WTO should encourage the use of 
PPP by transparency and uniformity in this highly regulated 
procurement area.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
‘Report on the Public Consultation in the Green Paper on Public-Private 
Partnerships and Community Law in Public contracts and Concessions’ (Staff 
Working Paper), SEC (2005) 629, 3rd May 2005, section 3.1. 
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Chapter 2 
 
 
 
Presentation of the PPP concept 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.  The background of PPP 
 
Limited public funds, as well as efforts to increase the quality and 
efficiency of public services, make Public-Private Partnership 
arrangements attractive. PPPs have been developed in part due to 
financial shortages in the public sector, and they have demonstrated 
the ability to harness additional financial resources and operating 
efficiencies inherent in the private sector.20
In a general legal context, a PPP can be characterised
 PPPs are often used in 
infrastructure projects, e.g. in sectors such as transport, public health, 
education and national security, and provide a wide range of public 
services, like telecommunication, water plants, financial support, 
innovative financing, general public services, education and research.  
21
                                                          
20 See Commission (EC), ‘Guidelines for Successful Public Private Partnerships’ 
March 2003. 
 as a long-
term contract arrangement between a public authority and a 
consortium of private parties based on co-operation, aiming to provide 
a mechanism for developing public service provision involving 
significant assets or services for a long period of time. The asset or 
service is entrusted to the private sector, and a part or all of the 
funding comes from the private sector. The latter means that the 
private party in a PPP holds all equity and handles the works, 
21 See Commission (EC), ‘Green Paper on public-private partnerships and 
Community Law on Public Contracts and Concessions’ (Green Paper), COM 
(2004) 327 final, 30th April 2004. 
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operation and maintenance of the project.22
 
 The PPP contract is, or at 
least should be, based on needs or functions instead of demands or 
concrete descriptions.  
 
2. The economic background of PPP 
 
PPP is a result of the economic effects of globalisation.23
Globalisation makes it difficult to maintain market power and 
market share. A company no longer competes only with national 
companies, but now also with companies all over the world. Because 
of the Internet, consumers have had access to all kinds of information 
and all types of products. Whatever their nationality, consumers have 
been receiving the same information; they want the same kind of life 
style and desire the same kinds of products, which has changed the 
market conduct.
 One problem 
created by globalisation was the cost of competing in a global arena 
because the numbers of competitors increased; the cost of selling 
products on a global market increased, and the cost of using 
information technology increased.  
24
Companies found new ways to compete by entering into joint 
ventures and strategic alliances
   
25
                                                          
22 See S. Arrowsmith, ‘Public Private Partnerships and the European Procurement 
Rules: EU Policies in Conflict?’ (2000) 37 Common Market Law Review 709-737, 
p. 709, and S. Arrowsmith, The Law of Public and Utilities Procurement, (2nd ed., 
London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2005), p. 415. See also Commission (EC), ‘Green 
Paper On Public-Private Partnerships And Community Law On Public Contracts 
And Concessions’ (Green Paper) COM (2004) 327 final, 30th April 2004. 
, and they explored new types of 
business strategies by creating the concept of co-operation. This 
development has enabled companies to ensure higher quality in the 
product, decrease the cost of Research and Development (R&D), 
information technology, and sale and distribution, and increase their 
competitive capacity. The motivation for making a strategic alliance 
was, and still is, to make a business arrangement that encourages 
23 C. D. Tvarnø, ‘Public private partnership in the European Union’, in R. Nielsen 
and S. Treumer (eds.), The New EU Public Procurement Directives (Copenhagen: 
Djøf, 2005), pp. 183-194. 
24 K. Ohmae, ‘The Global Logic & Strategic Alliances’, Harvard Business Review, 
March-April 1989. 
25 Y. L. Dos and G. Hamel, Alliance Advantage, The art of creating value through 
Partnering (Boston, Massachusetts: Harvard Business School Press, 1998), 
Preface, p. 9. 
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dynamism, collaboration and mutual learning among the parties. 
Therefore, initial agreements have less to do with success than 
adaptability to change in the market and in consumer needs.26
PPP has been precipitated by the globalisation reflected in the 
public sector. The structural change has affected the public wealth: 
 
 
The welfare state can no longer regard itself as having a 
purely domestic role in an increasingly internationalised 
world where it is being forced to act more and more like 
a market player.27
 
 
The governments in the EU Member States had the same problem as 
in the private industries - citizens in all the Member States want higher 
quality and better service but wish to pay less tax. The governmental 
attention to the market mechanisms and the success of privatisation 
efforts in several countries increased the interest in PPP.28 Companies 
had found ways to compete and meet consumer demand, and the 
governments needed to find a way to serve the citizens with higher 
quality and at the same time reduce taxes. Accordingly, partnering, 
partnership and Public Private Partnership became relevant in the 
public arena. 
The idea of PPP can be dated back to the 1960s when the US 
government developed a method of  stimulating private investments in 
infrastructures29. The idea was to protect public interest while at the 
same time bringing investment potential and added value from the 
private sector.30
                                                          
26 Y. L. Dos and G. Hamel, Alliance Advantage, The art of creating value through 
Partnering (Boston, Massachusetts: Harvard Business School Press, 1998), 
Introduction p. 15. 
  
27 R. Common, ‘The East Asia region: Do public-private partnerships make 
sense?’, in S. P. Osborne (ed.), Public-Private Partnership (London: Routledge, 
2000), p. 135. 
28 N. Pongsiri, ‘Regulation and public private partnership’ (2002) 15(6) 
International Journal of Public Sector Management 487-495. 
29 See further R.S. Fosler, ‘Book Reviews on Brooks, H., et.al. (eds.). ‘Public-
Private Partnership: New Opportunities for Meeting Social Needs’’ (1986) 46 (4) 
Public Administration Review 364-365 and N. Pongsiri, ‘Regulation and public 
private partnership’ (2002) 15(6) International Journal of Public Sector 
Management 487-495. 
30 Carr, The Canadian Council for Public Private Partnership, 1998, 
http:/home.infoamp.net/.partners/exford.html. 
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The economic recessions in the 1970s led governments to seek 
more efficient ways to provide services and infrastructure by 
contracting out. The USA and Great Britain were particularly 
fascinated by the privatization movement in the 1980s.31 The use of 
public asset sales, outsourcing, and divestitures of state owned 
enterprises became a vehicle for improved public service in a free 
market economy.32 
In Great Britain, the first attempts to establish a new type of 
contract were based on the problems in relation to the high degree of 
cost, the lack of competition and constructions of poor quality. In 
1998 Sir John Egan presented the report, Rethinking Construction,33 in 
which partnering was presented as a model for a new type of contract 
in the construction industry. The Egan report focused particularly on 
‘lean’ production and co-operation, and resulted in the development of 
the partnering concept.34 The British Government believed that a 
change in construction was necessary in order to create better contract 
conditions in support of better and more efficient buildings. Based on 
the results of the Egan report, the construction industry ended up with 
a new contract model using collaboration, negotiation and common 
utility - the partnering contract. In the report it was proposed that a 
binding collaborative contract may not be necessary.35 Today, 
however, t
Governments in the Member States need new types of co-
operation and contract agreements. This is one reason why the PPP 
contract is based on trust, co-operation and negotiation between the 
parties and is used when the need for co-operation is high.  
his idea has been abandoned. The first partnering model 
agreement came in 2000 as a binding contract concept. 
 
                                                          
31 N. Pongsiri, “Regulation and public private partnership” (2002) 15(6) 
International Journal of Public Sector Management 487-495. 
32 D. F. Kettl, Sharing Power, Public Governance and private 
markets,(Washington DC: Brookings. 1993). 
33 Sir John Egan, Rethinking Construction (London: Department of the 
Environment, Transport and the Regions, 1998). 
34 Sir John Egan, Rethinking Construction (London: Department of the 
Environment, Transport and the Regions, 1998). 
35 “Effective partnering does not rest on contracts. Contractors can add 
significantly to the cost of a project and often add no value for the client. If the 
relationship between a constructor and an employer is soundly based and the 
parties recognise their mutual interdependence, then formal contract documents 
should gradually become obsolete.” See Sir John Egan, Rethinking Construction 
(London: Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions, 1998). 
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3. The aim of PPP 
 
The aims of a PPP contract are to reduce the cost and price; to 
increase the quality; to reduce the risks and failures; to improve co-
ordination; and to share responsibility and capacity. Those objectives 
result in a shift of content in the contract.  
The PPPs can achieve additional value compared with other 
approaches if there is an effective implementation structure and if the 
objectives of all parties can be met within the partnership between the 
public and the private parties. 
There is a broad range of options for involving the private sector 
in public projects, for example, in regard to financing, physical 
development, operation, transport and environment. In one type of 
PPP, the public sector may retain all responsibility for financing, 
constructing, operating and maintaining assets, together with the 
responsibility for assuming all associated risks. In another type of 
PPP, the private sector might assume all of these responsibilities. The 
vast majority of PPP approaches fall in the middle of spectrum, with 
risks and responsibilities shared between the public sector and its 
private partners according to their strengths and weaknesses.36
In a contract where the risks and responsibilities are shared, the 
private party is often responsible for the funding, design, completion, 
implementation, service and maintenance of the project.
 
37
Normally, a traditional public contract is based on demands and 
concrete descriptions. To fulfil the objectives the PPP, the contract 
focuses on needs and functions, and it must be built on trust, 
transparency by open books, and co-operation between the parties.
 The 
incentive to build to reduce the cost of service and maintenance in the 
long run is heightened because the PPP concept provides the 
contractor with a compelling reason to create the cheapest building or 
infrastructure for a period of 20 to 30 years.  
38
                                                          
36 Commission (EC), ‘Guidelines for Successful Public Private Partnerships’ 
March 2003, p. 13. 
  
37 See Commission (EC), ‘Green Paper On Public-Private Partnerships And 
Community Law On Public Contracts And Concessions’ (Green Paper) COM 
(2004) 327 final, 30th April 2004 
38 Another legal constellation in regard to PPP is the Institutionalised Public-
Private Partnership (IPPP). See subsection 5.5. below for a definition of an IPPP. 
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The European Commission has set out the following reasons for 
establishing a PPP project:39
 
 
x the large financing requirement in the environment, 
infrastructure and transport sectors to upgrade and extend 
networks in line with the accession requirements and effective 
service provision 
x financial shortfall in available public funds, and the ability of 
international institutions to cover costs. 
x to gain some relevant advantages of PPP, for example: 
 Acceleration of infrastructure provision 
 Faster implementation  
 Reduced whole life costs  
 More optimal risk allocation  
 Improvement of the incentives to perform  
 Improve the quality of service 
 Generation of additional revenues in the private sectors 
 Transferring responsibility and enhanced public 
management  
 Increasing investments in general 
 Higher efficiency in the use of resources by joint utilities 
 Generating commercial value from public sector assets by  
joint utilities. 
 
 
3.1 PPP contract terms 
 
In the end the above mentioned factors can fulfill the main scope of a 
PPP agreement, which is to ensure joint utility between the parties, 
thereby ensuring the most efficient product at the lowest price. 
In contrast to a traditional public contract, it is the contractor who 
has the obligation to provide service and operation. The PPP contract 
must run for a period equal to the time it takes for the private party to 
regain the investment. This is the main reason for the long duration of 
PPP projects.  
By basing the contract on the needs of e.g. a school project, the 
public authority focuses on learning strategy, teaching environment, 
the differences in the learning abilities of pupils, etc. This is different 
                                                          
39 Commission (EC), ‘Guidelines for Successful Public Private Partnerships’ 
March 2003, p. 15. 
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from a traditional contract between those kinds of parties, in which the 
public party would instead focus on number of classrooms, number of 
square meters, types of furniture and facilities. In a PPP, such 
decisions are left to the private parties.  
This context of public procurement law is relevant because the 
PPP relationship is between a public and a private party. In many 
countries this type of relationship normally falls under the scope of 
public procurement law.  
For almost 20 years, the public sector in the EU and e.g. Great 
Britain have used PPP as an alternative to traditional public contracts, 
in most cases to great advantage.40
In the Green paper on PPP,
 The use of PPP is still increasing. 
With its 27 Member States and 500 million citizens, the European 
Union is a relevant international legal institution as regards Public 
Procurement Law and the impact on PPP.  
41
The distribution of risks between the public partner and the 
private partner is different. The risks generally borne by the public 
sector are transferred to the private party if this is efficient with 
regards to the transaction and the project.
 the EC Commission sets out some 
elements characterising PPPs. A PPP relationship has a relatively long 
duration, and involves co-operation between the public partner and the 
private partner on different aspects of a planned project. In some 
situations, public funds can be added to the private funds, but mostly 
the financing and funding comes from the private sector. The 
economic operator plays an important role, participating in all the 
different stages of the project (design, completion, implementation, 
funding). The public partner concentrates primarily on defining the 
objectives to be attained in terms of public interest, quality of services 
provided, and pricing policy, and it takes responsibility for monitoring 
compliance with these objectives. 
42
                                                          
40 In Great Britain, PPP is often used in construction and infrastructure projects. 
Some of the first PPP projects in Great Britain were arranged in 1996 by the Public 
Private Partnership Programme, the 4Ps. The 4Ps was initiated by the Local 
Authority Association in England and Wales and has all-Party support. It was 
launched in April 1996 with the purpose of identifying and assisting in delivering 
‘pathfinder’ projects in key sector areas, e.g. education, social services, IT, etc. to 
be used as models by other local authorities. See also www.4ps.gov.uk. 
  
41 See Commission (EC), ‘Green Paper On Public-Private Partnerships And 
Community Law On Public Contracts And Concessions’ (Green Paper) COM 
(2004) 327 final, 30th April 2004, p. 3.  
42 The Commission notes that a PPP does not necessarily entail that the private 
partner assumes all the risks, or even the major share of the risks linked to the 
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4. Structure of and parties in PPP projects 
 
When setting up the framework of a PPP, both the private party and 
the public party can generate substantial benefits for consumers and 
taxpayers. To achieve the benefits the parties must create a partnership 
which ensures that each party delivers what it does best in the most 
economically efficient manner. It is significant that the structure of the 
relationship between the parties seeks to provide the aim of value for 
money. This means, for example, that the structure divides the risks in 
the projects so the risks are borne by those best able to control them.  
In a PPP project, the private party becomes a long-term provider 
of services and infrastructure instead of simply delivering upfront 
asset builders. The public and the private party also share the 
responsibilities of designing, building, operating and possibly 
financing assets in order to deliver the services needed by the public 
sector.  
Collaboration with a long-term provider results in a new 
commitment from the public party to become increasingly involved as 
a regulator and to focus resources on service planning, performance 
monitoring and contract management rather than on the direct 
management and delivery of services. It is important to note that 
public bodies have a critical role to play in the management and 
regulation of PPPs during their design, construction and operation 
periods. PPPs also require effective contract monitoring procedures to 
ensure that contractual obligations continue to be met in terms of both 
quality and timing.43
 
 
 
5. The different types of PPP 
 
As stated above, neither national law, international law nor EU 
Community Law has a legal definition of PPP. Both PPPs regarding 
works and /or services are covered under the detailed provisions of the 
Public Procurement regulation. The lack of legal definition will be 
discussed further in chapter 6.  
                                                                                                                                                    
project. The precise distribution of risk is determined case by case, according to the 
respective ability of the parties concerned to assess, control and cope with this risk. 
43 Commission (EC), ‘Guidelines for Successful Public Private Partnerships’ 
March 2003, p. 17. 
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The European Commission suggests44
 
 that:  
the principal criteria for distinguishing a concession 
from PPP is the extent of risk transfer to the private 
party. This criterion will then also allow each type of 
PPP to be defined and related to the relevant legislation 
and methods for selecting private parties.  
While the choice of PPP structures is limitless in terms 
of financial and legal forms, the Commission is of the 
view that all PPPs can be defined in relation to the rules 
governing the choice of private partners and the 
selection and application of public procurement 
procedures.45
 
 
The illustration right below presents different types of PPPs; some 
with a minimal private involvement and some with maximal private 
sector involvement.  
                                                          
44 Commission (EC), ‘Interpretative Communication on Concessions’ 
(Communication) JOCE C/121, 29 April 2000. 
45 Commission (EC), ‘Guidelines for Successful Public Private Partnerships’ 
March 2003, p. 19. 
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Different types of PPP46
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Public Responsibility Private 
 Responsibility
      
Low degree of corporation High degree 
 of 
 corporation 
                                                          
46 The figure draws inspiration from Commission (EC), ‘Guidelines for Successful 
Public Private Partnerships’ March 2003. 
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5.1 Traditional Works or service contracts 
 
5.1.1 Service contracts 
 
Public agencies can enter into service contracts with private sector 
companies for the completion of specific tasks. These tasks could 
include areas such as operation, installation, maintenance, delivering 
of food and services, or technical support. Service contracts are well-
suited to operational requirements and may often focus on the 
procurement, operation and maintenance of new equipment. These 
types of service contracts are generally awarded by using public 
procurement regulation on a competitive basis, and extend from 
shorter periods of time, e.g. a few months, up to a few years.  
Most of the public partnership arrangements are made on a purely 
contractual basis, which means that there is no company set up 
between the public and private party. 
Instead of a building project, a public partnership in this type of 
contract concerns the delivery of a service, such as cleaning a school 
or a hospital, delivering food, or operating and maintaining public 
buildings. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 Source: C. Tvarnø47
                                                          
47 C. D. Tvarnø, ‘Public private partnership in the European Union’, in R. Nielsen 
and S. Treumer (eds.), The New EU Public Procurement Directives (Copenhagen: 
Djøf, 2005) pp. 183-194. 
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The service contract between the public party and the private 
party is based on a high degree of co-operation.48
 
 The public party 
benefits from the particular expertise of the private sector in managing 
staffing issues and achieving potential cost savings, but all 
management and investment responsibility remains with the public 
sector.  
 
5.1.2 Works contract 
 
A works contract builds on the framework of PPP, and therefore the 
co-operation is different from a traditional work contract. Normally, in 
a traditional work contract there are four or five contracts between the 
building owner, the adviser, the building contractor, the architect and 
the engineer and other suppliers.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
48 C. D. Tvarnø, Partnering mellem offentlige myndigheder og private 
virksomheder (Copenhagen: Julebog, 2003), p. 249. 
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 Source: C. Tvarnø49
In a partnering arrangement there is only one contract between the 
mentioned parties as shown in the figure above. All five or more 
parties are involved in the tender. By co-operating, they all contribute 
to finding the best and cheapest solution and they share the 
responsibility for the performance.  
 
The performance is based on the needs instead of the demands 
from the building owner, and therefore the partnering contract does 
not state exactly what the parties should perform, but instead how they 
will do it. 
 
 
5.2 BOT (build-operate-transfer) 
 
In a build-operate-transfer project (BOT), the contractual functions of 
the parties remain the same as in the building contract, but more 
responsibilities are passed on to the private party. In the BOT the 
partnership is more integrated in that it involves transferring 
responsibility for the design, construction, and operation of a single 
facility or group of assets to the private sector partner.  
The BOT concept combines responsibility for usually disparate 
functions – design, construction, and maintenance – under one single 
entity, which increases the efficiency. The project design can be 
tailored to the construction equipment and materials that will be used.  
Compared to a more traditional public contract under public 
procurement law, the contractor in a BOT is required to establish a 
long-term maintenance program up front, together with estimates of 
the associated costs. The idea is to benefit from the fact that the 
contractor’s detailed knowledge of the project design and the 
materials utilised can result in the development of a tailored 
maintenance plan over the project life that anticipates and addresses 
needs as they occur, thereby reducing the risk that issues will go 
unnoticed or unattended and then deteriorate into much more costly 
problems.  
 
 
                                                          
 
49 C. D. Tvarnø, ‘Public private partnership in the European Union’, in R. Nielsen 
and S. Treumer (eds.), The New EU Public Procurement Directives (Copenhagen: 
Djøf, 2005), pp. 183-194. 
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5.2.1 The service-works-BOT contract  
 
In both the service and the works contracts based on the PPP 
principles, the public party co-operates with the private party in order 
to share some of the responsibility for the service or operation with the 
private sector. The service providers or contractors can be paid on an 
incentive basis where they receive premiums for meeting specified 
service levels or performance targets. 
The service-works-BOT contract has a more broad-reaching scope 
involving the management of a series of facilities by the private 
sector, and, therefore, it must create a good opportunity in order to 
encourage both the public and the private sector’s involvement in the 
future.  
 
 
5.3 DBFO concession 
 
The DBFO (design-build-finance-operate) arrangement is based on 
the concession idea. A concession is rooted in the idea that the end 
price is paid by the users and that the level of financial support 
required from the government and other grantors depends on the 
concessionaire’s ability to implement the project. 
A concession agreement enables a private investment partner to 
finance, construct and operate a revenue-generating infrastructure 
improvement in exchange for the right to collect the associated 
revenues for a specified period of time. Concessions often extend for a 
period of 25 to 30 years, or even longer, and are normally awarded 
under the public procurement law and competitive bidding conditions.  
Traditionally, concessions are not directly defined under the scope of 
PPP and are, therefore, not covered by the scope of this text book.  
 
 
5.4 BOO (Building-Own-Operate)  
 
The BOO (Building-Own-Operate) concept is the most used in a PPP 
context. The performance in a BOO/PPP is focused on advice, design 
and architecture, works and construction, services, operation and 
maintenance. The duration of a BOO/PPP is normally 25-30 years, 
and the investments rest with the private party. 
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The BOO/PPP is a combination of the often used works contract 
(as described above) and the service contract. In most countries the 
use of PPP works and service contracts is widespread, and has been 
yielding good results. Both partnering building agreements and 
service partnership agreements are set up on the grounds that all 
investments are made by the public party, who pays the private party 
to build or supply. 
The BOO/PPP relationship is a combination between a works and 
a service agreement, combined with private financing and private 
ownership. In a BOO/PPP arrangement, the private party has all the 
investments in the building and the service.  
The contract and agreement between the parties are based on the 
premise that the parties optimise the joint utility of the transaction and 
not their own utility, and share all information by open books and 
calculations. The relationship is built on co-operation, trust and 
demands, facilitating the creation of the best and most efficient 
product. The parties still share the responsibility and cost of failures. 
 
 
5.4.1 The BOO/PPP contract 
 
The basis of the BOO/PPP agreement is co-operation, which affects 
the content of the contract. In a BOO/PPP contract the parties are 
bound by the following obligations50
 
: 
x The parties optimise the transaction, which means they optimise 
joint utility and not their own utility. 
x The parties share all information. They have open books and 
calculations.  
x The relationship is built on co-operation and trust. 
x The Parties do not know the final product at the beginning. 
Instead the public party’s needs are the focus. 
x The process is more important than the end product because the 
process facilitates the creation of the best and most efficient 
product. 
x The parties share the responsibility and cost of failures. 
 
                                                          
50 C. D. Tvarnø, ’Nogle særlige karakteristika ved partnering aftaler i 
byggebranchen’ (2003) 45  UFR 366; and C. D. Tvarnø, Partnering - En 
aftaleretlig udfordring (Copenhagen: RETTID, 2002), p. 74. 
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5.5 Definition of Institutional Public Private Partnerships - IPPP 
 
Pursuant to EC law, an IPPP is either a jointly held legal entity created 
by a public authority and a private party with the task of ensuring the 
delivery of a work of service for the benefit of the public, or an IPPP 
is being set up in situations where a private party takes control of 
some part of an existing public undertaking.51
In both situations, the private party will own a part of the stocks 
and control in the legal entity.
  
52
The Commission explained that an IPPP ‘involves the 
establishment of an entity held jointly by the public partner and the 
private partner’.
 Apart from the equity, both the public 
and the private party participate actively in the operation of the 
contracts awarded to the public-private entity and in the management 
of the joint company.  
53 By changing the investment structure in relation to 
a work or service, the Government can offer a work or service that 
would perhaps not otherwise be offered to the citizens. At the same 
time, an IPPP can ensure more efficient services and infrastructure 
projects based on the public needs, public and private funding, risk, 
know-how, and an efficient change in both parties’ incentives.54
The EC rules apply when private partners are chosen for IPPP. 
According to the Commission, whether the Public Procurement 
Directives or the general EC Treaty principles apply to the selection 
procedure of the private partner depends on the nature of the task 
 
                                                          
51 In Commission (EC), ‘Interpretative Communication on the Application of 
Community Law on Public Procurement and Concessions to Institutionalised 
Public-Private Partnerships (PPP)’ (Communication) C (2007) 6661, 5th February 
2008, it states that the Commission understands an IPPP as ‘a co-operation 
between public and private parties involving the establishment of a mixed capital 
entity which performs public contracts or concessions.’ Thus, an IPPP can be set 
up in relation to a public task, either by creating a jointly held entity or in situations 
where the private party takes control of an existing public undertaking.  
52 An IPPP can also be described as a joint venture company, as defined in S. 
Arrowsmith, ‘Public Private Partnerships and the European Procurement Rules: EU 
Policies in Conflict?’ (2000) 37 Common Market Law Review 709-737, p. 720.  
53 Commission (EC), ‘Green Paper on public-private partnerships and Community 
Law on Public Contracts and Concessions’ (Green Paper), COM (2004) 327 final, 
30th April 2004. 
54 Considering the positive effects from setting up an IPPP, it is remarkable that the 
number of IPPPs is very low in some Member States. 
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(public contract or concession) to be attributed to the IPPP.55
The EC procurement rules and principles cannot be avoided by 
claiming that the IPPP task is in-house. When the public authority 
holds part of the IPPP capital and one or more private parties also 
holds parts of the IPPP capital, the IPPP is defined as a company 
legally distinct from the public authority. In the Stadt Halle case,
 If the 
task falls within the material scope of the Procurement Directives, the 
public authorities must comply with the EC procurement rules when 
setting up and contracting with an IPPP.  
56 the 
ECJ concluded that the Directive must always be applied when a 
contracting authority intends to conclude a contract (relating to 
services within the material scope of procurement Directive)57 with a 
company legally distinct from it, in which the public authority holds 
capital together with one or more private undertakings.58
The ECJ is thus clearly stating that private capital investment in 
an undertaking follows considerations proper to private interests and 
  
                                                          
55 Thus, Community law is neutral as regards whether public authorities choose to 
provide an economic activity themselves or to entrust it to a third party. See also 
Commission (EC), ‘Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions, on Public-Private Partnerships and Community Law on 
Public Procurement and Concessions’ (Communication) COM (2005) 569, 15th 
November 2005, section 1. 
56 Case C-26/03 Stadt Halle and RPL Lochau [2005] E.C.R. I-00001. In the Stadt 
Halle case the ECJ concluded, in regard to the in-house situation, that the Directive 
must always be applied when a contracting authority intends to conclude a contract 
for pecuniary interest relating to services within the material scope of the 
procurement Directive (the ECJ referred to the Council Directive (EC) 92/50 
relating to the co-ordination of procedures for the award of public service contracts 
[1992] OJ L209/1 in the Stadt Halle case, but this also applies for the Council 
Directive (EC) 2004/18 on the co-ordination of procedures for the award of public 
works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts [2004] OJ 
L134/114 with a joint company, as e.g. an IPPP. This means that the IPPP can only 
be awarded a public contract if the joint company wins the contract in a 
competition under the procurement rules. See also S. Arrowsmith, The Law of 
Public and Utilities Procurement (2nd ed., London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2005), p. 
392. 
57 The ECJ referred to the Council Directive (EC) 92/50 relating to the co-
ordination of procedures for the award of public service contracts [1992] OJ 
L209/1 but this must still be the case concerning Council Directive (EC) 2004/18 
on the co-ordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public 
supply contracts and public service contracts [2004] OJ L134/114. 
58 This means that in this situation the public award procedures laid down by the 
Directive must always be applied; see the Stadt Halle case, Paragraph 52. 
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pursues objectives of a different kind than considerations and 
requirements proper to the pursuit of objectives in the public 
interest.59 If the award of a public contract to a semi-public company 
takes place without calling for tenders, this will, according to the ECJ, 
interfere with the objective of free and undistorted competition and the 
principle of equal treatment.60 If the task is covered by the 
procurement Directives and the IPPP is not procured in the correct 
legal way, the IPPP would have an advantage over its competitors, 
which would interfere with the objective of free and undistorted 
competition and the principle of equal treatment.61
The Commission has published an interpretative communication
 
62 
that, according to the Commission, will clarify ‘the rule of the game’. 
The Commission concludes that the aim of the interpretative 
communication is to enhance legal certainty and alleviate the concerns 
that procurement rules and EC law in general would make IPPPs 
unattractive or impossible to carry out.63
The question is whether this is the best solution, and whether this 
approach will succeed. The reasons for publishing the IPPP 
interpretation communication C (2007) 6661 were the perceived lack 
of legal certainty in the Member States in relation to the involvement 
  
                                                          
59 Stadt Halle, Paragraph 50. 
60 Stadt Halle, Paragraph 51. 
61 The only exemption to the main in-house rule in the Stadt Halle case is, 
according to the ECJ, if the public authority can perform the tasks conferred on it 
in the public interest by using its own administrative, technical and other resources 
without being obliged to call on outside entities. In an IPPP this situation will never 
be relevant, since the public authority will always call upon external entities, as this 
is the aim and purpose of setting up the IPPP. Thus, it follows from Paragraph 49 
in the Stadt Halle case that, if the public authority itself performed the tasks in the 
public interest for which it is responsible by its own means, without calling upon 
external entities, the EC rules do not apply. The ECJ referred to, Case C-458/03 
Parking Brixen [2005] E.C.R. I-8585, Paragraph 61, second part. 
62 Commission (EC), ‘The Commission Interpretative Communication on the 
Application of Community Law on Public Procurement and Concessions to 
Institutionalised Public Private Partnerships (IPPPs)’ (Communication), C (2007) 
6661, 5th February 2008. 
63 R. William, ‘The Commission Interpretative Communication on the Application 
of Community Law on Public Procurement and Concessions to Institutionalised 
Public Private Partnerships (IPPPs)’ (2008) 17 (4) Public Procurement Law Review 
NA116. 
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of private partners and the risk that the IPPP’s would not comply with 
EC Law.64
According to C (2007) 6661, the Commission does not consider a 
double tendering procedure to be practical. The Commission interprets 
the EC law in such a way that one tendering procedure suffices, and 
the procedure applies when selecting the private partner in an IPPP 
set-up.
  
65
In C (2007) 6661, the Commission recommends that the invitation 
to tender includes information on the public contracts to be awarded to 
the future public-private entity; the statutes of association; the 
shareholder agreement; all elements governing the contractual 
relationship between the contracting entity and the private partner; and 
all future adjustments concerning the task.  
 Either the Public Procurement Directives or the general EC 
Treaty principles apply to the selection procedure of the private 
partner in the IPPP. Hence, the IPPP must be set up by a fair and 
transparent procedure.  
Thus, when setting up an IPPP, it is not necessary to make one 
procedure for selecting the private partner to the IPPP and another 
tendering procedure for awarding public contracts to the IPPP after the 
establishment of the IPPP.66
The lack of a legal definition of the IPPP is a problem because EC 
law does not consider co-operation to be the key element in a 
successful IPPP. Both parties must have influence on the IPPP project. 
 
                                                          
64 This legal uncertainty and risk can discourage both public authorities and private 
parties from entering into an IPPP at all. This risk constitutes a problem since 
public authorities at all levels are interested in types of co-operations with the 
private sector, and this interest is increasing in the Member States. The interest in 
constructing IPPPs is increasing because of national needs for ensuring 
infrastructure and services; see Commission (EC), ‘Public Procurement: 
Commission issues guidance on setting up Institutionalised Public-Private 
Partnerships – Frequently Asked Questions’ (Memo) MEMO/08/95, 18th February 
2008. The IPPP interpretation communication therefore sets out, as a legal 
guidance to the Member States ,the Commission’s understanding of how the 
Community provisions on most types of public procurement and concessions are to 
be applied to the funding and operation an IPPP. The interpretation communication 
does not create new rules concerning IPPPs; rather, it reflects the Commission’s 
understanding of the rules in the procurement Directive and the EC treaty, and the 
relevant case law by the ECJ. 
65 See Commission (EC), ‘Public Procurement: Commission issues guidance on 
setting up Institutionalised Public-Private Partnerships – Frequently Asked 
Questions’ (Memo) MEMO/08/95, 18th February 2008.  
66 The Commission concludes in C (2007) 6661 that simple capital injections made 
by private investors into publicly owned companies do not constitute an IPPP. 
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However, the public procurement rules prescribe that the public party 
in the tender procedure sets out all of the conditions and that only 
minor matters can be changed after the award; otherwise, a new 
procedure must be set up. These rules do not support the key element 
of co-operation. The Commission does not take into consideration that 
both PPPs and IPPPs have very specific characteristics with regards to 
co-operation and output which are not reflected in the EC public 
procurement rules.  
The lack of acknowledgement of the co-operation and the need for 
negotiation between the parties is troublesome. The main priority of 
the present legislation is equal treatment, transparency and free 
movement, which are all fundamental principles in the European 
Union. However, the citizens, the private parties, and the public 
authorities must also be allowed to achieve the most efficient 
agreement and outcome when undertaking an IPPP.  
The lack of legal definition and the ban on negotiation are 
analysed and commented in chapter 6. 
 
 
6. The economics behind PPP 
 
A partnership can function only where organising the project 
between partners leads to a greater economic benefit than there would 
be otherwise.  
One significant objective of a PPP contract is to ensure the 
common utility by co-operation, open books, trust, negotiation, 
focusing on needs instead of demands, and the sharing of 
responsibility. As stated by McQuaid:  
 
The main assumption for using partnerships is that partners 
are not in a zero (or rather constant) sum game. By co-
operating the total output is increased for a given level of 
resources.67
 
 
If the parties are not allowed to negotiate and co-operate with each 
other, it is not possible to achieve the common utility: a better and 
cheaper product. This discussion is elaborated in chapter 6 below. 
                                                          
67 See also R. W. McQuaid, ‘The theory of partnerships: why have partnership?’, in 
S. P. Osborne (ed), Public-Private Partnerships: Theory and Practice in 
International Perspective (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 19. 
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The partnership can increase both joint and individual efficiency 
through improved co-ordination.68
The objectives of the partnership are to: 
  
 
x Reduce the cost and price 
x Increase the quality 
x Reduce the risk 
x Reduce the failures 
x Improve the co-ordination 
x Share capacity between the parties 
 
These factors may in the end reduce tax rates. By gaining these 
advantages the parties are allowing each partner to gain from the 
partnership, while still retaining party autonomy. These are important 
issues when public authorities in an urban economic development are 
aiming to create wealth, sustainability, social security and 
employment..69
 
 The results of partnering have been too good for 
governments to ignore. 
 
 
7. PPP in a public procurement law reality 
 
Public contracts, such as partnering contracts and PPP contracts, will 
normally fall under the scope of public procurement law. Neither 
national legislation70
                                                          
68 R McQuaid, ‘The theory of partnerships: why have partnership?’, in S. P. 
Osborne (ed), Public-Private Partnerships: Theory and Practice in International 
Perspective (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 21. 
 nor the EU has legal rules that specifically cover 
the PPP arrangement in regard to public contract rules. The EU public 
procurement law is based on the common market and the elimination 
69 See also R. McQuaid, ‘The theory of partnerships: why have partnership?’, in S. 
P. Osborne (ed), Public-Private Partnerships: Theory and Practice in International 
Perspective (London: Routledge, 2000),p. 25. 
70 A few countries have enacted specific national rules covering PPP: Brazil 
enacted a PPP act in December 2004, designed to encourage investments for 
crucially needed infrastructure projects. See Law No. 11.078, D.O.U.31 Dec., 2004 
and also C.V. Filho and J.B.Lee, ‘Brazil’s New Public-Private Partnership Law: 
One Step forward, Two Step Back’(2005) 22(5) Journal of International 
Arbitration 419-426. 
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of barriers to trade in goods between Member States and barriers to 
movement in business, labour and capital.71
The political and economic reasoning behind the common market 
is grounded in the economic theory of comparative advantages.
  
72 The 
purpose of the public procurement law is to ensure an opening up of 
the public procurement market.73
The public procurement law has several objectives, such as the 
elimination of corruption and the increased effectiveness of good 
public services and government. The procurement rules ensure that the 
government applies the highest professional standards when it spends 
money on behalf of taxpayers.  
 The public procurement Directives 
set out the legal framework for public procurement. The legislation, 
directives and model laws apply when public authorities and utilities 
seek to acquire goods, services, civil engineering or building works. 
The importance of these in relation to PPP is that the principles in the 
public procurement law set out rules and procedures which must be 
followed before awarding a PPP contract. 
Competition is one cornerstone of public sector procurement. 
Maintaining market interest or the creation of a market are also 
significant elements in public procurement regulation. In markets with 
no or limited competition, the procurement rules can undertake market 
soundings. Other objectives of the public procurement law are: to 
ensure fairness and equal treatment; to improve procurement 
practices; to open up the competition; and to lower the overall prices. 
The basic principles to obtaining these goals are transparency, non-
discrimination, equal treatment, proportionality and competition. All 
these objectives will be discussed and analysed later on in the book. 
 
                                                          
71 Thus, a public contract depends on the respect of the procurement rules, the 
respect of the fundamental principle of competition concerning equal access to the 
market, the ban on anti-competitive agreements, and economic and financial 
equilibrium of the projects.  
72 See P. Krugmann and M. Obstfeld, International Economics, Theory and Policy 
(6th ed., London: Addison-Weslet, 2003), part I. 
73 S. Arrowsmith, The Law of Public and Utilities Procurement, (2nd ed., London: 
Sweet & Maxwell, 2005), p. 121; C. H. Bovis, EU Public Procurement Law 
(Cheltenham: Elgar European Law, 2007), p. 52 and M. Burnett, Public-Private-
Partnerships (PPP) – A Decision Maker’s Guide (Maastricht: Institut Européen 
d’Administration Publique, 2007). 
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Legal analysis 
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Chapter 3  
 
 
 
PPP and WTO Procurement Law 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The World Trade Organisation (WTO) aims at facilitating the global 
trade flow of goods and services. Today, the term ‘globalisation’ has 
become a popular means of describing different global exchanges, 
including economic exchanges.74 In a WTO context, ‘economic 
globalisation’ has been defined as the process of integrating the global 
trade of goods and services, and the opening up of borders for foreign 
direct investment.75
This chapter concerns the WTO government procurement rules. 
As was described in chapter 2, government procurement law is 
relevant to PPPs in order to ensure transparency, non-discrimination 
and competition in the market. It is necessary to ensure these 
principles internationally through international rules dealing with PPP 
and government procurement. For example, the complex character of 
a PPP opens the possibility for potential private suppliers to bribe the 
governmental institutions in developing countries.
 Globalisation has a clear impact on PPP; a private 
enterprise might be interested in engaging in a partnership with a 
public entity from a foreign state, or a state might be interested in 
attracting foreign investment through a PPP.  
76
                                                          
74 See more about the concept of ‘globalisation’ and global regulation in L. Boulle, 
The Law of Globalization: An Introduction (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law 
International, 2009). 
 The WTO rules 
concern international trade between states, and the WTO procurement 
rules facilitate the access of a supplier to the procurement in a foreign 
75 See World Trade Organisation, World Trade Report 2008: Trade in a 
Globalising World, p. 15. 
76 OECD. ‘Ensuring the Efficient Use of Public-Private Partnerships in MENA 
Countries’(2010) 8 OECD Governance 210-233, at p. 218. 
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State, but at the same time they ensure the transparency in the 
procurement process to eliminate corruption.  
The WTO rules only apply in cross-border transactions – not in 
intra-domestic situations. They also only apply to situations where a 
WTO Member is imposing trade obstacles to the importation of goods 
or services from another WTO Member. For example, if a public 
entity in the EU wants to enter into a PPP arrangement, the WTO rules 
on government procurement provide that a bidder in, for example, 
Singapore shall be treated in a non-discriminatory manner. The WTO 
rules will not apply to internal situations. For example, if the 
government in Singapore imposes some restrictions on its internal 
production with no effect on the importation of like products, then the 
WTO rules will not apply.  
Compared to the general WTO framework with its 153 Members, 
the WTO government procurement rules have a lower number of state 
parties. Furthermore, the parties to the WTO government procurement 
rules have made different commitments. For example, the different 
parties have different commitments in relation to which services or 
products are covered by the WTO procurement rules. The central 
WTO agreement on government procurement is the Agreement on 
Government Procurement (GPA). The GPA is the main focus in this 
analysis of WTO procurement law and PPPs.  
In order to get a full picture and understanding of the GPA, an 
analysis of the GPA must include a general WTO context as well as a 
public international law context. The GPA is under the WTO 
framework, which includes the general WTO principles and the WTO 
Dispute Settlement System. However, the WTO cannot be examined 
in isolation from public international law. The WTO agreements, 
including the GPA, must be interpreted in accordance with the 
customary rules of interpretation of public international law; public 
international law fills in the gaps where the WTO agreements are 
silent.77
The question is whether the GPA in its present form is sufficient 
to cope with PPPs. One major challenge is the lack of signatories, in 
particular from developing and least-developed countries, to the GPA. 
  
This chapter is divided into 2 parts. Part 1.2 concerns WTO as a 
legal system. The WTO is largely based on treaties between nations 
and must be seen in the context of public international law. Part 1.3 
focuses on the GPA.  
                                                          
77 See more in section 2.2. 
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2. WTO Law and PPP 
 
 
2.1 PPP and the WTO Members 
 
Several WTO Members use PPPs in projects concerning 
infrastructure, communication, etc. For example, in Bangladesh, 
private parties are encouraged to invest in public infrastructural 
projects.78 Indonesia carries out a PPP project concerning the supply 
of drinking water.79 Macao uses PPPs in the energy sector.80 In 
Mongolia, the Government has facilitated the development of 
information and communications infrastructure by entering into PPP 
arrangements.81 The Myanmar Ministry of Hotels and Tourism has 
enhanced the use of PPPs concerning marketing activities for tourism 
in Myanmar.82 The Philippines has enacted the Build-Operate-
Transfer Law to attract private investments in the development of 
infrastructure.83
                                                          
78 Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh Ministry of Finance, 
‘Country Paper on Infrastructure Development with Focus on Public-private 
partnerships’ (2007), p. 9, at: 
 The Eastern African Submarine Cable System 
(EASSy) aims at connecting 21 African countries by establishing 
<http://www.unescap.org/ttdw/ppp/reports/Bangladesh_10July2007.pdf> accessed 
30 November 2010. 
79 Indonesia, ‘Country Paper on Public-private partnerships for Infrastructure 
Development in Indonesia’ (2007), p. 17, at: 
<http://www.unescap.org/ttdw/ppp/reports/Indonesia_2July2007.pdf.> accessed 30 
November 2010. 
80Macao, Special Administrative Region, China, ‘Country Report on Infrastructure, 
Macao, China’ (2007) at: 
<http://www.unescap.org/ttdw/ppp/reports/Macao_31May2007.pdf.> accessed 30 
November 2010. 
81 ICT Authority of Mongolia, ‘Information and Communication Technology 
Sector Development in Mongolia’ ,(2007), pp. 4-5, at: 
<http://www.unescap.org/ttdw/ppp/countryreports.html.> accessed 30 November 
2010. 
82 Myanmar, ‘Country Report on Infrastructure Development with Focus on Public-
Private Partnerships (PPP)’ (2007), p. 38, at:  
<http://www.unescap.org/ttdw/ppp/reports/Myanmar_6july2007.pdf > accessed 30 
November 2010. 
83 Philippines, ‘Philippine Country Report on Infrastructure’ (2006), pp. 5-6, at:  
<http://www.unescap.org/ttdw/ppp/reports/Philippines_4Jan2006.pdf > accessed 
30 November 2010. 
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partnerships between governmental entities and private investors.84 
MSC Malaysia has an e-Government program which depends on 
private investments in PPP.85 In Kenya, AIDS information is provided 
by mobile phone by interactive voice response, WAP and SMS 
technology from a PPP.86 The PPP model is also used widely within 
the EU Member States87 and in the US.88
International organisations work to propagate the PPP instrument 
as a means of enhancing improvements in infrastructure. In particular, 
these organisations suggest that developing and least-developed 
countries use the PPP model as a means to overcome infrastructural 
problems. The United Nations Economic and Social Commission for 
Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP) addressed PPPs at the ‘High-level 
Expert Group Meeting on PPPs for Infrastructure Development’ in 
2007.
 
89 The World Bank Institute, which is the World Bank’s 
principal provider of learning services, focuses specifically on PPPs as 
important tools to deliver essential public services such as 
infrastructure, health and education.90
In the WTO, different committees recommend States to enhance 
the use of PPPs. For example, in the field of capacity building for food 
standards, the Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
under the WTO has improved the collaboration with the Food and 
 
                                                          
84 ICT Regulation Toolkit, Practice Note: Public-Private Partnerships in the 
telecommunications and ICT sector, at: 
<http://www.ictregulationtoolkit.org/en/PracticeNotes.html.> accessed 30 
November 2010. 
85 ibid. 
86 Danida, ‘PPP, Partnership With a Purpose, Corporate Social Responsibility: 
Support Facilities in the Public Private Partnership Programme’ (2006), p. 8, at: 
<http://amg.um.dk/nr/rdonlyres/7c67fb92-9f8f-476b-8867-
a5216e6434a1/0/publicprivatepartnershipprogramme.pdf> accessed 30 November 
2010. 
87 PPPs are, for example, used in the educational sector and in healthcare in the 
United Kingdom; see N. Maltby, ‘Current Developments in the United Kingdom’ 
(2010) 5 (2) European Public Private Partnership Review 120-123. In Portugal, 
PPPs have been used in the road sector; see D. Duarte de Campos, ‘Changes in the 
Road Sector’ (2010) 5 (2) European Public Private Partnership Review 119-120. 
88 See, for example, Oregon Telecommunications Coordinating Council, ‘Public-
Private Partnerships for Telecommunication in Oregon’ (2003), pp. 7-10, at: 
<http://www.ortcc.org/PDF/PPPartnerships.pdf> accessed 30 November 2010. 
89 See: <http://www.unescap.org/ttdw/common/TPT/ppp/egm_ppp_oct07.asp> 
accessed 30 November 2010. 
90 See: <http://wbi.worldbank.org/wbi/about/topics/public-private-partnerships> 
accessed 30 November 2010. 
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Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) and World 
Health Organisation (WHO). Together with the World Organisation 
for Animal Health (OIE) and Industry Council for Development 
(ICD), the latter organisations are reviewing the means of increasing 
the use of PPP in order to enhance the capacity building for food and 
water supply for the global needs.91
Even though the PPPs have become an international recognised 
concept and are applied in a global scale, there is no clear 
international agreement or provision in the GPA specifically dealing 
with PPPs and government procurement. PPPs are often of a complex 
nature, both in terms of their intended output, and their institutional 
aspects. This complexity has led the EU to introduce more flexible 
rules for competitive dialogue between the public entity and the 
potential suppliers in order to define the actual intended output based 
on the needs of the public entity.
  
92 The United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe questions whether the traditional rules on 
government procurement suffice to cover the complexities of 
establishing PPPs.93
 
 In particular, the lack of flexibility in government 
procurement law might be an obstacle to fruitful co-operation between 
public entities and private parties. However, they must also aim to 
avoid abuse and corruption, which may result from rules which are too 
flexible. 
 
2.2 The WTO and Its Legal Character 
 
The WTO is concerned with international trade in goods and services. 
There are 153 Members of the WTO, and 30 states currently hold an 
                                                          
91 Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, ‘Capacity Building for 
Food Standards and Regulations’ (16 June 2009) G/SPS/GEN/938,  section III.  
92 Directive (EC) 2004/18 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 
March 2004 on the Co-ordination of Procedures for the Award of Public Contracts, 
Public Supply Contracts, and of Public Service Contracts [2004] OJ L 134/114, 
Article 29. See also Commission (EC), ‘Green Paper on public-private partnerships 
and Community law on public contracts and concessions’ (Green Paper) COM 
(2004) 327 final,30 April 2004,. 
93 United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, Guidebook on Promoting 
Good Governance in Public-Private Partnerships (Geneva: United Nations, 2008), 
pp. 4-5. 
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observer status in the WTO. Also, several organisations are granted 
observer status in the WTO. The WTO has two important functions:94
1. The WTO is an international forum for its 153 members to 
negotiate trade rules and to address the different challenges that follow 
from increased globalisation. The increase of, and demand for, global 
transactions of goods and services requires a decrease in national and 
regional trade barriers.  
  
2. The WTO monitors the different WTO trade agreements and 
provides enforcement mechanisms if a WTO member violates another 
member’s right under the trade rules. The WTO provides different 
legal means to ensure the reduction of trade barriers.  
The legal character of the WTO system is reflected in both the 
trade agreements, the institutions to monitor and supervise the WTO 
members, and the Dispute Settlement Body to settle disputes between 
WTO Members. The WTO, as a legal system based on trade 
agreements and with the Dispute Settlement Body, is part of public 
international law. Public international law is a system of rules with the 
states as the primary subjects and primary actors in the creation of 
law.95 The creation of public international law is primarily 
decentralised, in contrast to national law, where there is a central body 
to create law.96 The GPA must be seen in that light. The GPA is an 
international agreement based on states’ consent, but the GPA cannot 
be seen in isolation from public international law.97
PPPs are a direct effect of globalisation with its need for free trade 
between states;
 Public 
international law will fill any gaps in the GPA and can serve as 
context in the interpretation of the GPA.  
98
                                                          
94 See Art. III of the WTO Agreement. 
 therefore, the WTO trade rules are an important legal 
95 It is a point of contention whether states can be bound by international rules of 
law to which they have not consented.  
96 See, for example, J. Pauwelyn, ‘The Role of Public International Law in the 
WTO: How Far Can We Go?’ (2001) 95 American Journal of International Law 
535-578. 
97 See also I. Van Damme, Treaty Interpretation by the WTO Appellate Body 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 358-359; and G. Marceau, ‘Conflict 
of Norms and Conflict of Jurisdictions – The Relationship between the WTO 
Agreement and MEAs and other Treaties’ (2001) 35 (6) Journal of World Trade 
1081-1131. 
98 See also chapter 2 above and C. D. Tvarnø, ‘Public private partnership in the 
European Union’, in R. Nielsen and S. Treumer (eds.), The New EU Public 
Procurement Directives (Copenhagen: Djøf, 2005), pp. 183-194. 
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tool for ensuring that national and regional legislation on government 
procurement aids openness to foreign suppliers participating in PPPs. 
The public entity of states parties to the GPA must be familiar with 
the rules of the GPA.  
Both Multi-National Enterprises and national enterprises must 
also be aware of WTO procurement law to monitor that their bidding 
on a PPP contract is treated in accordance with WTO law. Even 
though WTO law does not create direct rights for private parties in the 
WTO system -  i.e. the Dispute Settlement System in the WTO applies 
only to States - a private party can either try its case at the domestic 
courts or through other national enforcement mechanisms in the 
country of the government procurement, or the private party can 
persuade its own government to file a complaint against the country 
which has violated WTO procurement law.      
The following sections focus on the legal character of the WTO. 
The first section explains the aim of the WTO. The next section 
concerns WTO and government procurement law. The following 
section describes WTO as a rule-oriented system that is a legal system 
with some political aspects. Finally, the sources of law relevant to 
government procurement law of the WTO are described.  
 
 
2.2.1 The Aim of the WTO 
 
It follows from the aim of the WTO Agreement that the parties are: 
 
Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and 
economic endeavour should be conducted with a view to 
raising standards of living, ensuring full employment 
and a large and steadily growing volume of real income 
and effective demand, and expanding the production of 
and trade in goods and services, while allowing for the 
optimal use of the world’s resources in accordance with 
the objective of sustainable development, seeking both 
to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance 
the means for doing so in a manner consistent with their 
respective needs and concerns at different levels of 
economic development, 
Recognizing further that there is need for positive efforts 
designed to ensure that developing countries, and 
especially the least developed among them, secure a 
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share in the growth in international trade commensurate 
with the needs of their economic development.99
 
 
Hence, the WTO has two important purposes. First, the WTO 
aims at facilitating trade between its Members. This is reflected in the 
different WTO agreements, which aim at reducing trade barriers. 
Secondly, the WTO aims at securing for developing and least 
developed countries a share of international trade. For example, some 
of the WTO cornerstones, which are briefly touched upon below, have 
special exceptions for developing and least-developed countries.  
The WTO provides a range of different Agreements in order to 
fulfil the aims of the WTO. Those different WTO agreements are all 
annexed to the overall WTO Agreement, the Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the WTO (the WTO Agreement). Most of the agreements 
under the WTO Agreement are multilateral, i.e. they are binding on all 
the WTO members. Here, the GPA is an exception. The GPA is 
plurilateral, i.e. it is not a general agreement but has a smaller number 
of signatories. 
The different agreements in the WTO system can broadly be 
categorised into three areas concerning goods, services, and 
intellectual property rights. The different WTO agreements, including 
the GPA, have some common traits which reflect the general aims of 
the WTO (which are also the cornerstones of the WTO):  
x Non-Discrimination: the WTO builds upon two important non-
discrimination principles. 1) the Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) 
principle, i.e. members must not discriminate between its 
trading partners; 2) the National Treatment principle, i.e. 
members must not discriminate between national and foreign 
goods, services and investments. The National treatment 
principle is directly written into the GPA. The MFN principle, 
although with some reservations and another label,100
1.3.2.1
 is also in 
the GPA. See more in section ; 
x Market access: through negotiation rounds, the general level of 
trade obstacles for goods and services has been decreased, for 
example by tariff reductions and by eliminating non-tariff 
barriers like rules on import licensing. The GPA is, by its very 
nature, promoting market access for foreign suppliers in 
                                                          
99 WTO Agreement, preamble. 
100 In the GPA, the MFN principle is categorised as ‘non-discrimination principle’. 
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government procurement and is opening up for foreign direct 
investment;  
x Unfair trade: the WTO market access principle must be 
weighed against rules on fair competition. A WTO Member is 
allowed to impose country-specific duties and thereby exempt 
the MFN principle and the market access principle in situations 
where the imported products are being subsidised by the 
exporting country, or when the exporting producer is dumping 
the prices. The GPA also has written unfair trade rules into its 
purpose and text. For example, a public entity must not seek 
advice from a potential supplier/partner to a PPP if the 
competition would, through this, be precluded. See more in 
section 1.3.4.1.2;  
x Special differential rules for developing and least-developed 
countries: The different WTO agreements allow developing 
and least-developed countries to make exceptions from the 
national treatment principle and the MFN principle in order to 
enhance the local production. The GPA also contains special 
and differential rules for developing and least-developed 
countries, although the GPA has not appealed to developing 
and least-developed countries yet. See more in section 1.3.2.3. 
 
 
2.2.2 The WTO and Government Procurement Law 
 
The WTO has its roots in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) from 1947.101
                                                          
101 GATT was both the name of the agreement and the name of the organisation 
between 1948 and 1994, until the WTO came to life in 1995. Under the WTO 
umbrella, there is an agreement, GATT 1994, based on the GATT 1947. GATT 
1994 consists of the provisions of GATT 1947. Therefore, when reference is made 
to GATT 1994, GATT 1947 must be consulted. For a thorough examination of the 
pre-GATT and GATT negotiations concerning government procurement and 
GATT, see: G. Marceau and A. Blank, ‘History of the government procurement 
negotiations since 1945’ (1996) Public Procurement Law Review 77-147. 
 GATT 1947 concerned only trade in goods, 
and government purchases were explicitly exempted from the 
agreement. As the years passed, some GATT Contracting Parties, 
mainly developed countries, wanted to regulate governmental 
purchases under the GATT multilateral framework. However, those 
countries did not succeed in persuading the other GATT Contracting 
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Parties toward such an agreement. Instead, the GPA was created as a 
plurilateral agreement, only binding a few of the GATT Contracting 
Parties.  
When the WTO was established in 1995, the GPA was amended, 
but it continued as a plurilateral agreement. The GPA has not appealed 
to several developing and least-developed countries, which are not 
under the obligations of the GPA concerning government 
procurement.102
Government procurements of goods are exempted from the 
National Treatment principle in the GATT 1994, Article III. 8(a). It is 
unclear and debated in literature whether government procurements 
are exempted from the MFN principle in Article I of the GATT 1994. 
Some, including many of the GPA members, argue that this principle 
does not apply to government procurement.
 The scope of WTO law in relation to procedures for 
public entities’ procurement when establishing PPPs are, therefore, 
more limited in comparison with the general trade facilitating rules in 
the multilateral agreements of GATT 1994, the successor to GATT 
1947, and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).  
103 The alternative view is 
that the MFN principle does apply, since there is no explicit exception 
written into the GATT; based on a textual approach, this may indicate 
that the MFN principle in GATT applies to government 
procurement.104
In relation to services, government procurements are explicitly 
exempted from the MFN principle, the National Treatment principle 
and market access. However, GATS Article XIII.1 and GATS Article 
  
                                                          
102 See, for example, A. Kovacs, ‘The Global Procurement Harmonisation 
Initiative’ (2004) Public Procurement Law Review 15-38, at p. 18; V. Guimaraes 
De Lima e Silva, ‘The revision of the WTO Agreement on Government 
Procurement: to what extent might it contribute to the expansion of current 
membership?’ (2008) Public Procurement Law Review 61-98; V. Rege, 
‘Transparency in Government Procurement – Issues of Concern and Interest to 
Developing Countries’ (2001) 35 (4)  Journal of World Trade 489-515. 
103  S. Arrowsmith Government Procurement in the WTO (The Hague:Kluwer Law 
International, 2003), pp. 61-63. See M. Dischendorfer, ‘The Existence and 
Development of Multilateral Rules on Government Procurement under the 
Framework of the WTO’ (2000) Public Procurement Law Review 1-38, at 15-17. 
104 For this approach, see: A. Reich, ‘The New GATT Agreement on Government 
Procurement – The Pitfalls of Pluralism and Strict Reciprocity’ (1997) 31 Journal 
of World Trade 125-151, at pp. 142-145. For a discussion about the GATT 
negotiations, see: G. Marceu and A. Blank ‘History of the government procurement 
negotiations since 1945’ (1996) Public Procurement Law Review 77-147, at pp. 
87-88 and footnote 19.  
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XIII.2 require the WTO Members to negotiate on preparation to 
include government procurement of services multilaterally under 
GATS.  
Due to the plurilateral nature of the GPA, any amendments to it, 
decision-making, or interpretations of it are based on the special rules 
in the GPA, and not on the overall rules in the WTO Agreement.105
Other international organisations provide different tools 
concerning government procurement. The United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) provides the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on Procurement of Goods, Construction and 
Services (1994). The UNCITRAL Model Law is applied by several 
countries as an inspiration to modulate their national laws on 
government procurement. The World Bank provides procurement 
guidelines addressing projects that are financed by the World Bank. 
Such projects may not be influenced by political or other non-
economic considerations.
 
However, in cases of dispute between GPA Parties, the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Body has the authority to settle the dispute. 
106 The result is the non-binding 
Procurement Guidelines of the World Bank.107
All of those tools have been addressed at the WTO working 
Group on Transparency in Government Procurement; the GPA, the 
UNCITRAL and the World Bank share the same common goal: to 
increase transparency in government procurement. It is important to 
note that unlike with the GPA, the guidelines by these other 
organisations are non-binding, and, if they conflict with the GPA, the 
GPA prevails. 
   
On a regional level, there are both binding and non-binding rules 
on government procurement. The EU procurement rules are a clear 
example of rules which create rights and obligations between both the 
EU member states, and between private companies and the EU 
                                                          
105 WTO Agreement, Art. IX.5 and Art. X.10. It must further be assumed that in 
cases of conflict between the WTO Agreement and the GPA, the GPA will prevail 
due to the principle of lex specialis. This assumption is further strengthened by the 
fact that Art. XVI.3 of the WTO Agreement deals only with conflicts between the 
WTO Agreement and the multilateral Agreements, where the former will prevail. 
106 See Art. V.1(g) of the International Development Association (IDA) Articles of 
Agreement, and Art. III.5(b) of the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD) Articles of Agreement. Both the IDA and the IBRD are 
institutions under the World Bank. 
107 See Art. I (1.1) of the Guidelines. 
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states.108
rules dealing with government procurement in the inter-state 
relationship between Canada, Mexico and the US.
 The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has 
specific  
109 The Common 
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) requires its 
members to increase the information flow between themselves 
concerning public procurement,110 although the Agreement does not 
provide specific rules concerning such procurement procedures. El 
Mercado Común del Sur (Mercosur) in South America has worked out 
a Protocol on government procurement, which still needs 
implementation.111
 
  
 
2.2.3 Rule Orientation 
 
In order to fully understand WTO procurement law, law must, as far 
as is possible, be distinguished from politics.  One must find the line 
between international law as a normative system with binding force 
forming national and regional law to comply with WTO law on the 
one side, and international relations as reflecting actual state power 
where politics shapes law on the other.112 In other words, an 
international law perspective on WTO procurement law will claim 
that the GPA has a binding character and that the GPA parties will 
follow the GPA guidelines, for example, if there is a well-functioning 
enforcement system.113
As mentioned above, the WTO provides an international trade 
forum for negotiations, and the WTO monitors its Members’ 
 An international relations perspective will 
instead focus on the political power between the GPA Parties. 
                                                          
108 See more in chapter 4 below. 
109 North American Free Trade Agreement, Chapter 10, Art. 1001-1007. 
110 Agreement Establishing COMESA, Art. 141. 
111 Protocolo de Contraciones Públicas del Mercosur, Decisión No. 23/06, not 
currently in force. 
112 See for example A.M. Slaughter Burley, ‘International Law and International 
Relations Theory’ (1995) 87 American Journal of International Law 205-239, at 
215. 
113 In WTO, European Communities – Trade Description of Sardines – Report of 
the Appellate Body (26 September 2002) WT/DS231/AB/R,para.278, the Appellate 
Body made the clear assumption that every WTO Member will abide by their 
treaty obligations in good faith, as required by the principle of pacta sunt servanda  
articulated in Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
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compliance with the WTO agreements.114
Originally, GATT was supposed to be a part of a bigger complex 
of agreements in the International Trade Organisation (ITO) that was a 
conclusion of post-war negotiations in the United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Employment. The result was an agreement, the Havana 
Charter, and in cases of conflict between the ITO Members, the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) would deal with it.
 The WTO has no power to 
create law. The law creation is entirely left to the WTO Members. The 
WTO monitoring of member’s compliance also depends on the WTO 
members providing the necessary information to the WTO; the WTO 
does not provide a government to enforce the WTO agreements. 
Furthermore, the WTO itself cannot sanction a WTO Member. Such 
sanctions depend on its members’ willingness to carry them out. WTO 
law cannot be seen outside of its political context, but, at the same 
time, the WTO reflects the request for a more rule-oriented demand 
from its members compared to its predecessor GATT, which was 
more power-oriented. 
115
The GATT 1947 was intended to be of a provisional character 
until the ITO would enter into force, which it never did. The GATT 
1947 was, in several respects, unclear about dispute settlement, and 
contained several flexible rules that left a lot of room for diplomacy 
and political power-orientation in cases of dispute between the GATT 
Contracting Parties. This flexibility in GATT 1947, and the lack of 
clear guidelines about dispute settlement, also created legal 
uncertainty. In cases of dispute, the GATT evolved into a system 
where a Panel of usually three persons – selected by the disputing 
parties – would make a recommendation about the interpretation of 
GATT 1947. One of the major issues in the GATT system was that 
such a Panel recommendation would only have been legally binding 
on the disputing parties if it was adopted by consensus by all the 
GATT Contracting Parties – including the losing party. Often, the 
losing party would use its veto not to accept the Panel 
recommendation. 
 
From a legal perspective, the GATT system was lacking in 
transparency and predictability, and the enforcement was vague. The 
negotiating power between the members could often be decisive, and 
the GATT system had the character of a political system rather than a 
legal system. The system has often been described as a power-oriented 
                                                          
114 WTO Agreement, Art III. 
115 The Havana Charter, Art. 96. 
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system.116
The WTO Dispute Settlement Body applies to the WTO members, 
not to private parties. The disputing parties will first have to try 
consultancy to reach a satisfactory conclusion themselves. If the 
consultancy is unsuccessful, the Dispute Settlement Body establishes 
a Panel, which will come up with a recommendation. That 
recommendation can be appealed to the Appellate Body. The 
recommendation from the Panel or, in case of appeal, the Appellate 
Body, must be adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body. A Panel or 
Appellate Body recommendation is automatically adopted unless all 
WTO Members consensually reject the recommendation. This is a 
different and more rule-based approach compared to the power-
oriented GATT system.   
 However, during GATT’s 50 years of existence before it 
evolved into the WTO, several agreements were made to clarify the 
provisions of GATT 1947. These elaborating agreements were 
concluded in the different trade negotiation rounds between the GATT 
Contracting Parties during the GATT era. Rules on disputes were also 
agreed upon to make the procedures for disputes more clear. In 1986, 
the GATT Contracting Parties started the Uruguay Trade Negotiation 
Round. The agenda focused on reforming the GATT in a more rule-
oriented direction by improving the Dispute Settlement System, and 
by including services and intellectual property rights under the 
multilateral system. The result was the WTO, which had a broader 
range of agreements and an improved Dispute Settlement Body.   
The GPA reflects the rule-oriented approach. Compared to its 
predecessor, the Tokyo GPA, which entered into force in 1981, the 
present GPA from 1994 is clearer in its language, although there are 
still several unclear elements. However, the GPA also has a power-
oriented mechanism; the Parties to the GPA are not bound by the GPA 
in every aspect of government procurement. The GPA has a reciprocal 
nature where the Parties negotiate the individual scope and coverage 
of which entities and services shall be included within the GPA. For 
more on this, see section 1.3.2.1 and section 1.3.3. The reciprocal 
aspects of the GPA might allow more politically powerful Parties to 
place themselves in a comparatively advantageous position.  
                                                          
116 See, for example, J. H. Jackson, ‘Global Ecocomics and International Economic 
Law’ (1998)1 Journal of International Economic Law 17; E. U. Petersmann, The 
GATT Dispute Settlement System – International Law, International Organisations 
and Dispute Settlement (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1997), p. 66; H. 
Andersen, EU Dumping Determinations and WTO Law (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 2009), pp. 23-25 and chapter 2. 
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Institutionally, the GPA also reflects a rule-oriented approach. 
Firstly, the GPA is monitored by a Committee on Government 
Procurement.117 Each Party must inform the Committee about 
amendments in national legislation on government procurement and 
the administration of the legislation.118
A private supplier which feels that the public entity has violated 
the GPA cannot apply to the Dispute Settlement Body but must 
instead rely on the domestic courts or another impartial body in the 
country of the government procurement. In contrast to the other WTO 
agreements,
 Secondly, disputes between 
GPA Parties must be notified to the Dispute Settlement Body and 
eventually – if the parties cannot reach a mutual understanding – a 
Panel will be established, whose recommendation can be appealed to 
the Appellate Body.  
119 Article XX of the GPA requires the GPA Parties to 
establish challenge procedures which are non-discriminatory, timely, 
transparent and effective. The challenge shall be heard by a court or 
by an impartial and independent review body. Furthermore, in contrast 
to other WTO agreements, Article XX.7(c) of the GPA requires that 
the challenge procedure shall provide for correction of the breach of 
the GPA or compensation for the loss or damages suffered by the 
private supplier.120
The WTO is a rule-oriented system, and the GPA must be seen in 
that light. The GPA is binding on the Parties, and private suppliers can 
enforce the GPA in the national systems. However, the GPA is not 
    
                                                          
117 The Committee was already established under the first GPA. 
118 For more details about the information that each GPA Party must submit to the 
Committee, see Art. XIX.5 of the GPA. 
119 Generally, the WTO agreements do not contain such challenge procedures 
requiring the WTO members to establish systems where private parties can 
challenge the WTO member’s compliance with the WTO agreements. Under the 
general WTO framework, it is left to the WTO members individually to decide 
whether courts shall apply the different WTO agreements. Therefore, the 
application of WTO agreements by national courts is different from country to 
country. For example, the application of WTO law before the EU courts is limited 
to those situations where a Directive or Regulation is intended to implement 
particular WTO provisions, or the Directive or Regulation has an express reference 
to the specific WTO provision. See, for instance, Case C-93/02 P Biret v Council 
[2003],ECR I-497, para. 61. The GPA, then, provides a more secure system for the 
private parties than the general WTO framework. 
120 For a thorough examination of the challenge procedure and the GPA, see S. 
Arrowsmith, ‘The character and role of national challenge procedures under the 
Government Procurement Agreement’ (2002) Public Procurement Law Review 
235-260. 
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always clear in its text, and to request clarity of the GPA by the 
Dispute Settlement Body would be a political decision by the GPA 
Party of the supplier which feels that the GPA rights are violated by a 
foreign public entity. Otherwise, clarity can be reached by amending 
the GPA, which will also be a matter of politics. The GPA Parties 
have provisionally agreed upon a revised version of the GPA, which is 
clearer both in text and structure than the present. However, it is 
uncertain what the final outcome of the revised GPA will be and when 
it will enter into force.  
The following part will briefly list the sources of WTO 
government procurement law of relevance for PPPs. 
 
 
2.2.4 Sources of WTO Law of Importance for PPPs and 
Government Procurement 
 
Commentators have debated widely on the sources of WTO law. Due 
to the WTO’s international nature, some commentators will delimit 
the range of sources to those sources deriving from state consent, and 
thereby see the sources of law being narrowed down to the actual 
WTO agreements and to the actual state practice reflected in 
customary law.121 Other commentators will take a more institutional 
approach, where the WTO agreements reflect the state interest, but at 
the same time the WTO as an institution becomes a part of the 
creation of law, for example by taking the rulings from Panels and 
Appellate Body into account as part of the range of WTO sources.122 
Others might include an even broader context and include sources of 
law which are formed outside the WTO framework, such as principles 
of human rights.123
Even though a discussion of the range of sources is very 
interesting, it lies outside the scope of this chapter. The approach 
 
                                                          
121 For a discussion of this, see M. Matsushita, T. H. Schoenbaum and P. C. 
Mavroidis, The World Trade Organisation – Law, Practice, and Policy (2nd ed.,  
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), chapter 2. 
122 For a discussion, see J. E. Alvarez, ‘International Organisations: Then and Now’ 
(2006) American Journal of International Law 324-347. 
123 See for example E. U. Petersmann, ‘Human Rights and International Trade Law 
– Defining and Connecting the Two Fields’, in T. Cottier, J. Pauwelyn and E. 
Bürgi (eds.) Human Rights and International Trade (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005), 29-94. 
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taken in this chapter is a broader one, and the sources of law in this 
chapter are laid out below.  
 
 
2.2.4.1 Treaties  
 
The WTO Agreement and its annexed agreements are binding on the 
WTO members. Here, the GPA is very important. The other WTO 
agreements are also important in order to get the full picture of the 
GPA. For example, both GATT and GATS impose some limitations 
on State conduct in regard to goods and services which can guide the 
understanding of the GPA.124
Other international written sources are important to take into 
account. The GPA refers, for example, to international standards 
which could be developed by the International Organisation for 
Standardization (ISO). Furthermore, international treaties can be taken 
into account when interpreting the WTO agreements to get an 
understanding of terms therein;
 As mentioned above, it remains unclear 
whether the MFN principle of GATT applies generally to government 
procurement.  
125 1.3.7 see more in section . The 
question is whether other international treaties can prevail in cases of 
conflict with a WTO provision. This is not discussed further in this 
chapter.  
 
2.2.4.2 Customary law  
 
Customary law consists of two elements: the practice between states 
and opinio juris, i.e. the sense of obligation to perform the practice. 
Customary law is the basis of public international law; for example, 
                                                          
124 For example, GATT 1994, Art. VI, in conjunction with the WTO Anti-Dumping 
Agreement, allows the WTO Members to impose anti-dumping duties on products 
from other WTO Members if the prices are dumped and the industry in the 
importing country is injured by the dumped prices. The GPA requires that a public 
entity submits such information if the anti-dumping duty will reflect the evaluation 
of the tender prices in the awarding phase; cf. Art. XII.2(h). 
125 See, for example, WTO, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp 
and Shrimp Products- Report of the Appellate Body (12 October 1998) 
WT/DS58/AB/R, para. 130  
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the principle of pacta sunt servanda, i.e. that treaties must be 
performed in good faith, is based in customary law.126
In Korea – Procurement, the Panel stated that: 
   
 
Customary international law applies generally to the 
economic relations between the WTO Members. Such 
international law applies to the extent that the WTO 
treaty agreements do not “contract out” from it.127
 
  
Customary international law applies to the economic relations 
between states if it is not in conflict with the text of a WTO 
agreement. Customary international law is written into the WTO 
agreements and constitutes the basis for the interpretation of WTO 
agreements.128 The Panels and Appellate Body find that those 
customary rules are reflected in the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties Article 31 and Article 32.129 The interpretation tools of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties must be used to clarify the 
text of the GPA.130
                                                          
126 The principle of pacta sunt servanda is written into Art. 26 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
 The question is whether there are specific 
127 WTO, Korea – Measures Affecting Public Procurement – Report of the Panel (1 
May 2000) WT/DS163/R, para. 7.96 (emphasis added). 
128 See DSU, Art. 3.2. 
129 Other parts of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties also reflect 
customary international law. In WTO, Korea – Measures Affecting Public 
Procurement – Report of the Panel (1 May 2000) WT/DS163/R, the Panel referred 
to Art. 48 of the Vienna Convetion on the Law of Treaties, which, according to the 
Panel, reflects the customary international rule of law that an error in a treaty can 
be grounds for invalidating the treaty or part of it; see para 7.123. 
130Art. 31 and Art. 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provide:  
“Article 31: General rule of interpretation 
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its 
object and purpose. 
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in 
addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes: 
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in 
connection with the conclusion of the treaty; 
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the 
conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related 
to the treaty. 
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context: 
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of 
the treaty or the application of its provisions; 
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customary rules of international law addressing government 
procurement specifically. The UNCITRAL Model Law, which is non-
binding in its codified version, is apparently a reflection of several 
countries’ government procurement system, and it has apparently been 
implemented into several national systems.131 Based on this wide 
acceptance in state practice, the question is whether some principles 
from the UNCITRAL Model Law will eventually achieve the status of 
customary law. However, several countries have procurement laws 
which are not based on the UNCITRAL Model Law,132
 
 and it would 
require a far wider acceptance in state practice before the UNCITRAL 
Model Law could be regarded as customary international law.  
 
2.2.4.3 Principles of law 
 
The WTO itself is based on the above-mentioned non-discrimination 
principles like the Most-Favoured-Nation principle, which requires a 
WTO Member not to discriminate between its trading partners, and 
the National Treatment principle, which requires that a WTO Member 
does not discriminate between national and foreign products once they 
have entered into the territory of the respective WTO member. Those 
principles are also written into the different WTO agreements.  
                                                                                                                                                    
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the 
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation; 
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the 
parties. 
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so 
intended. 
Article 32: Supplementary means of interpretation 
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the 
preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to 
confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine 
the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31: 
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or 
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.” 
131 Z. Xinglin, ‘Forum for review by suppliers in public procurement: an analysis 
and assessment of the models in international instruments’ (2009) Public 
Procurement Law Review 201-226, at p. 203. 
132 See A. Kovacs, ‘The Global Procurement Harmonisation Initiative’ (2004) 
Public Procurement Law Review 15-38, at p. 23. For a rejection of the UNCITRAL 
Model Law as international law, see: G. Westring, ‘Multilateral and unilateral 
procurement regimes - to which camp does the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
procurement belong?’ (1994) Public Procurement Law Review 142-151, at p. 147. 
65 
 
The principle of jus cogens also applies to WTO law. Article 53 of 
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states that a treaty is 
void if it is in violation of a peremptory norm of international law (jus 
cogens).133 Jus cogens can for example be prohibition of slavery or 
genocide. That rule reflects customary international law, and any state 
acting in violation of such a principle would also act in violation of a 
WTO treaty, or, put differently, if a WTO agreement allowed slave 
trade, it would be void.134
 
 Because of this, several of the WTO 
agreements contain mechanisms for the protection of human life or 
safety – in the GPA it follows from Article XXIII. Therefore, a State 
establishing a PPP may reject a bid – or generally step out of the PPP 
after the contract has been concluded – if the private party is using 
slaves in its production to the PPP.  
 
2.2.4.4 Case law 
 
The question here is whether international courts and tribunals can 
take part in law creation through their judgments. Generally, 
international courts are not supposed to make rulings binding on 
future cases. The binding power is often solely related to the actual 
case. If international courts were making rulings binding on future 
cases, it would be in conflict with the often state-centric approach in 
the law creation of public international law.135
                                                          
133 Art. 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides: “Treaties 
conflicting with a peremptory norm of general international law (“jus cogens”): A 
treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of 
general international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a 
peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognised by 
the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no 
derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of 
general international law having the same character.” 
 This is reflected in the 
See also D. Shelton, ‘Normative Hierarchy in International Law’ (2006) 100 
American Journal of International Law 291-323. 
134 See J. Pauwelyn, ‘The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How Far 
Can We Go?’ (2001) 95 American Journal of International Law 535-578, at p. 565. 
135 An example is the decisions from the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Such 
decisions have no binding force in future cases for the ICJ; see Art. 59 of the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice. However, the ICJ may apply its former 
decisions as subsidiary means for the determination of law; see Art. 38.1(d). As a 
fact, the ICJ often refers to its former decisions.  
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WTO. According to Article3.2 of the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding, that is the rules governing the Dispute Settlement 
Body, Panels and Appellate Body cannot add to or diminish the rights 
and obligations written into the WTO agreements. A textual approach 
suggests that the Panel and Appellate Body only have an interpretative 
function and that recommendations can only be binding on the parties 
to the actual case, but cannot bind in future cases. As parts of a rule-
oriented system, however, the Panel and Appellate Body cannot 
ignore their former recommendations, and they always refer to former 
cases, as such interpretations from former cases create ‘legal 
expectations’.136
The line between interpretations creating legal expectations and 
actual precedence is not clear,
  
137 and some commentators argue that, 
in particular, the Appellate Body has overstepped its line by 
illegitimately taking part in the creation of WTO law,138
                                                                                                                                                    
A different perspective concerns the International Criminal Court (ICC) which 
may apply principles and rules of law as interpreted in its previous decisions. Yet, 
it appears to be limited to the interpretations, and the ICC shall apply text and 
principles of law; see Art. 21 of the Rome Statue of the ICC. It seems there is no 
requirement that the decisions of the ICC only apply as subsidiary means. 
 while others 
136 See statement in WTO,  Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II – Report of 
the Appellate Body (4 October 1996) WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R and 
WT/DS11/AB/R, p. 14. See also L. Nielsen. The WTO, Animals and PPMs 
(Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007), pp. 115-123. 
137 See most notably the statement by the Panel in WTO, US – Final Anti-Dumping 
Measures on Stainless Steel from Mexico (20 December 2007) WT/DS344/R, paras 
7.115-7.140, where the Panel explicitly stated that it would not follow the line of 
reasoning developed by the Appellate Body in previous cases. The Panel report 
was, as expected, overruled by the Appellate Body, WTO, US – Final Anti-
Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel from Mexico – Report of the Appellate Body 
(30 April 2008) WT/DS344/AB/R; see in particular para. 162. This case 
demonstrates one major problem in the WTO judicial system; the guidelines for 
Panels and Appellate Body are not clear and have contradictory elements, as Panels 
and Appellate Body must not make binding interpretations in future cases but, at 
the same time, have to ensure the predictability in the WTO system. See Martti 
Koskenniemi’s interesting and excellent discussion about the argumentation in 
public international law as a contrast between normativity, i.e. distances from state 
power, and concreteness, i.e. distances from natural morality. See Martti 
Koskenniemi,  From Apology to Utopia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2005). 
138 See J. Greenwald, ‘WTO Dispute Settlement: An Exercise in Trade Law 
Legislation?’ (2003) 6 (1) Journal of International Trade Law 117; and D. K. 
Tarullo, ‘Paved with good intentions: the dynamic effects of WTO review of anti-
dumping action’ (2003) 2 (3) World Trade Review 379. See also M. Matsushita, T. 
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suggest that recommendations from Panels and Appellate Body should 
be accepted as a source of WTO law.139
In relation to the GPA, there were a few cases under the former 
GPA, the Tokyo GPA, before the WTO was established.
  
140 The 
interpretations from those Tokyo GPA cases have legal value if they 
were adopted under the former system.141 Since the establishment of 
the WTO, there have been only three disputes concerning the present 
GPA. Two of those never came through the Panel procedure. Japan – 
Procurement of a Navigation Satellite142 concerned the specifications 
of the tender to the US system. The EU claimed it violated the non-
discrimination principle and the rules on technical specification. Japan 
and the EU reached a mutually agreed solution and therefore no Panel 
was established.143 In US – Procurement,144 in which both the EU and 
Japan claimed that the US violated the rules about selection 
procedures and qualification of suppliers because the entities in the 
state of Massachusetts were not allowed to procure goods or services 
from any persons who did business with Burma, a Panel was 
established, but the parties later requested the Panel to suspend its 
work, and it was not asked to resume its work. The case later expired. 
Korea – Procurement145 is the only GPA case that has resulted in a 
Panel recommendation. The case concerned definitions of Korean 
government entities covered by the GPA.146
                                                                                                                                                    
H. Schoenbaum & P. C. Mavroidis, The World Trade Organisation – Law, 
Practice, and Policy (2nd ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 908-910. 
 
139 See for example R. Bhala, Modern GATT Law – A Treatise on the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2005), pp. xvii-xviii. 
140 WTO, EEC – Value-Added Tax (VAT) and Threshold – Report of the Panel (16 
May 1984) BISD 315/247; WTO, United States – Procurement of a Sonar 
Mapping System – Report of the Panel (23 April 1992) GPR.DS1/R;  WTO, 
Norway – Tendering Procedures on Trondheim Toll Ring Project – Report of the 
Panel (28 April 1993) BISD 405/319. 
141 See statement in WTO,  Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II – Report of 
the Appellate Body (4 October 1996) WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R and 
WT/DS11/AB/R, p. 14. 
142 WTO, Japan – Procurement of a Navigation Satellite (1 April 1997) WT/DS73, 
no report issued. 
143 WTO, Notification of Mutually-Agreed Solution (3 March 1998) WT/DS73/5. 
144 WTO, United States – Measure Affecting Government Procurement (12 
February 1999) WT/DS88 and WT/DS95, no report issued. 
145 WTO, Korea – Measure Affecting Government Procurement – Report of the 
Panel (1 May 2000) WT/DS163/R. 
146 See more in section 1.3.3.1. 
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Based on those sources, the next section examines the GPA in 
relation to PPPs.   
 
 
3. The GPA 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The GPA is included in annex 4 to the WTO Agreement, which 
contains the plurilateral agreements. The GPA is only binding on 
those members that have accepted the GPA, and does not create rights 
or obligations for the other WTO Members.147 The GPA regulates 
government procurement between 40 members. There are another 23 
WTO members with an observer status in the GPA.148 Out of those 23 
WTO members with observer status, 9 WTO Members are negotiating 
on accepting the GPA.149 Besides those 9 WTO members negotiating 
on entering the GPA, Armenia,150 Croatia,151 the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia (FYROM),152 Mongolia153
                                                          
147 WTO Agreement, Art. II.3. 
 and Saudi 
148 Those WTO Members are: Albania, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Bahrain, 
Cameroon, Chile, China, Colombia, Croatia, Georgia, India, Jordan, the Kyrgyz 
Republic, Moldova, Mongolia, New Zealand, Oman, Panama, Sri Lanka, 
Chinese Taipei and Turkey. 
149 Those 9 WTO members are: Albania, China, Georgia, Jordan, the Kyrgyz 
Republic, Moldova, Oman, Panama and Chinese Taipei. 
150 WTO, Report of the Working Part on the Accession of Armenia, (26 November 
2002) WT/ACC/ARM/23, para. 153; WTO, Decision of Accession of Armenia of 
10 December 2002 (17 December 2002) WT/L/506, Part I.2. 
151 WTO, Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Croatia (29 June 2000) 
WT/ACC/HRV/59, para. 156 and para. 225; WTO, Decision of the Accession of 
Croatia of 17 July 2000 (3 August 2000) WT/ACC/HRV/60; WTO, Protocol of the 
Accession of Croatia (19 September 2000) WT/ACC/HRV/61, Part I.2.  
152 WTO, Report of the Working Part on the Accession of the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia (26 September 2002) WT/ACC/807/27, para. 177 and para. 
255; WTO, Decision of Accession of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
of 15 October 2002 (18 October 2002) WT/L/494, Part. I.2. 
153 WTO, Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Mongolia (27 June 
1996) WT/ACC/MNG/9, para. 59 and para. 61; WTO, Decision of Accession of 
Mongolia of 18 July 1996 (25 July 1996) WT/ACC/MNG/10; WTO, Protocol of 
the Accession of Mongolia (25 July 1996) WT/ACC/MNG/11, Part. I.2. 
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Arabia154
This part looks further into both the material and procedural rules 
of the GPA. First, the part describes the aims of the GPA and its 
overall principles. Second, the part describes the scope and coverage 
of the GPA. Third, the product requirements that a public entity can 
make will be discussed. Fourth, the different tender procedures will be 
discussed. Fifth, the section discusses the criteria to select the 
potential suppliers to the government procedure for the PPP. Sixth, the 
award criteria will be discussed. Finally, the formal aspects of the 
procurement, such as tender documentation and publication of notices 
are described. 
 have all respectively written provisions into their Protocols 
of Accession to the WTO about acceding to the GPA.  
 
 
3.2 Aims and Principles 
 
In line with the general aim of the WTO, the GPA has an economic 
and non-discriminatory purpose, and aims at achieving greater 
liberalisation, expanding world trade and applying the non-
discrimination principles. In order to avoid arbitrary tender awarding, 
the GPA aims at increasing the transparency of laws, regulations, 
procedures and practices regarding government procurement. 
Furthermore, the GPA aims to provide special and differential rules 
for developing and in particular least-developed countries, as their 
development, financial and trade needs should be taken into account 
in government procurement.  
The GPA aims are reflected in the underlying principles of the 
GPA. Those principles are Non-Discrimination, National Treatment, 
Transparency, and Special and Differential Treatment for Developing 
Countries. 
 
3.2.1 The Non-Discrimination Principle 
 
In a WTO context, non-discrimination is often associated with the 
MFN principle and the National Treatment principle. The GPA is no 
exception to this, although the term ‘MFN’ has been abandoned. Non-
                                                          
154 WTO, Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia (1 November 2005) WT/ACC/SAU/61, paras. 231 and 315; WTO, Decision 
of Accession of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia of 11 November 2005 (11 November 
2005) WT/L/627, Part. I.2. 
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discrimination is central in ensuring a fair competition on the 
government procurement market. The focus in this part is on the 
general concept of non-discrimination and its MFN character in the 
GPA. The following part focuses on the National Treatment principle.  
Article III.1(b) of the GPA requires the GPA Parties not to treat 
products, services and suppliers from some Parties less favourably 
than is they treat products, services and suppliers from other Parties. 
In the GPA text, it is not referred to as a MFN treatment, although it 
shares several similarities with a MFN principle. The difference 
between the general MFN principle and the GPA lookalike is that the 
GPA coverage of entities and products is based on reciprocity; that is, 
the GPA Parties can in their coverage schemes arrange different 
treatment between the GPA Parties depending on the reciprocal 
arrangements.155
Another deviation from the traditional MFN principle is that the 
non-discrimination between trading partners is limited to only 
covering the GPA parties and not the other WTO Members that are 
not parties to the GPA. For example, the authorities in Singapore must 
not discriminate between potential suppliers from Denmark and the 
US, but Singapore is allowed to treat the potential suppliers from 
Denmark and the US more favourably than potential suppliers from a 
non-GPA party. As mentioned above, however, the question remains 
whether the MFN principle from GATT 1994 applies to government 
procurement of goods, i.e. whether the MFN principle can be applied 
by non-GPA Parties in situations with government procurement of 
goods. This is not resolved in practice, and it is subject to a range of 
opinions from different commentators.
 For example, even though Canada and Japan are 
parties to the GPA, the GPA does not apply to Canadian bids on 
Japanese procurement of several Japanese sub-central government 
entities, whereas the GPA applies to all the other GPA parties. 
156
                                                          
155 See also C. Bovis, ‘The New Public Procurement Regime: A Different 
Perspective on the Integration of Public Markets of the European Union’ (2006) 12 
(1) European Public Law 73-109 at p. 104. See more in section 
 What is clear, however, is 
that the MFN principle concerning services in GATS does not apply 
to government procurement. In that respect, only the GPA applies to 
government procurement of services. Therefore, a public entity which 
establishes a PPP consisting of services that are covered by the GATS 
will not be bound by the MFN principle in GATS, and the public 
1.3.3.  
156 See above in section 1.2.2.2. 
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entity can, therefore, arrange better treatment to the GPA Parties than 
the other WTO Members.  
Another aspect of the non-discrimination principle is written into 
the GPA, Article III.2(a). A public entity must not treat a locally-
established supplier less favourably than another locally-established 
supplier on the basis of degree of foreign affiliation or ownership. 
That rule implies that the non-discrimination principle applies to 
situations where two potential suppliers are established in the country 
of the public entity. The cross-border aspect is the affiliation or 
ownership of one of the potential suppliers. A public entity may not 
favour a potential supplier with less or no foreign owners over a 
potential supplier with foreign affiliation or ownership, nor may the 
public entity favour a potential supplier with foreign affiliation or 
ownership over a completely locally owned potential supplier. For 
example, there could be the situation where the government policy 
would favour the attraction of foreign investment in a PPP from a 
domestically established potential supplier that is fully or partly 
owned by foreign shareholders, and not allow domestically owned 
suppliers to make a bid. Such reverse discrimination is not allowed 
under the GPA. 
Article III.2(b) provides that a public entity may not discriminate 
against locally established suppliers on the basis of the country of 
production of the goods or service being supplied, provided that the 
country of production is a Party to the GPA in accordance with the 
rules of origin, which is described in section 1.3.4.2. 
 
 
3.2.2 The National Treatment Principle   
 
Article III.1(a) of the GPA codifies the National Treatment principle. 
A GPA party may not treat products, services, or suppliers from the 
other parties less favourably than the treatment accorded to domestic 
products, services and suppliers. 
A public entity which desires to establish a PPP cannot require 
that the products provided by the private supplier only be products 
originating in the country of the public entity. 
In line with the non-discrimination principle and the national 
treatment principle, the GPA does not allow a public entity to impose, 
seek or consider offsets in the qualification and selection of suppliers, 
products and services, or in the evaluation of tenders and award of 
72 
 
contracts.157 Offsets are defined in the GPA as measures used to 
encourage local development or improve the balance-of-payments 
accounts by means of domestic content, licensing of technology, 
investment requirements, counter-trade or similar requirements.158 
However, offsets can be allowed in situations with developing and 
least-developed countries.159
 
 
3.2.3 Special and Differential Treatment for Developing Countries 
 
Article V concerns special rules and differential rules for developing 
and least-developed countries. Article V.1 states the objectives; the 
development, financial and trade needs of developing and in particular 
least-developed countries must duly be taken into account by the 
developed countries. The rule, however, is limited to concern the need 
for developing and least developed countries: to safeguard their 
balance-of-payments position; to promote the establishment or 
development of domestic industries; to support industrial units which 
are dependent on the government procurement; and to encourage 
economic development through regional or global arrangements 
among developing countries. Those objectives must be taken into 
account in the negotiation of developing and least-developed countries 
to enter the GPA. 
In the preparation and application of laws, regulations and 
procedures affecting government procurement, the developed GPA 
Parties shall facilitate increased imports from least-developed 
countries, bearing in mind the special problems of least-developed 
countries and of those countries at low stages of economic 
development.160
Article V.4 provides that a developing country may negotiate 
exclusions to the National Treatment Principle with respect to certain 
entities, products and services, which are written into its Annexes; see 
more in section 
 This rule only requires facilitated import from 
developing and least-developed countries. The rule does not imply 
that a public entity from a developed country shall favour a bid from a 
supplier from a developing country over a bid from a supplier from a 
developed country. 
1.3.3 about the Annexes. The exclusion depends on a 
                                                          
157 Art. XVI.1 of the GPA. 
158 Art. XVI.1 of the GPA, footnote. 
159 Art. XVI.2 of the GPA. 
160 Art. V.2 of the GPA. 
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mutual agreement with the other GPA parties, although the developed 
GPA Parties shall take the above-mentioned objectives into account. 
Also, the GPA allows for developing and least-developed countries to 
modify the coverage of entities and products under the GPA after the 
entry into force of the GPA.161
Developing countries may also seek offsets, for example by 
encouraging local development or improving the balance-of-payments 
accounts, in the qualification to participate in the procurement – not as 
awarding criteria. In order to seek offsets, the developing country 
must negotiate the conditions for their application.
 
162
The special and differential treatment rules for developing and 
least-developed countries have several unclear and critical elements: 
 
 
x There is no definition of developing and developed countries in 
the WTO framework. A GPA Party must define itself as a 
developing or developed country. However, a GPA Party 
cannot define itself as a developing country without getting 
through a political debate with the other GPA Members, who 
might not allow the country to categorise itself as a developing 
country. Only least-developed countries are defined in 
accordance with the definition provided by the UN;163
x In particular, the least-developed countries might not have the 
negotiation power to achieve exceptions like the exception to 
the National Treatment Principle;  
 
x The text of Article V is very vaguely formulated. In case of a 
dispute, the question is whether a Panel will be hesitant to read 
the provision, the objectives in particular, as one imposing 
obligations on developed countries.164
 
 
                                                          
161 Art. V.5 of the GPA. 
162 Art. XVI.2 of the GPA. 
163 See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD); 
http://www.unctad.org/ 
164 See Panel practice in the anti-dumping area: WTO, United States – Anti-
Dumping and Countervailing Measures on Steel Plate from India – Report of the 
Panel (28 June 2002) WT/DS206/R, para. 7.110. The question is whether the GPA 
is clear in defining any obligations on developed countries. See also panel in WTO, 
European Communities – Anti-Dumping Duties on Malleable Cast Iron Tube or 
Pipe Fittings from Brazil – Report of the Panel (7 March 2003) WT/DS219/R, 
para. 7.68. 
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The special and differential rules for developing and least-developed 
countries have not appealed to the developing and least-developed 
countries. Interestingly, as seen above, several international 
organisations, including the WTO, promote the idea of PPPs in 
developing and least-developed countries to improve infrastructure, 
etc. It is possible that the rejection of the GPA causes some suppliers 
to refrain from investing in PPPs in non-signatory countries, given 
that the GPA could provide some legal certainty for those suppliers.165
 
 
3.2.4 Transparency 
 
Transparency is a keyword in government procurement. On the one 
hand, transparency ensures that different suppliers of products and 
services become aware of the potential government procurement in 
order to let the public entity know of their products. Therefore, 
transparency reduces the transaction costs. On the other hand, 
transparency ensures control, to some extent, with the public entity not 
favouring or discriminating between the different suppliers. Hence, 
transparency limits the opportunity for arbitrary contract awards and 
limits bribery. 
The GPA and its enforcement system contain several rules 
reflecting the transparency principle. As mentioned above, the GPA 
Parties must inform the Committee on Government Procurement 
about changes in legislation. Thereby, such changes will be known by 
the other GPA Parties. Furthermore, Article XIX obligates the GPA 
Parties to collect and provide to the Committee, on an annual basis, 
statistics on its procurements covered by the GPA; and each GPA 
Party must, upon request from another GPA Party, provide 
information concerning procurement by covered entities and their 
individual contract awards. There is, however, an exception 
concerning confidential information.166
Furthermore, the GPA contains rules about the tendering 
procedures applicable to government procurement as well as rules on 
 
                                                          
165 The GPA has been criticized for not being appropriate to developing and least-
developed countries. See for example V. Guimaraes De Lima e Silva, ‘The revision 
of the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement: to what extent might it 
contribute to the expansion of current membership?’ (2008) Public Procurement 
Law Review 61-98, at pp. 68-81. 
166 Art. XIX.4 of the GPA. 
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how the public entity informs the potential suppliers about the 
procurement, tender award etc.  
 
3.3 Scope and Coverage 
 
Generally, the GPA covers all types of goods. Concerning services 
and constructions services, the GPA is more limited, as it only applies 
to services and construction services written into country-specific 
schedules. Furthermore, the GPA is limited because the parties can 
make individual thresholds and, to some extent, individually 
determine which entities shall be covered by the GPA. 
The limitation for both goods and services is the thresholds each 
party has made, and the covered entities. The threshold is measured by 
Special Drawing Rights (SDR), which is a basket composition of 
different currencies consisting of the Euro, Japanese Yen, Pound 
Sterling, and US Dollars. The SDR is based on specific amounts of 
each of the four currencies, and it is valued in US Dollars. The SDR is 
updated on a daily basis on the exchange rates of the four currencies. 
The SDR was created by the International Monetary Fund (IMF).167 
Each time a covered entity is procuring for no less than the threshold, 
the GPA applies.168
The GPA contains an Appendix I concerning those limitations. 
The Appendix I is individually made for each party to the GPA. 
Appendix I is an integral part of the GPA,
 
169 and it can be found on 
the WTO website.170
 
 The Appendix I contains five annexes and 
general notes. 
3.3.1 The Annexes: Thresholds, Entities, Services, and 
Construction Services 
 
The five Annexes to each GPA Party’s Appendix 1 concern which 
entities are covered by the GPA, and the thresholds for goods and 
services covered by the GPA. 
                                                          
167 See more information about SDR on the web-page of the International 
Monetary Fund: <http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/sdr.htm>  accessed 30 
November 2010. 
168 GPA, Art. I.4. 
169 GPA, Art. XXIV.12. 
170 See <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/appendices_e.htm.>  
accessed 30 November 2010 
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Annex 1 contains the central government entities which are under 
the GPA. For example, South Korea has written into its Annex 1 a 
number of central government entities covered by the GPA with a 
threshold of 130,000 SDR for goods. Therefore, each time one of 
those central government entities mentioned on the South Korean list, 
e.g. the Korean Ministry of Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs, is 
buying goods for a value of 130,000 or above, the GPA applies. For 
example if the Ministry were to buy goods to work on infrastructure in 
South Korea and enter a PPP, the GPA would apply to such an 
arrangement. 
Annex 2 contains the sub-central government entities which are 
under the GPA. For example, South Korea has written a list of such 
entities, like the Seoul Metropolitan Government, with a threshold of 
200,000 SDR for goods. 
Annex 3 contains all other entities that are covered by the GPA. 
South Korea has, for instance, written Korea Highway Corporation 
into the list of several entities covered by the GPA. The threshold for 
goods is 450,000 SDR. 
Annex 4 contains the services covered by the GPA. Each Party 
can make its individual list of services. The lists of each Party can be a 
positive or negative. For example, South Korea has made a positive 
list of services covered by the GPA. All other services are excluded 
from the GPA. Therefore, if one of the entities mentioned in Annex 1, 
2, or 3 are entering into a PPP concerning one or more of the services 
explicitly mentioned in Annex 4, the entity must follow the 
procedures in the GPA. 
Annex 5 contains the list of construction services covered by each 
GPA Party respectively. To continue with the South Korea example, it 
has made a positive list of such services covered by the GPA. 
Furthermore, there are different thresholds depending on whether the 
entity is a central public entity (Annex 1), a sub-central public entity 
(Annex 2), or one of the other entities (Annex 3) covered by the GPA. 
For central government entities the threshold of construction services 
is 5,000,000 SDR; for sub-central government entities the threshold is 
15,000,000 SDR; and for all other entities the threshold for 
construction services is also 15,000,000 SDR. 
The country-specific lists of entities covered by the GPA, which 
each GPA Party writes into Annex 1, 2 or 3, are not always clear in 
their definitions. That was the case in Korea – Procurement. In the 
specific case, the US claimed that ‘branch offices and subsidiary 
organisations’ were included under the list of Korean entities covered 
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by the GPA. The South Korean commitment provides: ‘The above 
central government entities include their subordinate linear 
organisations, special local administrative organs, and attached organs 
as prescribed in the Government Organisation Act of the Republic of 
Korea’. The Panel, however, did not find such basis to include branch 
offices and subsidiary organisation under the list, and the claim of the 
US was rejected.171
All the services and construction services that each party to the 
GPA mentions – whether positively or negatively – in their Annexes 4 
and 5 are categorised in the WTO Service Sectoral Classification 
List.
 
172 That system has its own numbering of the different services. 
For example, ‘Refuse disposal services’ is listed under number ‘6.B’. 
However, the WTO classification system refers to the Central Product 
Classification (CPC) system, which is an international classification 
system of goods and services used by the UN Statistics Division.173 
The latter is much more detailed than the WTO system. The ‘Refuse 
disposal services’ is numbered ‘9402’ under the old CPC system. One 
problem with the double classification system is that neither the WTO 
Service Sectoral Classification List, nor the Annexes of the parties to 
the GPA are updated in accordance with the updates of the CPC. The 
CPC system referred to in the WTO system and in the Annexes is the 
provisional CPC.174
Some of the GPA Parties refer to both systems, and where the 
WTO system is not explicit about one of the services mentioned in the 
CPC, the WTO system categorises such services as ‘other’ services. 
South Korea, for example, refers to both systems. Some parties only 
refer to the CPC system in situations where the WTO system is not 
explicit about the service. See, for example, Japan, which includes 
Building-cleaning services in its Annex 4, but only refers to CPC 
number 874. Finally, other parties, like the EU, only refer to the CPC 
system.
  
175
                                                          
171 WTO, Korea – Measures Affecting Government Procurement – Report of the 
Panel (1 May 2000) WT/DS163/R, paras. 7.14-7.83. 
 
172 WTO, Services Sectoral Classification List - Note by the Secretariat (10 July 
1991) MTN.GNS/W/120. 
173 See for more information about CPC on: 
<http://unstats.un.org/unsd/class/default.asp> accessed 30 November 2010 
174 See the provisional CPC on: 
<http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/registry/regcst.asp?Cl=9&Lg=1.> accessed 30 
November 2010  
175 See the Annex 4 of the EU. 
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3.3.2 The General Notes 
 
Besides the five Annexes, Appendix 1 includes each GPA Party’s 
General Notes, which are also an integral part of the GPA.176
If a public purchase is under the threshold, or it is the purchase of 
a service or a construction service not listed in the Annexes, the GPA 
does not apply. 
 The 
general notes reflect the reciprocal character of the GPA – and the 
exception to the MFN principle – by discriminating between the GPA 
Parties. For example, as mentioned above, the GPA does not apply to 
Canadian bids on Japanese procurement by several Japanese sub-
central government entities, whereas the GPA applies to all the other 
GPA parties. That follows from the general notes of Japan. Another 
example is the United States’ general notes, which provide that, for 
construction services, the GPA applies only to procurement of the 
entities listed in Annexes 2 and 3 above a threshold of 15 million SDR 
for suppliers from South Korea, whereas the threshold in Annex 2 and 
3 is 5,000,000 SDR for other GPA Parties. Also, the GPA does not 
cover construction services of US central governmental entities 
(Annex 1) for South Korean bids. So, in respect to such construction 
services, the US gives the other GPA Parties better treatment than it 
gives South Korea. 
 
 
3.3.3 Calculation of the Estimated Value of the Contracts  
 
In Article II, the GPA provides special rules for the public entity with 
regards to calculating the value of the contracts. The idea is to avoid 
the public entities circumventing the GPA by using a calculation 
method which will lower the contract value to a level below the 
threshold to the benefit of certain suppliers. In a footnote the GPA 
provides that the GPA applies to those government contracts which 
are estimated to be equal to or above the thresholds.177
                                                          
176 Art. XXIV.12 of the GPA. 
 Therefore, if 
for example a US central public entity wants to establish a PPP 
concerning, for example, translation services, and the estimate of the 
value of the contract is exactly 130,000 SDR, which is the US 
177 Art. II.1, footnote 2. 
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threshold for services for central government entities, the GPA 
applies.178
The valuation shall take all forms of remuneration, including 
premiums, fees, commissions and interest into account. In its method 
of calculating the value, the public entity must not circumvent the 
GPA by lowering the valuation, for example by dividing the 
procurement requirements, or in any other way
 
179
In those situations where more than one contract is awarded, or 
the award is separated into parts, it follows from Article II.4, a and b, 
that the entity then must choose between finding a basis from the 
actual value of other contracts that are both similar, or from recurring 
contracts like the one offered for the procurement. Those other 
contracts shall have been concluded within the previous fiscal year or 
12 months, adjusted, where possible, for anticipated changes in 
quantity and value over the subsequent 12 months; or finding a basis 
in an estimated value of recurring contracts in the fiscal year or 12 
months subsequent to the initial contract. 
 
Article II.4 does not suggest any hierarchy between those two 
methods for calculating the value, but apparently Article II.4 exhausts 
the methods, i.e. the entity cannot use any other method than those 
two mentioned here. One problem would, however, occur in situations 
where the entity has neither other similar and recurring contracts nor 
other just recurring contracts to base the valuation on. Also, from the 
wording, it appears that the basis for valuation cannot be based solely 
on one other contract; see the plural form, ‘contracts’, in Article II.4 a 
and b.180
Article II.5 concerns contracts for the lease, rental or hire 
purchase of products or services, or contracts that do not specify a 
total price. In such cases, the basis for evaluations shall be: 
  
 
(a) in the case of fixed-term contracts, where their term 
is 12 months or less, the total contract value for their 
duration, or, where their term exceeds 12 months, their 
total value including the estimated residual value; (b) in 
the case of contracts for an indefinite period, the 
monthly installment multiplied by 48.181
                                                          
178 See United States, Appendix I, annex 1. 
 
179 Art. II.2 and Art. II.3. 
180 That would follow from the textual interpretation. 
181 Art II.5 of the GPA. 
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It is further provided that in cases of doubt, the valuation method in 
(b) shall be used. 
 
3.4 Product Requirements and other limitations  
 
The GPA imposes limitations on the public entity if it wants to make 
product requirements. For example, a public entity might require that 
the PPP partner may only use products with a specific shape. It has 
already been mentioned above that the product requirement may not 
be based on offsets. Besides the limitation on offsets, the product 
requirements are limited in relation to technical specifications and 
rules of origin. 
x Technical specifications; it will be a violation of the non-
discrimination principle if a public entity could freely decide 
only to procure products with, for example, a specific 
trademark. That would give the public entity an option to make 
arbitrary decisions and for example only allow the trademark 
owner to make bids to enter the PPP. 
x Rules of origin; the public entity might find itself in a situation 
where the private party performing in the PPP is using final 
products which contain product elements that are imposed with 
an anti-dumping duty from the country where the public entity 
is located. For example, consider that the EU has imposed an 
anti-dumping duty on pre-manufactured cotton cloth from 
India. A public entity from an EU member state is interested in 
building a hospital as a PPP where the private supplier is 
purchasing the bed linen for the hospital beds in South Korea, 
but the South Korean bed linen is made of the cotton cloth from 
India. The question in this situation is whether the public entity 
can reject the bed linen from the potential supplier. 
The following parts look further into the technical specifications 
and rules of origin. 
 
3.4.1 Technical Specifications 
 
The GPA regulates technical specifications in Article VI. The 
provision deals with both the actual requirements for technical 
specifications imposed by a public entity and the level of advice for 
preparing the procurement that a public entity can seek from a 
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potential supplier or other with interest in the procurement. Both will 
be addressed in the following.  
 
3.4.1.1 Technical Requirements 
 
It follows from paragraph 1 that technical specifications about quality, 
performance, safety and dimensions, symbols, terminology, 
packaging, marking and labelling, or the processes and methods for 
their production and requirements relating to conformity assessment 
procedures prescribed by the procuring entity shall not be prepared, 
adopted or applied with a view to, or with the effect of, creating 
unnecessary obstacles to international trade. Therefore, a public entity 
is allowed to make technical specifications, for example to require 
specific quality measures being reached by the supplier, but any intent 
or effect of technical specifications creating unnecessary obstacles to 
the trade is not allowed. It is worth noticing the term ‘unnecessary 
obstacles’. This might imply that there can be situations where there 
can be obstacles to trade which are necessary; for example, in order to 
fulfil some safety requirements, a public entity can require that the 
product instructions are translated into the language of country where 
the public entity is established.182
Article VI.2 concerns requirements for technical specifications. 
Technical specifications shall, where appropriate, be in terms of 
performance rather than design or descriptive characteristics, and the 
technical specifications shall be based on international standards, like, 
for example, the standards developed by the International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO). If no international standards 
exist, then the technical specifications shall be based on national 
technical regulations, recognised national standards or building codes. 
  
The public entity is not allowed to require or make reference to a 
specific trademark, patent, design or type, specific origin, producer or 
supplier; see Article VI.3. Only in a situation where there is no 
sufficiently precise or intelligible way to describe the product in the 
procurement requirements, the public entity will be allowed to do so if 
a term such as ‘or equivalent’ is written into the tender documentation.  
 
 
                                                          
182 For a thorough examination of this, see: S. Arrowsmith, Government 
Procurement in the WTO (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2003), pp. 312-
317. 
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3.4.1.2 Advice on Technical Specifications 
 
Due to the complex nature of PPP, public entities might seek advice 
from the potential suppliers to formulate and specify the needs of the 
public entity. It is seen in chapter 4 that the EU uses the competitive 
dialogue as a means to achieve the flexibility required in such 
complex arrangements. Article VI.4 of the GPA imposes limitations 
on such dialogues. It follows that the public entity shall not seek or 
accept advice about the specific procurement from suppliers with a 
commercial interest in the procurement, if doing so would result in a 
preclusion of the competition. The ‘firm’ would here be any potential 
supplier to the PPP as well as other companies with a commercial 
interest in the PPP. However, advice can be sought if the competition 
is not precluded.  
The emphasis on ‘competition’ does not imply that the non-
discrimination rules are abandoned. Article VI.4 must be seen in light 
of the non-discrimination rules; that is, a public entity cannot seek 
advice only from a national private supplier, but must first ensure that 
seeking advice in the preparation of technical specifications is not a 
violation of the non-discrimination and national treatment rules in 
Article III. If the public entity fulfils the requirements in Article III 
and can seek advice from a private party with commercial interest in 
the PPP, e.g. a supplier, without violating Article III, the public entity 
must do it in a manner that will not preclude the competition. One 
possible option is to seek advice from all the potential suppliers and 
engage with them about specific solutions to the complex character of 
the PPP. For example, if the specifications have been determined with 
the advice from a potential private supplier to the PPP, the 
specifications for the product must not be company-specific for that 
advising supplier. The specifications must be made in a manner where 
other suppliers, given the actual market structure, can suggest a like 
product to the one produced by the advising supplier. Even in 
situations where the potential supplier holds a patent for a product 
which could be of interest to the public entity, the result of the 
preparation of the procurement must be open to include products 
around the patent as long as those products are not violating the patent 
owner’s right.  
If the public entity seeks advice from potential suppliers, the 
question is whether it is possible to keep some information from one 
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supplier away from other suppliers due to confidentiality; see Article 
XIX.4 of GPA. It will be left to the public entity to decide what 
information from a potential supplier is of a confidential character. 
Certainly, some information, like trade secrets, must not be revealed 
to the other potential suppliers. However, the public entity cannot 
keep all sorts of information confidential when the dialogue concerns 
the definition and refinement of its own needs. For example, all the 
characteristics of the product, i.e. the output needed by the public 
entity, must be revealed. Otherwise, the rule of confidentiality could 
be used to circumvent the GPA and prevent competition.  
Article VI.4 is a limitation on the public entity’s option of 
engaging in a dialogue with the potential suppliers to define the needs 
of the public entity with regards to the often complex aspects in a PPP 
if the outcome of such dialogue cannot be revealed to the other 
potential suppliers. 
Besides the limitations on the seeking of advice on technical 
specifications from potential suppliers, it is not clear from Article VI 
whether the public entity can seek advice on matters not related to 
technical specifications. For example, in the case of PPPs, there can be 
organisational and financial matters concerning the structure of the 
partnership which it could be important for the public entity and 
potential suppliers to discuss before the exact need of the public entity 
is clearly established. The headline of Article VI is ‘technical 
specification’, which indicates that the negotiators of the GPA 
intended only to regulate technical specifications and not other 
specifications. However, Article VI.4 only mentions ‘specifications’, 
whereas paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article VI both mention ‘technical 
specifications’. Based on the actual wordings of Article VI.4, it can be 
argued that ‘specifications’ in the sense provided in Article VI.4 is 
broader than the sense provided in Article VI.1 and Article VI.2. Had 
the drafters of the GPA wanted Article VI.4 to be limited to only 
concern ‘technical specifications’, they would have written it into 
Article VI.4. From that perspective, Article VI.4 will also include 
specifications concerning matters other than the ‘technical 
specifications’ referred to in Article VI.1 and Article VI.2.  
 
3.4.2 Rules of Origin 
 
The GPA regulates rules of origin in Article IV. Generally, the rules 
of origin concern the determination of where a product originates. 
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Although the WTO facilitates trade between its members, there are 
several exceptions where a WTO member can impose obstacles to 
products from other countries, for example where there is unfair trade 
like dumping or subsidised products.183
GPA Parties shall not apply other rules of origin in relation to 
government procurement than they do in the normal course of trade. 
Nor shall the GPA Parties apply rules of origin different from those 
applied at the time of the transaction in question to imports or 
suppliers of the same products or services from the same parties. 
  
Generally, the WTO members have established a work 
programme to harmonize the rules of origin.184 The result from that 
work programme shall be taken into account by the GPA Parties.185
 
  
3.5 Procedures  
 
As seen above, the GPA imposes limitations on a dialogue between a 
public entity and potential suppliers when defining and shaping the 
needs of the public entity concerning specifications in the preparation 
of the procurement. It is also necessary to ascertain whether the 
tendering procedures under the GPA allow for the flexibility needed in 
PPP arrangements. The following part will describe the procedures 
allowed by the GPA.   
 
3.5.1 General Rules on Procedures 
 
The GPA offers three types of procedures in which the public entity 
can enter into a contract with a private party: open tendering, selective 
tendering, and limited tendering. There is no hierarchy between the 
open tendering procedure and the selective tendering procedure.186 
The limited tendering procedure is an exception and can only be used 
if certain conditions are met.187
                                                          
183 See GATT 1994, Art. VI and Art. XVI and the related Agreements: Agreement 
on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 
and Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties. 
 
184 See Art. 9 in the Agreement on Rules of Origin. 
185 Art. IV.2 of the GPA. 
186 S. Arrowsmith, Government Procurement in the WTO (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 2003), 181. 
187 Art. XV.1 of the GPA. 
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The three procedures can include negotiations under specific 
circumstances. The negotiation aspect is examined in section  
The GPA does not offer a specific procedure for PPPs. The GPA 
does not explicitly deal with the need for flexibility to discuss and 
refine the needs of the public entity, as, for example, the competitive 
dialogue offered by the EU does. Without explicit reference to such a 
procedure, the question is whether the GPA provides sufficient 
flexibility to include such a dialogue under the three procedures or the 
negotiation option. Put differently, to what extent may the public 
entity use the potential suppliers to discuss, refine and shape the 
overall goal at which the public entity is aiming? Clearly, there is a 
difference between the task of buying 200 school tables and the task 
of building, running and maintaining a school; the latter cannot be 
easily defined in an invitation notice to submit tenders, and it may 
require expert advice from the potential suppliers about the actual 
limitations on their performance ability.  
 
3.5.1.1 Open Tendering Procedure 
 
The open tendering procedure in the GPA requires that all interested 
suppliers may submit tender to the public entity.  
In the case of PPPs, some of these procedures might not be 
appropriate. As PPPs often involve complex legal, economic, and 
organisational arrangements between the public entity and the private 
party, the open tendering procedure seems unsuitable, since it can be 
very costly. The public entity would not be allowed to just pick out a 
few tenders to make the dialogue. Therefore, an open procedure may 
not be suitable to highly integrated partnerships like the Institutional 
PPP (IPPP).188
 
  
3.5.1.2 Selective Tendering Procedure 
 
By applying the selective tendering procedure, only those suppliers 
which have been invited by the public entity may submit tenders.189
                                                          
188 See more in chapter 2. 
 
Article X.1 provides that to ensure optimum effective international 
competition, the public entity must invite tenders from the maximum 
number of domestic suppliers and suppliers of other GPA Parties, 
189 Art. VII.3(b) of the GPA. 
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consistent with the efficient operation of the procurement system. The 
public entity must select the suppliers to participate in the procedure 
in a fair and non-discriminatory manner.190 The public entity, 
therefore, seems to have limited discretion to decide on the number of 
participants in the procedure with respect to fairness, non-
discrimination and international competition. Apparently, the 
limitation in the number of participants can only find justification in 
the operation of the procurement system.191
By applying the selective tendering procedure, the public entity is 
then in a position to use a two-step procedure:  
   
 
x First, there is a qualification procedure. The interested suppliers 
make themselves known to the public entity, indicating their 
interest in the government contract or PPP and their 
qualification to submit tenders. At this stage, the public entity 
shall decide which of the interested suppliers are qualified to 
submit tenders. The qualification process is described in section 
3.6. Based on the operation of the procurement system, the 
public entity will then be able to reduce the cost of evaluating 
the tenders, which may be high in the case of complex PPP 
tenders.192
x Second, the qualified potential suppliers will be allowed to 
submit tenders, which then will be evaluated by the public 
entity.  
  
 
Article X.3 requires that the public entity shall permit a potential 
supplier which is not yet qualified to submit tender and be considered 
if there is sufficient time to complete the qualification procedures. The 
only limitation a public entity can make on the number of such 
additional suppliers is the efficient operation of the procurement 
system. 
The selective tendering procedure seems more suitable than the 
open tendering procedure in relation to a PPP. The public entity can 
work towards more complex arrangements, like a PPP, by making the 
                                                          
190 Art. X.1 of the GPA. 
191 See S. Arrowsmith, Government Procurement in the WTO (The Hague: Kluwer 
Law International, 2003), at p. 212. 
192 See S. Arrowsmith, Government Procurement in the WTO (The Hague: Kluwer 
Law International, 2003), at p. 202. 
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qualification round and selecting the appropriate suppliers to enter 
into a further qualitative qualification process.  
However, the question remains whether the selective tendering 
procedure is open to a dialogue, like the competitive dialogue, 
between the public entity and the potential suppliers to offer different 
solutions to undefined aspects in the often complex organisational, 
institutional, legal, and financial issues related to a PPP. The rules 
governing the selective procedures are silent in that respect. This will 
be addressed in section 3.1.5.3. 
 
3.5.1.3 Limited tendering 
 
In the limited tendering procedure, the public entity contacts the 
suppliers individually. The limited tendering procedure can only be 
applied under certain circumstances provided that it is not used with a 
view to avoid maximum possible competition or in a manner violating 
the national treatment principle or the non-discrimination principle. 
The different circumstances are provided in an exhaustive list in 
Article XV.1 of the GPA: 
 
(a) in the absence of tenders in response to an open or 
selective tender, or when the tenders submitted have 
been collusive, or not in conformity with the essential 
requirements in the tender, or from suppliers who do 
not comply with the conditions for participation 
provided for in accordance with this Agreement, on 
condition, however, that the requirements of the initial 
tender are not substantially modified in the contract as 
awarded;  
(b) when, for works of art or for reasons connected with 
protection of exclusive rights, such as patents or 
copyrights, or in the absence of competition for 
technical reasons, the products or services can be 
supplied only by a particular supplier and no 
reasonable alternative or substitute exists; 
(c) in so far as is strictly necessary when, for reasons of 
extreme urgency brought about by events 
unforeseeable by the entity, the products or services 
could not be obtained in time by means of open or 
selective tendering procedures; 
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(d) for additional deliveries by the original supplier 
which are intended either as parts replacement for 
existing supplies, or installations, or as the extension 
of existing supplies, services, or installations where a 
change of supplier would compel the entity to procure 
equipment or services not meeting requirements of 
interchangeability with already existing equipment or 
services; 
(e) when an entity procures prototypes or a first product 
or service which are developed at its request in the 
course of, and for, a particular contract for research, 
experiment, study or original development. When 
such contracts have been fulfilled, subsequent 
procurements of products or services shall be subject 
to Articles VII through XIV6; 
(f) when additional construction services which were not 
included in the initial contract but which were within 
the objectives of the original tender documentation 
have, through unforeseeable circumstances, become 
necessary to complete the construction services 
described therein, and the entity needs to award 
contracts for the additional construction services to 
the contractor carrying out the construction services 
concerned since the separation of the additional 
construction services from the initial contract would 
be difficult for technical or economic reasons and 
cause significant inconvenience to the entity. 
However, the total value of contracts awarded for the 
additional construction services may not exceed 50 
per cent of the amount of the main contract; 
(g) for new construction services consisting of the 
repetition of similar construction services which 
conform to a basic project for which an initial contract 
was awarded in accordance with Articles VII through 
XIV and for which the entity has indicated in the 
notice of intended procurement concerning the initial 
construction service, that limited tendering procedures 
might be used in awarding contracts for such new 
construction services; 
(h) for products purchased on a commodity market; 
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(i) for purchases made under exceptionally advantageous 
conditions which only arise in the very short term. 
This provision is intended to cover unusual disposals 
by firms which are not normally suppliers, or disposal 
of assets of businesses in liquidation or receivership. 
It is not intended to cover routine purchases from 
regular suppliers; 
(j) in the case of contracts awarded to the winner of a 
design contest provided that the contest has been 
organized in a manner which is consistent with the 
principles of this Agreement, notably as regards the 
publication, in the sense of Article IX, of an invitation 
to suitably qualified suppliers, to participate in such a 
contest which shall be judged by an independent jury 
with a view to design contracts being awarded to the 
winners.193
 
 
The limited tendering procedure has several legal reservations 
and, given those reservations, the limited tendering procedure will 
often not be applicable to PPPs. However, some aspects of the limited 
tendering procedure might be considered in case of re-negotiating the 
PPP contract. For example, it follows from Article XV(f) that a public 
entity is allowed to use the limited tendering procedure and thereby 
contact its PPP partner for additional construction services which have 
not been addressed in the initial contract and which, for unforeseeable 
reasons, have become necessary in order to complete the construction 
service, and where awarding a second contract to another supplier will 
be difficult for technical or economic reasons. However, the additional 
contract value must not exceed 50 per cent of the amount of the initial 
contract.  
 
3.5.1.4 Negotiations 
 
Article XIV of the GPA offers the possibility for the public entity to 
supplement the procedure by conducting negotiations with the private 
parties.194
                                                          
193 Art. XV.1 of the GPA 
 Negotiations can be seen as a tool for the public entity to 
194 See B. M. Hoekman and P. Mavroidis, ‘Basic Elements of the Agreement on 
Government Procurement’, in B. M. Hoekman and P. Mavroidis (eds), Law and 
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help to define the actual output based on the overall need. However, 
negotiation can only be applied in two occasions:  
1) if the public entity has mentioned the intent to negotiate in the 
initial notice of proposed procurement; or 
2) if the evaluation of the tenders has led to the conclusion that 
none of the tenders is the most advantageous one. 
In the establishment of a PPP, the government procurement would 
then, in the first place, be required to indicate the intent to make 
negotiations.  
The negotiation option has limitations. Article XVI.2 reads that 
negotiations shall primarily be used to identify the strengths and 
weaknesses in tenders. The term ‘primarily’ suggests that negotiations 
can concern situations other than actually identifying strengths and 
weaknesses in tenders.195 However, such other situations can only be 
exceptions to the general rule and must therefore be applied 
carefully.196 The exception seems to open up the possibility of 
applying negotiation during the tendering process – before the tenders 
have been submitted – to define the actual needs of the public 
entity.197 However, it is up to the public entity’s state to demonstrate 
the conformity of its action with the exception to the general rule of 
identifying strengths and weaknesses in the tenders.198
                                                                                                                                                    
Policy in Public Purchasing – The WTO Agreement on Government Procurement 
(Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1997), at 17. 
 The exception 
must be seen in light of the general transparency principle and non-
discrimination principle. Therefore, a public entity engaging in 
negotiations with a private supplier with the aim of finding 
organisational, institutional, financial, etc. solutions must offer 
persuasive reasons why it goes into such negotiations before the final 
tenders have been submitted. The question is whether an 
argumentation based on reduced transaction costs will be sufficient. 
195 See also S. Arrowsmith, Government Procurement in the WTO (The Hague: 
Kluwer Law International, 2003), at 258.  
196 See about interpretation of exceptions in WTO, United States – Tax Treatment 
for “Foreign Sales Corporations” – Report of the Appellate Body (14 January 
2002) WT/DS108/AB/RW, para. 140.   
197 See S. Arrowsmith, Government Procurement in the WTO (The Hague: Kluwer 
Law International, 2003), p. 258, which suggests that a dialogue between a public 
entity and potential suppliers may take place before the actual tenders have been 
submitted. 
198 See from GATT practice; WTO, Norway – Tendering Procedures on 
Trondheim Toll Ring Project- Report of the Panel (28 April 1992) BISD 405/319, 
para. 4.5. 
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Another limitation on the application of negotiations to define the 
output needed by the public entity is provided in Article VI.4, which 
was described above in section 1.3.4.1.2. Article VI.4 concerns the 
preparation of the procurement. The limitations on the seeking of 
advice from potential suppliers would be nullified if the negotiation 
option could apply on the preparation of the procurement. Such 
interpretation would then not be in good faith in accordance with 
Article 31.1 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Thus 
the negotiation provision seems to apply only to the actual tenders, 
and may only take place after the tendering procedure has been 
initiated. 
Concerning the situation where the tendering procedure has been 
initiated and an invitation notice has been published,199 it also seems 
there are limitations for defining the required product in co-operation 
with a private supplier. If a potential supplier requests tender 
documentation, the public entity must, among other information, 
provide a complete description of the products or services required or 
any other requirements including: technical specifications; conformity 
certification to be fulfilled; necessary plans, drawings; and 
instructional material.200
A textual reading of Article XIV suggests that negotiations 
between the public entity and the private parties that are potential 
bidders in the set-up of the financial options, organisational and 
institutional structures, legal aspects, etc. is very limited under the 
negotiation option in Article XVI.  
 A public entity would not be able to meet 
that requirement if the actual product is not completely defined when 
the tendering procedure has been initiated.  
 
3.5.1.5 Flexibility to Engage in Dialogue? 
 
Given the open tendering procedure, the selective tendering 
procedure, the limited tendering procedure and the negotiation option 
in the GPA, the question remains to what extent a public entity can 
engage in some kind of competitive dialogue with the possible private 
parties to specify the potential output of the need of the public entity. 
The challenge is to weigh the risks of alleged discrimination and non-
transparency against the reduced transaction costs and reduced 
uncertainties in the complex partnership between the public entity and 
                                                          
199 See more below in section 3.8.1 
200 See Art. XII.2(g) of the GPA. 
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the private party. As seen in chapter 4 below, the complexities of the 
PPP nature have led the EU to open up to allow the competitive 
dialogue. The competitive dialogue is a procedure between the open 
procedure and negotiation.201 Also, the UNCITRAL Model Law 
suggests a ‘competitive negotiation’,202 which is applicable in 
situations where it is not feasible for a public entity to formulate 
detailed specifications or identify characteristics.203
On the one hand, it can be argued that the lack of specific GPA 
rules about dialogue between the public entity and the private parties 
is not the same as a prohibition of the dialogue. On the contrary, 
without an explicit prohibition under WTO law, the parties to the GPA 
cannot be met with a claim of violation of the GPA when the 
Members allow the use of competitive dialogues between a public 
entity and private parties. As long as the GPA principles are followed, 
the public entity may engage in dialogues with the suppliers about the 
means to satisfy their needs. For example, the rules governing the 
selective tendering procedure are so vaguely formulated that they can 
encompass a competitive dialogue in the second phase after the 
 The competitive 
dialogue allows the public entity and the potential private parties to 
meet and discuss and elaborate solutions to the needs of the public 
entity.  
                                                          
201 See S. Arrowsmith, ‘Implementation of the new EC procurement directives and 
the Alcatel ruling in England and Wales and Northern Ireland: a review of the new 
legislation and guidance’ (2006) Public Procurement Law Review 86-136, at p. 
102. 
202 Art. 49 of the UNCITRAL Model Law. It provides: 
“(1) In competitive negotiation proceedings, the procuring entity shall engage in 
negotiations with a sufficient number of suppliers or contractors to ensure effective 
competition. 
(2) Any requirements, guidelines, documents, clarifications or other information 
relative to the negotiations that are communicated by the procuring entity to a 
supplier or contractor shall be communicated on an equal basis to all other 
suppliers or contractors engaging in negotiations with the procuring entity relative 
to the procurement.  
(3) Negotiations between the procuring entity and a supplier or contractor shall be 
confidential, and, except as provided in article 11, one party to those negotiations 
shall not reveal to any other person any technical, price or other market information 
relating to the negotiations without the consent of the other party.  
(4) Following completion of negotiations, the procuring entity shall request all 
suppliers or contractors remaining in the proceedings to submit, by a specified date, 
a best and final offer with respect to all aspects of their proposals. The procuring 
entity shall select the successful offer on the basis of such best and final offers.” 
203 Art. 19 of the UNCITRAL Model Law. 
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potential suppliers have gone through the qualification process. A 
dialogue between a public entity and the potential suppliers will not be 
in violation of WTO law as long as the competition is not limited and 
the non-discrimination principles are applied.204 This argument finds 
further support by looking to the international context, such as the 
rules on competitive negotiation in the UNCITRAL Model Law, 
which guides several national systems, and the EU competitive 
dialogue model. Furthermore, the limitations on dialogues in the 
negotiation model, which was discussed above, cannot be juxtaposed 
to a prohibition of dialogue, as ‘negotiation’ has a different meaning 
to ‘dialogue’.205
On the other hand, it can be argued that, without an explicit 
procedure for dialogues under the GPA, such dialogues will be in 
violation of WTO law; in cases where WTO legislation has listed 
procedures to be followed, a procedure beyond the list will be in 
violation of WTO law. The GPA only offers two options for the 
public entity and the potential supplier to have the closeness of contact 
that competitive dialogue necessitates: negotiations, and the seeking 
of advice. Both have several limitations and the competitive dialogue 
must be seen in this light. Had the drafters of the GPA intended that 
the parties could use a procedure such as the competitive dialogue 
they would have written it into the GPA, as it has been written in the 
EU system. Any dialogue, outside the options provided in negotiation 
and seeking advice, will be a violation of the fundamental 
transparency principle if the competitive dialogue is a closed-door 
meeting. Such a perspective leaves little room for the public entity to 
apply a competitive dialogue under the selective tendering procedure. 
Even though a dialogue or negotiation to help identify the actual need 
of the public entity finds support in some international systems, they 
seem to be prohibited in others like the World Bank.
 
206
                                                          
204 See S. Arrowsmith, Government Procurement in the WTO (The Hague: Kluwer 
Law International, 2003), at 265. 
 Therefore, it 
205 In Black’s Law Dictionary, ‘negotiation’ is defined as ‘[t]he deliberation, 
discussion or conference upon the terms of a proposed agreement; the act of 
settling or arranging the terms and conditions of a bargain, sale, or other business 
transaction’. The terms of the contract then seem to be an essential element of the 
definition of negotiation. The dialogue on the other hand is applied to help define 
and shape the needs of the public entity. 
206 The World Bank has issued procurement guidelines in the Guidelines 
Procurement under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits, which apply where a State is 
borrowing money for a specific project. The Guidelines Procurement provides that 
a two-stage bidding is allowed for complex contracts, where the first stage 
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cannot be said that there is an international consensus on the 
application of such dialogue or negotiation, and, as such, the GPA 
cannot be interpreted in such manner.  
The lack of textual support of competitive dialogue leads to 
uncertainty about the conformity of that procedure with the GPA. 
Such uncertainty was also reflected in the EU system before the 
introduction of the competitive dialogue provision in the Public Sector 
Directive in 2004. There were concerns whether the public entity 
could enter into dialogues with the private party in order to establish a 
PPP under the procurement rules at that time.207 After the introduction 
of the competitive dialogue provision in the Public Sector Directive, 
several legal concerns have been raised about of the lack of clarity in 
the scope of application of competitive dialogue.208
                                                                                                                                                    
concerns the submission of unpriced technical proposals by the potential suppliers, 
on which the public entity may base its adjustment of its tender documentation; see 
Art. 2.6. Negotiations only seem to be an option where all tenders have been 
rejected; see Art. 2.61-2.64. Besides, the World Bank has issued Guidelines: 
Selection and Employment of Consultants by World Bank Borrowers. Such 
consultants may be used to define the output based on the need of a public entity 
and can therefore be relevant to PPPs. However, such consultants are ‘disqualified 
from subsequently providing goods, works or services (other than consulting 
services covered by these Guidelines) resulting from or directly related to the 
firm’s consulting services for such preparation or implementation’; see Art. 1.9(a). 
The World Bank makes a clear distinction between advisory services, for example 
to identify specific projects a country can carry out in order to achieve a certain 
goal, and ‘services in which physical aspects of the activity predominate (for 
example, construction of works, manufacture of goods, operation and maintenance 
of facilities or plant, surveys, exploratory drilling, aerial photography, satellite 
imagery, and services contracted on the basis of performance of measurable 
physical output)’; see Art. 1.7. The latter type of service is regulated in the 
Guideline Procurement. This distinction further indicates that technical advice on 
preparing the procurement is not allowed under the World Bank framework. See 
also E. Nwogwugwu, ‘Towards the harmonisation of international procurement 
policies and practices’ (2005) Public Procurement Law Review 131-152, at p. 137. 
 
207 For discussion on this, see S. Arrowsmith, ‘Public Private Partnerships and the 
European Procurement Rules: EU Policies in Conflict?’ (2000) 37 Common Market 
Law Review 709-737. 
208 See, for instance, S. Treumer, ‘The Field of Application of Competitive 
Dialogue’ (2006) Public Procurement Law Review 307-315; and also S. Treumer, 
‘Competitive Dialogue’ (2004) Public Procurement Law Review 178-186. 
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So far, the negotiators have provisionally agreed on a revised 
version of the GPA.209
 
 The revised version is also silent about PPPs 
and the possibility to engage in a dialogue outside of the rules on 
technical specification and negotiation. However, one notable change 
concerns the negotiation procedure. In the revised GPA, the 
requirement in the existing GPA that negotiations shall primarily 
identify strengths and weaknesses in the tender has been deleted. 
Negotiations are not limited to concern the tender but may also 
concern other matters, e.g. different solutions for the institutional and 
financial framework of a PPP. Those changes seem to offer more 
flexibility in the GPA; through their implementation, the rules in the 
GPA will, perhaps, be better suited for PPPs than the existing GPA. 
3.6 Qualification of Suppliers 
 
Due to the complexity of PPPs, the public entity will have 
requirements for the suppliers, who will make a bid on the PPP 
contract. The GPA allows public entities to set up conditions for 
suppliers to qualify for the tendering procedure.  
The public entity may use a permanent list of qualified suppliers 
which are automatically qualified to participate in the tendering 
procedure. In the selective tendering procedures, the public entity may 
select potential suppliers from such a list to submit tender. Any 
selection shall allow for equitable opportunities for the suppliers on 
the lists.210
 
 In line with the transparency principle, entities maintaining 
such a list are required to publish annually a notice of: 
a) the enumeration of the lists maintained, including 
their headings, in relation to the products or services or 
categories of products or services to be procured through 
the lists; b) the conditions to be fulfilled by suppliers 
with a view to their inscription on those lists and the 
methods according to which each of those conditions 
will be verified by the entity concerned; and c) the 
period of validity of the lists, and the formalities for their 
renewal.211
                                                          
209 For more details about the revised version of the GPA, see: R. D. Anderson, 
‘Reviewing the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement: Progress to Date 
and Ongoing Negotiations’ (2007)  Public Procurement Law Review 255-273. 
  
210 Art. X.2 of the GPA. 
211 Art. IX.9 of the GPA. 
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The notice shall be published in one of the media each GPA Party has 
written into its Appendix III. 
The following part concerns the conditions that the government 
entities may use in the qualification process.  
 
3.6.1 Conditions  
 
Article VIII(b) of the GPA states that the requirements for the 
suppliers to participate in the procedure must not go beyond 
conditions which are essential to ensure the supplier’s capability to 
fulfil the PPP contract. The GPA does not define or clarify the 
essential conditions a public entity can impose on suppliers in the 
expectations of them to fulfil a PPP contract, but the conditions must 
be related to the performance of the contract.212
The conditions and the verification of the suppliers’ qualifications 
must be in line with the non-discrimination and national treatment 
principle, e.g. a public entity must not make fewer requirements for a 
domestic supplier compared to the requirements for suppliers from 
other GPA Parties.  
   
The conditions may be – but are not limited to:  
x Financial capacity: the public entity may require financial 
hguarantees from the supplier to participate in the process. In 
particular for PPPs, where the private supplier will often be the 
economic investor in building the object, such as infra-
structure, the public entity needs financial guarantees from the 
private supplier to ensure it has the financial capacity to fulfil 
the possible PPP contract; 
x Commercial capacity: the public entity may need certainty 
about the commercial qualifications of the supplier. For 
example, the supplier might be operating a road-pricing system, 
with requirements on the commercial capacity to advertise; 
x Technical capacity: the public entity needs information about 
the technical qualifications of the supplier in order to ensure 
                                                          
212 See also S. Arrowsmith, Government Procurement in the WTO (The Hague: 
Kluwer Law International, 2003), p. 225 and; C. Pitschas and H. J. Priess, 
‘Secondary policy criteria and their compatibility with E.C. and WTO procurement 
law. The case of the German Scientology Declaration’ (2000) Public Procurement 
Law Review 171-195, at 188. 
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that the supplier can fulfil for example the building of a school, 
bridge, road system etc. 
 
The supplier’s capacity in the above-mentioned areas shall be 
evaluated on 1) the supplier’s global business activity and 2) the 
supplier’s activity in the territory of the public entity making the 
procurement.213
The text of Article VIII(b) is not limited to the above-mentioned 
conditions, but what other conditions a public entity may include is 
unclear. The general principles, such as non-discrimination, must 
obviously be followed, and in the selection of suppliers a public entity 
may not impose, seek or consider offsets.
 
214 From the text of Article 
VIII(b), the conditions for the suppliers to qualify must be essential to 
fulfil the contract. The question is whether it can be an essential 
condition for a contract that the potential supplier has a record of 
acting in accordance with, for example, environmental standards or 
human rights if the PPP contract concerns the establishment of a 
communication network, or whether the conditions can only relate to 
the material aspect of the contract, like the potential supplier’s 
capacity to establish the communication network. In such a scenario, a 
human right condition could relate to fair wages to the workers, which 
may not be an essential condition to establish the communication 
network. In US – Procurement, the EC and Japan questioned the US 
practice of rejecting companies that were doing business with 
Myanmar (Burma) from qualifying to submit bids on public 
procurements. The EC and Japan claimed that the US practice violated 
Article X of the GPA, as the qualification of suppliers was based on 
political rather than economic considerations.215
                                                          
213 Art. VIII(b). 
 The EC and Japan 
requested the Panel to suspend the Panel proceedings and the case 
later expired. The question of whether the qualification criteria are 
limited to economic considerations was not clarified in the Dispute 
Settlement Body. Article X does not mention that a public entity may 
only apply economic considerations in its selection process of 
qualifying suppliers to make bids, but only that the procedure must be 
fair and non-discriminatory. However, the rejection of suppliers who 
are in business with another WTO Member which apparently violates 
214 Art. XVI.1 of the GPA 
215 WTO, Request for Consultations by the European Communities (26 June 1997) 
WT/DS88/1, GPA/D2/1; and WTO, Request for Consultations by Japan, (21 July 
1997) WT/DS95/1, GPA/D3/1. 
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international human rights216
However, the GPA allows the public entity to reject a supplier 
from qualifying on grounds other than those solely contract-related. 
Article VIII(h) of the GPA provides that the public entity can at any 
time exclude a supplier from the process for example if the supplier 
goes bankrupt or the supplier has submitted false declarations.
 will probably be a violation of the GPA, 
unless the public entity can demonstrate that human rights are 
essential to fulfil the contract in question, which apparently was not 
the case. If Article VIII(b) does not allow a public entity to include 
human rights or environmental conditions as essential to the contract 
performance, it must be asked whether the public entity can make it 
part of the contract that human rights or environmental standards are 
followed, thereby including human rights or environmental conditions 
as essential to the contract performance.   
217 Sue 
Arrowsmith has suggested a broader interpretation of Article VIII(h), 
which would include an examination of the potential suppliers’ 
integrity. From that perspective, a public entity would be allowed to 
disregard potential suppliers with a criminal record or other unethical 
elements.218
The question about the conditions to select the suppliers cannot 
easily be answered, and it must be a case-to-case discussion whether 
the conditions on the suppliers are legitimate or not. What is clear 
from the text though is that the conditions are not limited to only 
concern economic considerations; the conditions must be essential to 
perform the contract. The question is whether human rights, 
environmental aspects or other non-economic policies in relation to 
the potential supplier are essential for the supplier to perform the 
contract concerning the PPP.
 In this respect, it is open to discussion whether a public 
entity can reject a supplier which has a record of violating 
international conventions on fair wages or equal payment.  
219
                                                          
216 Myanmar is a WTO Member. 
  
217 Art. VIII(h) of the GPA. 
218 S. Arrowsmith, Government Procurement in the WTO (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 2003),  pp. 226-228. See also C. McCrudden, Buying Social Justice – 
Equality, Government Procurement, & Legal Change (Oxford:Oxford University 
Press, 2007), at 484-486. For a different view, see C. Pitschas and H. J. Priess, 
‘Secondary policy criteria and their compatibility with E.C. and WTO procurement 
law. The case of the German Scientology Declaration’ (2000) Public Procurement 
Law Review 171-195, at 188-189. 
219 See also S. Arrowsmith, Government Procurement in the WTO (The Hague: 
Kluwer Law International, 2003), pp. 337-342. 
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Three aspects must be noted. Firstly, in the awarding phase there 
seems to be more options for a public entity to include other factors 
that are not attached to the actual contract performance. Even though a 
public entity may not disregard a supplier in the procedure, if there is 
an interest in including factors like human rights, a later phase in the 
procedure will allow the public entity to include such factors. 
Secondly, the GPA allows exceptions for aspects concerning human 
and plant life, etc. which may be applicable; see more in section 1.3.7. 
Thirdly, a GPA Party might be bound by other international 
obligations that might interfere with the GPA. That could, for 
example, be the human right concerns. In that case, it can be argued 
that the GPA should be interpreted in a manner not to conflict with the 
other international treaty due to the principle of harmonious treaty 
interpretation. In particular, if the other international treaty is binding 
on both the state of the public entity and the state of the interested 
suppliers, it can be argued that the conditions on the suppliers should 
reflect the requirements of the other international treaty.220
 
  
3.6.2 Qualification process 
 
The public entity must not use the process of, and time required in, 
qualifying suppliers to keep suppliers from other GPA Parties from 
being considered for the intended procurement or to be kept out of a 
supplier list. If a potential supplier fulfils the conditions, the public 
entity must recognise that supplier as qualified to participate in the 
tendering process. Suppliers which have not yet qualified must also be 
considered by the public entity if there is sufficient time to complete 
the qualification process.221 The public entity must advise the supplier 
about its decision.222
If the public entity applies permanent lists of qualified suppliers, it 
shall ensure that other suppliers may apply for qualification to that list 
at any time.
 
223 If a supplier is terminated or removed from the list, the 
public entity must inform that supplier.224
The public entity must publish the conditions on suppliers for 
participating in the tender procedures in adequate time so the suppliers 
  
                                                          
220 See more below in section 3.7. 
221 Art. VIII(c) of the GPA. 
222 Art. VIII(f) of the GPA. 
223 Art. VIII(d) of the GPA. 
224 Art. VIII(f) of the GPA. 
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can both initiate and complete the qualification procedure.225 If a 
supplier that is not yet qualified requests to participate in an intended 
procurement after the public notice has been published, the public 
entity must promptly start qualification procedures for that supplier.226
 
  
 
3.7 Awarding Criteria 
 
Article XIII.4 of the GPA concerns the award of the contract. A 
supplier can be considered for the award if the tender conforms to the 
requirements in the notice or tender documentation. The award goes to 
the supplier who is capable of undertaking the contract and whose 
tender is either the lowest tender or the most advantageous, i.e. the 
tender which, in terms of the evaluation criteria set forth in the notices 
or tender documentation, is determined to be the most advantageous.  
The lowest tender is the tender with the lowest price. An award 
based on the lowest tender is the most transparent. However, basing 
the award on the lowest tender does not give the public entity any 
room to include qualitative aspects in the award determination, and it 
may therefore not be suitable for a PPP.  
The most advantageous tender based on the criteria in the tender 
documentation is the tender which, for example, gets the highest score 
in the evaluation process. Basing the award on the most advantageous 
tender allows the public entity to include qualitative measures by 
setting up qualitative criteria that the suppliers must fulfil in order to 
get the contract;227
If the award is based on the most advantageous tender, the 
question is what criteria a public entity can apply to evaluate the 
different tenders and whether such evaluation criteria can be non-
economic criteria. The aim of the GPA highlights the economic goals 
of achieving liberalisation and expanding the world trade. 
Furthermore, the GPA emphasises competition in the procedures. For 
example: seeking advice from potential suppliers must not have the 
effect of precluding competition; the selective tendering procedure 
must be made in a manner to ensure optimum effective international 
competition; the public entity must not provide any supplier 
 therefore it seems more suitable for PPPs.  
                                                          
225 Art. VIII(a) of the GPA.  
226 Art. VIII(e) of the GPA. 
227 See S. Arrowsmith, Government Procurement in the WTO (The Hague: Kluwer 
Law International, 2003), pp. 250-254. 
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information in a manner that would have the effect of precluding 
competition etc.  
Looking into the context, Article XII.2(h) of the GPA provides 
that a public entity must give tender documentation to the potential 
suppliers, and that tender documentation shall contain the criteria for 
awarding the contract, 
 
including any factors other than price that are to be 
considered in the evaluation of tenders and the cost 
elements to be included in evaluating tender prices, such 
as transport, insurance and inspection costs, and in the 
case of products or services of other Parties, customs 
duties and other import charges, taxes and currency of 
payment.228
 
  
Criteria other than economic ones may be included by the public 
entity to evaluate the different tenders.229
The criteria, however, must comply with the non-discrimination 
principle, national treatment principle and transparency principles of 
the GPA, as well as the requirements about technical specifications in 
Article VI. Furthermore, the prohibition of offsets must be followed, 
which rules out the possibility for the public entity to require some 
domestic social policies to be carried out, for example, the use of local 
women or men to work for the PPP,
 Therefore, a public entity 
may require that the private partner in the PPP follows some 
international labour standards, human rights standards, environmental 
standards, etc.   
230
1.3.2.3
 although there may be some 
exceptions if the public entity is from a developing or least-developed 
country; see section .  
                                                          
228 Art. XII.2(h) 
229 See also S. Arrowsmith, Government Procurement in the WTO (The Hague: 
Kluwer Law International, 2003), at 343-344 and; C. McCrudden, Buying Social 
Justice – Equality, Government Procurement, & Legal Change (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007),  at 487. See, for a different view, C. Pitschas and H. J. 
Priess, ‘Secondary policy criteria and their compatibility with E.C. and WTO 
procurement law. The case of the German Scientology Declaration’ (2000) Public 
Procurement Law Review 171-195, at 190; and A. Kovacs, ‘The Global 
Procurement Harmonisation Initiative’ (2004) Public Procurement Law Review 15-
38, at p. 18. 
230 See also M. Dischendorfer, ‘The Existence and Development of Multilateral 
Rules on Government Procurement under the Framework of the WTO’ (2000) 
Public Procurement Law Review 1-38, at 26-27. 
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Those limitations affect the criteria that a public entity may apply. 
For example, by including environmental standards, the public entity 
might give a supplier from country A an advantage over a supplier 
from country B if the supplier in country A follows country A’s strict 
environmental standards, but country B has no such standards, and the 
supplier in country B has not implemented a restrictive environmental 
production method which will be costly to implement. In such 
situations, the supplier from country A will be in a more advantageous 
position than the producer in country B. The question will then be 
whether the high standard requirement is, in fact, indirect 
discrimination to favour the suppliers from country A. If a public 
entity includes criteria that are in violation of the GPA, there is the 
possibility that such criteria can be exempted in accordance with 
Article XXIII of the GPA.  
Therefore, the test will first be whether the factor is in accordance 
with the GPA. In this respect it can be argued that if those GPA 
parties that are relevant in the actual procedure have all signed an 
international treaty, for example concerning the environment, the 
interpretation of the GPA should use the international treaty as a 
context. That could lead to an interpretation where the GPA is not 
violated even though environmental concerns are included in the 
awarding phase.231
If the criterion is a violation of the GPA, the next step is to 
evaluate whether such criterion can still be applied in accordance with 
the exceptions written into Article XXIII of the GPA.
 For example, if the international environmental 
treaty requires a special process in producing products, which 
potentially would put some of the GPA Parties in a better position 
than other GPA Parties, there would not be a violation of the non-
discrimination principle, as all the relevant GPA Parties have signed 
that international environmental treaty. The situation would be 
different, however, if some of the GPA Parties had not signed the 
international environmental treaty. In that case it can be argued that 
the GPA would be violated if the environmental criteria would leave 
the non-signatories in a worse position than the other GPA parties. 
232
                                                          
231 This follows from the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Art. 31.3(c).  
   
232 See, in relation to Art. XX of GATT 1994, WTO, United States – Standards for 
Reformulated  and Conventional Gasoline Report of the Appellate Body (29 April 
1996) WT/DS2/AB/R, p. 22. See also: GATS Art. XIV; and WTO, United States – 
Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services – 
Report of the Appellate Body (7 April 2005) WT/DS285/AB/R, para. 339. 
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Article XXIII.1 of the GPA concerns exceptions based on security 
interest. If the PPP concerns essential security interest, the public 
entity may exempt the government procurement procedure from the 
GPA if it is necessary and the essential security interest is related to 
either arms, ammunition or war materials, or if the security interest is 
related to procurement indispensable for national security or for 
national defence purposes. There are no requirements concerning non-
discrimination or limitations on the restrictions of international trade. 
Hence, if a public entity can demonstrate that the procurement 
concerns an essential security interest concerning one of the 
mentioned areas, and a violation of the GPA is necessary to protect 
those interests, then there is a legitimate basis for such exemption.233
Besides the protection of essential security interests, the GPA 
exempts other areas, although there are stricter requirements. Article 
XXIII.2 of the GPA provides:  
  
 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not 
applied in a manner which would constitute a means of 
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between 
countries where the same conditions prevail or a 
disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in 
this Agreement shall be construed to prevent any Party 
from imposing or enforcing measures: necessary to 
protect public morals, order or safety, human, animal or 
plant life or health or intellectual property; or relating 
to the products or services of handicapped persons, of 
philanthropic institutions or of prison labour. (emphasis 
added). 
 
Article XXIII.2 has a similar structure and requirements for 
imposing the exceptions as Article XX of GATT 1994; and the 
interpretation of that provision by Panels and Appellate Body might 
be useful in relation to Article XXIII.2 of the GPA.234
                                                          
233 See also C. Pitschas, ‘World Trade Organisation/United States: award of prime 
contracts for infrastructure reconstruction in Iraq - an assessment under the WTO 
Agreement on Government Procurement’ (2004) Public Procurement Law Review 
NA85-89, at 87. 
 In US – 
Gasoline, the Appellate Body stated that the first step in applying 
Article XX of GATT 1994 is to make a provisional justification of the 
234 See also C. McCrudden, Buying Social Justice – Equality, Government 
Procurement, & Legal Change (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), at 491. 
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measure in question, which is to determine whether the actual policy 
is listed in Article XX and whether the measure is necessary to reach 
the policy. The second step is to evaluate the measure under the 
introduction part of Article XX of GATT 1994.235
 
 If the public entity 
fulfils the first-step requirement, the public entity must evaluate the 
chapeau of Article XXIII.2 in the second step. In Brazil — Retreaded 
Tyres, The Appellate Body made a statement about the evaluation of 
the chapeau of Article XX of GATT 1994, which can be useful in the 
context of the GPA: 
The chapeau's requirements are two-fold.  First, a 
measure provisionally justified under one of the 
paragraphs of Article XX must not be applied in a 
manner that would constitute "arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination" between countries where the same 
conditions prevail.  Secondly, this measure must not be 
applied in a manner that would constitute "a disguised 
restriction on international trade".236
 
  
In relation to Article XXIII.2 of the GPA, the public entity must: 
1) Evaluate whether the secondary policy is necessary to protect 
one of the listed areas: protection of public morals, orders or 
safety; protection of human, animal or plant life or health; 
protection of intellectual property rights; relating to products or 
services of handicapped persons; relating to products or 
services of philanthropic institutions; or relating to product or 
services of prison labour. If the requirements under step 1 are 
met, the public entity must then move on to step 2.  
2) The public entity must ensure that the measures are not applied 
in a manner that will constitute arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination towards private suppliers from countries with 
similar conditions. For example, if two countries are using the 
same protection for plant life, the public entity from the one 
                                                          
235 WTO, United States – Standards for Reformulated  and Conventional Gasoline 
Report of the Appellate Body (29 April 1996) WT/DS2/AB/R, p. 22. See also 
WTO, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products 
– Report of the Appellate Body (12 October 1998) WT/DS58/AB/R, para. 118-120. 
See more about the test under Art. XX of GATT 1994 in L. Nielsen, The WTO, 
Animals and PPMs (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007),pp. 156-176. 
236 WTO, Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres- Report of the 
Appellate Body  (3 December 2007) WT/DS332/AB/R, para. 215. 
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country cannot impose standards which will favour the private 
suppliers from the same country over suppliers from the 
countries with the same standards. However, if the standards in 
the countries are not the same, the public entity may require – 
and thereby indirectly discriminate – that suppliers from 
countries with lower standards will not be accepted unless the 
suppliers apply the similar standards as the country of the 
public entity. For example, if a country has signed a specific 
multilateral environmental agreement, that agreement will 
obligate the country. It can be argued that such a commitment 
is a justifiable reason for the country to discriminate, even in a 
situation where the other GPA Party has not signed the other 
international treaty.237
The following part discusses some policies which a public entity 
may include in the awarding criteria. The focus here is on human 
rights and environmental issues. 
 Furthermore, the measures may not be 
applied in a manner that could constitute a disguised restriction 
on international trade.  
 
 
3.7.1 Human Rights  
 
Human rights are often used in the context of protection of citizens 
against the state. Even though human rights often concern citizens 
rights versus the state, several of the human rights guarantees are also 
relevant in the relation between the employee and the employer; the 
private buyer and the private supplier; and, in this case, a public entity 
and the product supplied by the potential supplier to the PPP. The 
question here is whether it is legitimate or even a requirement under 
WTO law for a public entity to require that the supplier follows 
human rights principles in the production, or whether the public entity 
can require that the private supplier uses materials which have been 
produced by others following human right principles. Human rights 
were one reason for the US rejection of suppliers doing business with 
Myanmar (Burma), as there is evidence of several human rights 
violations in Myanmar (Burma). As written above, the case never 
proceeded through a Panel. The question about the rejection of 
                                                          
237 G. Marceau, ‘Conflict of Norms and Conflcit of Jurisdictions – The 
Relationship between the WTO Agreement and MEAs and other Treaties’ (2001) 
35 (6) Journal of World Trade 1081-1131, at p. 99. 
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suppliers which are in business with a WTO Member that violates 
human rights, therefore, remains open. 
Neither in the multilateral WTO context, nor in the GPA are there 
any requirements on the public entity to take human rights into 
account in the procurement process. Even though human rights are not 
explicitly written into the GPA or the WTO agreements, some of the 
human rights values, such as non-discrimination and the right to 
water, are protected in the WTO framework.238 Such aspects must be 
taken into account by the public entity. However, even though the 
WTO agreements share some similarities with human right treaties, 
there are also clear differences, e.g. the WTO aim of enhancing the 
economic environment without taking notice of human rights.239
Even though the WTO does not impose any human rights 
requirements on the public entities, the WTO and the GPA cannot be 
seen in isolation from public international law. Public international 
law has several human rights safeguards in international treaties and 
peremptory norms in the principle of jus cogens. For example, slavery 
is forbidden, and the imposition of such a requirement on the suppliers 
will be legitimate under public international law. Several GPA Parties 
have ratified international human rights treaties, and the lack of clear 
guidance in the GPA opens the possibility to fill in the gaps of the 
GPA with the human rights concerns.  
 
Furthermore, there is no definition of Human Rights in the WTO 
framework, and therefore the balance between the economic 
promotion and human rights cannot be derived from such a definition. 
No guidance can be found in Panel and Appellate Body practice, as 
they have, so far, been able to avoid the question of human rights in 
WTO law.  
Including human rights as a criterion in the evaluation of the 
tenders cannot be a violation of the GPA if the human rights have a 
legitimate basis in another international treaty that the state of the 
public entity and the states of the potential suppliers are bound by, or 
jus cogens.240
                                                          
238 E. U. Petersmann, ‘Human Rights and International Trade Law – Defining and 
Connecting the Two Fields’, in T. Cottier, J. Pauwelyn, and E. Bürgi (eds.), Human 
Rights and International Trade (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 29-94, at 
33. 
 In accordance with the principle of harmonious 
239 H. Lim, ‘Trade and Human Rights What’s at Issue?’ (2001) 35 Journal of 
World Trade 275–300, at 278-280. 
240 See J. Pauwelyn, ‘Human Rights in WTO Dispute Settlement’, in T. Cottier, J. 
Pauwelyn, and E. Bürgi (eds.), Human Rights and International Trade (Oxford: 
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interpretation,241
However, should the situation be that the interpretation of the 
GPA cannot lead to conclusions that conflict with the human rights 
requirements under the other international treaty, the GPA allows 
exceptions from the GPA in order to protect public morals; human 
lives and safety; and measures relating to products or services of 
handicapped people. As mentioned above, there are several limitations 
which must be applied, including the necessity test and that the 
measures are not applied in a manner that will constitute arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination. In this respect, it must be assumed that if 
a state is party to an international human right treaty, and if failure to 
apply the human right measure as a criterion to award the tender will 
be a violation of the human right treaty, the necessity test will be 
fulfilled and the possible discrimination justified.   
 it must be assumed that the GPA will not be 
interpreted in a manner that would conflict with those international 
treaties if a public entity, for example, requires that the product from 
the supplier to the PPP is produced in accordance with human rights 
concerning working hours. 
On an international level, there are several international treaties 
concerning the protection of human rights; therefore, only a few will 
be mentioned here. In a UN context, it follows from Article 55 of the 
Charter of the United Nations (UN) that the UN shall promote 
universal respect for and observance of human rights, and it is written 
into the preamble that the faith in human rights is reaffirmed. Within 
the UN framework, the UN provides several human right treaties that 
are binding on states.242 For example, the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR) concerns principles of human rights. The 
Declaration is not a binding treaty, but it may, debatably, have 
achieved status as international customary law.243
                                                                                                                                                    
Oxford University Press, 2005) 205-231, and; S. Arrowsmith, Government 
Procurement in the WTO (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2003), at 356. 
 The UDHR 
241 See Art. 31.3(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. See also I. 
Van Damme, Treaty Interpretation by the WTO Appellate Body (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), pp. 357-359. 
242 See for an overview the Office of United Nations High Commissioner of 
Human Rights: <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/> accessed 30 November 
243 See, for example, H. Hannum, ‘The Status of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights in National and International Law’ (1995/6) 25 Georgia Journal of 
International and Comparative Law 287-397; and M. Darrow and L. Arbour, ‘The 
pillar of Glass: Human Rights in the Development Operations of the United 
Nations’ (2009) 103 American Journal of International Law 446-501, at 470. 
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provides, for example, that slavery is forbidden;244that everyone has a 
right to work under just and favourable conditions of work; that no 
discrimination must take place at work; and the right to form or join 
trade unions.245 The International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) is a binding treaty with 166 parties.246 The ICCPR 
includes provisions concerning the prohibition of slavery and slave-
trade, including forced labour.247 The International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) is a binding treaty 
with 160 parties.248 Generally, the ICESCR gives the right to self-
determination for individuals to freely chose their political status and 
pursue their economic, social and cultural development.249 The 
ICESCR provides that wages must be fair and, in particular, women 
are guaranteed working conditions which are not inferior to those 
enjoyed by men; that there is equal payment for equal work; and also 
that the working conditions must be healthy and safe.250
It is important to bear in mind that the treaties are only binding on 
the states, and not the private suppliers. Attempts have been made to 
make a treaty with binding human rights principles on Multi-National 
Enterprises; however, with no consensus among states, no Treaty has 
been concluded.
 
251 Generally, public international law is not directly 
applicable on private companies or citizens, and it is debated whether 
public international law ought to be extended to cover the actions by 
Multi-National Enterprises.252
                                                          
244 Art. 4 of the UDHR. 
 Instead, States are required to protect 
human rights. It can be argued that the obligations on states to protect 
human rights must also be reflected in the actual PPP. The State 
245 Art. 23 of the UDHR. 
246 Some countries have signed the ICCPR but not ratified it; for example China, 
Laos and Pakistan. Others, e.g. Malaysia, Burma, Saudi Arabia and Singapore, 
have not signed the ICCPR.   
247 Art. 8 of the ICCPR. 
248 Some countries, e.g. the US, have signed the ICESCR but not ratified it. 
249 Art. 1 of the ICESCR. 
250 Art. 7 of the ICESCR. 
251 UNESC ‘Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and other 
Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights’ (26 August 2003) 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2.  
252 See, for example: J. H. Knox, ‘Horizontal Human Rights Law’ (2008) 102 
American Journal of International Law 1-47, concerning the risks of private duties 
under public international law. See for a different approach; D. Kinley and J. 
Nolan, ‘Trading and Aiding Human Rights Corporations in the Global Economy’ 
(2007) 25 (4) Nordisk Tidsskrift for Menneskerettigheter 353-377. 
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engaged in a PPP would have to terminate the PPP if the private party 
was supplying its services with slave labour.  
Also, the WTO Ministerial Conference recognises human rights 
principles. In 1996, The WTO Ministerial Declaration from Singapore 
renewed WTO’s commitments to observe the internationally 
recognised core labour standards which are set and dealt with by the 
International Labour Organization (ILO).253
Within the ILO context, binding standards have been made. For 
example, forced labour is prohibited;
 Those standards are not 
binding in a WTO context, but, as mentioned above, those treaties 
may have an impact on WTO law given that the WTO agreements 
might be interpreted in a manner that would not conflict with other 
international law treaties. 
254 discrimination is 
prohibited;255 and the worst forms of child labour, like slavery, 
prostitution, drug trafficking, or work harming the health, safety, or 
morals of the child are prohibited.256 Furthermore, the ILO also 
governs wages and labour clauses in public contracts, which can be 
important for government entities establishing PPPs.257
Even though some ILO standards might be seen as context to the 
GPA, the ILO standards do not impose obligations on the companies 
but only the states. However, states that are parties to the conventions 
must fulfil their ILO commitments. Therefore, a public entity must 
require that the potential suppliers to the PPP fulfil the standards 
under which the state of the public entity is committed. The public 
entity can make such requirements as a part of the awarding criteria 
 Some 
countries, such as China and the US, are, however, reluctant to ratify 
those standards. The problem is whether some of the aspects of the 
standards also reflect customary rules of international law, like the 
prohibition of slavery under the principle of jus cogens, and therefore 
will be binding upon those states which do not ratify the standards. 
                                                          
253 WTO, Singapore Ministerial Declaration adopted on 13 December 1996 (18 
December 1996) WT/MIN(96)/DEC, para. 4. 
254 Convention concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, C29, adopted on 28 June 
1930; and Convention on the Abolition of Forced Labour, C105, adopted 25 June 
1957. 
255 Convention concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and 
Occupation, C111, adopted 25 June 1958. 
256 Convention concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the 
Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour, C182, adopted 17 June 1999. 
257 Labour Clauses (Public Contracts) Convention, C94, adopted 29 June 1949. See 
also H. K. Nielsen, ‘Public Procurement and International Labour Standards’ 
(1995) Public Procurement Law Review 94-101. 
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without coming in conflict with the GPA, which in that case must be 
interpreted in harmony with the ILO requirements of the state.. 
Even though the GPA may be interpreted in a manner that allows, 
or even requires, the human rights concern, several issues are then 
brought to the forefront. The definitions of human rights and the 
possible hierarchy between different human rights are not clear, 
although jus cogens is the highest ranking norm.258 However, the 
principle of jus cogens lacks precision in its definition and content.259 
Some human rights are core principles under jus cogens, thus ranking 
higher than the GPA. Other human rights values are not. The question 
is how to interpret the GPA in cases where the interpretation of the 
GPA may lead to conflict with such human rights.260
 
 Another question 
concerns the extra-territorial consequences of applying a human right 
criterion based on an international treaty which is not ratified by all 
GPA Parties. For example, several of the ILO conventions have not 
been ratified by the US. The question is, therefore, whether a public 
entity which requires the supplier to only use products from countries 
where the workers have such protection can be justified under the 
GPA. As mentioned above, it can be argued that by applying the 
exceptions under the GPA, a public entity can apply such standards 
that are not applied in the State of the potential supplier. However, the 
question has not been resolved in practice and, therefore, needs some 
clarification.  
 
3.7.2 Environment 
 
The aim of the WTO to open up the global market for cross-border 
sales might be in conflict with national measures protecting the 
environment. For example, a WTO member might have a special 
focus on biodiversity and will not allow the sale – and, indirectly, the 
import – of products which, in the process of production, emit 
wastewater into rivers, lakes, etc. and harm wildlife, etc. unless the 
                                                          
258 See D. Ingram, Law – Key Concepts in Philosophy (London: Continuum 
International Publishing Group, 2006), 27. 
259 D. Shelton, ‘Normative Hierarchy in International Law’ (2006) 100 American 
Journal of International Law 291-323. 
260 See, for example, E. U. Petersmann, ‘Human Rights and International Trade 
Law – Defining and Connecting the Two Fields’, in T. Cottier, J. Pauwelyn, and E. 
Bürgi (eds.), Human Rights and International Trade (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005), 29-94, at 33. 
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production uses certain filters for the wastewater. Such a national 
measure will also bind the public entity, which is about to establish a 
PPP. The public entity might require that its private partner fulfils the 
same conditions. However, such a requirement can be discriminatory 
if some potential suppliers depend on products from producers in 
states without such standards; and the requirements can be a 
quantitative restriction to trade in violation of general WTO principles 
and the GPA.   
The WTO does not provide an agreement specifically dealing with 
the protection of the environment, although several WTO agreements 
include provisions that are relevant to environmental issues.261 The 
WTO has established the Committee on Trade and Environment, 
which, among other things, looks into the relationship between trade 
and the environment in order to promote sustainable development. 
Furthermore, there have been some cases concerning WTO law and 
the environment in the Dispute Settlement System, and in Brazil – 
Retreaded Tyres, the Appellate Body stated that it is aware that a 
tension exists between the free trade ideal and environmental 
protection.262
The GPA is, to a limited extent, opening up for environmental 
perspectives which may be included as factors in the awarding phase. 
As already mentioned, the public entity can apply criteria other than 
economic criteria to evaluate the potential tenders from different 
suppliers. Environmental criteria can be a requirement of the public 
entity without violating the GPA if the GPA principles of non-
discrimination, national treatment, transparency, etc. are followed. A 
public entity may therefore require that the supplier to the PPP fulfils 
environmental criteria.
  
263
                                                          
261 For example, the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade provides that the 
protection of the environment is a legitimate factor in imposing obstacles to trade 
in goods if the trade restriction does not go beyond what is necessary, and the 
evaluation of the risk to harm the environment is based on available scientific and 
technical information; related processing technology; or intended end-uses of 
products; see Art. 2.2 of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade.  
 Such criteria find further legitimacy if both 
the state of a public entity and the state of the potential suppliers are 
parties to a multilateral environmental agreement, as it can be argued 
that the GPA must be interpreted in that light.  There exists a great 
262 WTO, Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres- Report of the 
Appellate Body  (3 December 2007) WT/DS332/AB/R, para. 210. 
263 See also R. H. Weber, ‘Development promotion as a secondary policy in public 
procurement’ (2009) Public Procurement Law Review 184-200, at 188. 
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number of multilateral environmental agreements concerning, for 
example, the atmosphere,264 biodiversity,265 chemicals and wastes,266 
ocean, seas and water,267 land,268 and other areas.269
The question is whether the argument of including multilateral 
environmental treaties as context to the interpretation of the GPA can 
be extended to also include environmental principles. In EC – 
Hormones (Canada) and (US), which concerned the Agreement on 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, the Appellate Body did not rule 
out that the precautionary principle is applicable WTO law and can be 
taken into account in the interpretation of the particular agreement.
  
270 
However, in the specific case, the Appellate Body stated that the 
precautionary principle is not yet clearly substantiated as customary 
international law, and nor does it have a textual directive.271 In case of 
conflict with a treaty provision, the Panel and Appellate Body have as 
their task to first of all interpret such provision in accordance with the 
customary rules of international law in the Vienna Convention, and 
can therefore not narrow down the interpretation with reference to a 
non-substantiated principle of law.272
                                                          
264 See, for example, the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, which has 192 parties, the US being the only one 
not to ratify it. 
  
265 See, for example, the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety and the Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species. 
266 See, for example, the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary 
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal. 
267 See, for example, some regional agreements: Barcelona Convention for 
Protection against Pollution in the Mediterranean Sea; or the Helsinki Convention 
on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area. 
268 See, for example, United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification. 
269 For example, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisations 
(UNESCO) World Heritage Convention. 
270 The precautionary principle is defined in the WTO SPS Training Module, no 8, 
as ‘a notion which supports taking protective action before there is complete 
scientific proof of a risk; that is, action should not be delayed simply because full 
scientific information is lacking.’  
271 The precautionary principle is written into several international instruments, like 
Art. 15 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. In practice, the 
application of the principle in different national systems heads towards a 
recognition of the principle, but international courts and tribunals have been more 
reluctant to apply it as customary international law. See P. Sands, Principles of 
International Environmental Law (2 edn. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2003), pp. 266-279. 
272 WTO, European Communities – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat 
Hormones (Canada) and European Communities – Measures Concerning Meat 
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If the public entity applies some environmental criterion that is in 
violation of the GPA, it must be examined whether the criteria fulfils 
the exception requirement in Article XXIII.2.  
As mentioned above, Article XXIII.2 of the GPA resembles 
Article XX of GATT 1994 in that the protection of human, animal and 
plant life are legitimate reasons for departing from both GATT 1994 
and the GPA. However, unlike GATT 1994, the GPA does not 
explicitly mention exceptions ‘relating to the conservation of 
exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in 
conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or 
consumption.’273
The Appellate Body has made a few statements concerning GATT 
1994, Article XX. In relation to Article XX of GATT 1994, the 
Appellate Body has stated that it is a fundamental right of a WTO 
Member to decide the level of protection, as long as the contribution 
of the level of protection is necessary to reach the aim.
 By not mentioning such an exception, the GPA 
indicates that the protection of exhaustible natural resources is not a 
criterion exempted from the GPA. As such, the protection of 
exhaustible resources can only be a criterion for awarding the contract 
if the other requirements, like non-discrimination, etc., in the GPA are 
met. The environmental exceptions in the GPA Article XXIII.2, 
therefore, seem narrower than the exceptions provided in GATT 1994.  
274 It can here 
be argued that in cases where a WTO member has made a 
commitment under a multilateral environmental agreement, an 
awarding criterion which is in violation of the GPA will be excepted 
under Article XXIII.2, if it is necessary to comply with the other 
multilateral agreement, and the possible discrimination may then also 
be justified. That line also seems to be followed by the Appellate 
Body, which, in US – Shrimps, apparently emphasised the multilateral 
nature of international environmental agreements as a justifiable 
reason to invoke the exception.275
                                                                                                                                                    
and Meat Hormones (US) – Report of the Appellate Body (16 January 1996) 
combined cases WT/DS26 and 48/AB/R, section VI. 
 What is noteworthy is that the 
Appellate Body furthermore applied the other multilateral 
273 Art. XX(g) of GATT 1994. 
274 WTO, Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres- Report of the 
Appellate Body  (3 December 2007) WT/DS332/AB/R, para. 210. 
275 WTO, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products- Report of the Appellate Body (12 October 1998) WT/DS58/AB/R, para. 
168. See also See P. Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law (2 edn., 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 945. 
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environmental agreements to define the concept ‘natural resource’ in 
Article XX(g),276
Politically, the WTO seems to emphasise environmental concerns. 
The Doha Ministerial Declaration provides that:  
 which indicates willingness to include other 
international treaties as context in order to understand WTO law.   
 
We recognize that under WTO rules no country should 
be prevented from taking measures for the protection of 
human, animal or plant life or health, or of the 
environment at the levels it considers appropriate, 
subject to the requirement that they are not applied in a 
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the 
same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on 
international trade, and are otherwise in accordance with 
the provisions of the WTO Agreements.277
 
 
The Doha Declaration gave the mandate to negotiate on the 
relationship between WTO rules and specific trade obligations in 
multilateral environmental agreements although the negotiations may 
not prejudice the WTO rights of those WTO Members not parties to 
the multilateral environmental agreements.278
Furthermore, in the revised version of the GPA, ‘environment’ is 
specifically written into the GPA. A public entity may ‘prepare, adopt, 
or apply technical specifications to promote the conservation of 
natural resources or protect the environment.’
 However, on a political 
level, it indicates the possibility of including environmental 
agreements in the understanding of WTO law between Members that 
are parties to the same environmental agreements.  
279
                                                          
276 WTO, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products- Report of the Appellate Body (12 October 1998) WT/DS58/AB/R, para. 
130. 
 Furthermore, 
environmental characteristics are mentioned as an evaluation criterion 
277 Para. 6 of the Doha Declaration. 
278 Para. 31(i) of the Doha Declaration, which suggests a reduction or elimination 
of tariffs and non-tariff barriers on environmental goods and services; see para. 
31(iii).   
279 Art. X.6 in the revised GPA. See R. Anderson, ‘Reviewing the WTO 
Agreement on Government Procurement: Progress to Date and Ongoing 
Negotiations’ (2007) Public Procurement Law Review 255-273, at 264. 
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that the public entity may apply.280
 
 The political line indicates that 
sooner or later WTO law will put more emphasis on environmental 
concerns. 
3.8 From Notice of Proposed Government Procurement to the 
Awarding Phase 
 
This part concerns the different formalities that the public entity must 
take into account from the initial notice of proposed government 
procurement to the final opening of tenders. 
 
 
3.8.1 Notice of Proposed Government Procurement 
 
In line with the transparency principle, the public entity must publish 
an invitation to suppliers with an interest to participate in the intended 
PPP. The notice with the invitation shall be published in one of the 
publication media which is written in Appendix II of the GPA.281 For 
example, if a Hong Kong public entity wants to establish a PPP, it 
must either publish the notice in The Government of the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region Gazette or the daily press.282
The public entity must make it clear in the invitation that the GPA 
applies to the procurement.
 
283
After the publication of the notice, amendments to or re-issuing of 
the notice must be given the same circulation as the original notice. 
Any significant information given to one potential supplier must be 
given to all other potential suppliers in adequate time to permit the 
potential suppliers to consider such information and to respond to it.
 
284
The GPA distinguishes between the information requirements in 
the public notice depending on whether the public entity is either a 
central public entity (Annex 1), or a sub-central or any other public 
entity (Annex 2 or Annex 3).  
 
                                                          
280 Art. X.9 of the revised GPA. 
281 Art. IX.1 of the GPA. 
282 See the specific list for Hong Kong in Appendix II of the GPA. 
283 Art. IX.11 of the GPA. 
284 Art. IX.10 of the GPA. 
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3.8.1.1 Public Entities from Annex 1 
 
A public entity from Annex 1 shall make the invitation to participate 
in the process of make tenders to establish a PPP as a notice of 
proposed procurement. The notice of proposed procurement shall 
contain the following information: 
 
(a) the nature and quantity, including any options for 
further procurement and, if possible, an estimate of the 
timing when such options may be exercised; in the case 
of recurring contracts the nature and quantity and, if 
possible, an estimate of the timing of the subsequent 
tender notices for the products or services to be 
procured; 
(b) whether the procedure is open or selective or will 
involve negotiation;  
(c) any date for starting delivery or completion of 
delivery of goods or services;  
(d) the address and final date for submitting an 
application to be invited to tender or for qualifying for 
the suppliers’ lists, or for receiving tenders, as well as 
the language or languages in which they must be 
submitted;  
(e) the address of the entity awarding the contract and 
providing any information necessary for obtaining 
specifications and other documents;  
(f) any economic and technical requirements, financial 
guarantees and information required from suppliers; 
(g) the amount and terms of payment of any sum payable 
for the tender documentation; 
(h) whether the entity is inviting offers for purchase, 
lease, rental or hire purchase, or more than one of these 
methods.285
 
 
Furthermore, a summary notice must be provided. It shall be in one of 
the official WTO languages, i.e. English, French or Spanish, and it 
shall contain the subject matter of the contract; the time-limits set for 
the submission of tenders or an application to be invited to tender; and 
                                                          
285 Art. IX.2 and Art. IX.6. 
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the addresses from which documents relating to the contracts may be 
requested.286
 
 
 
3.8.1.2 Public Entities from Annex 2 or Annex 3 
 
A public entity, which is listed in Annexes 2 or 3, may use a notice of 
planned procurement with fewer requirements than the notice of 
proposed procurement as invitation to participate. The notice need not 
contain as much information as listed above, but shall, as a minimum, 
provide a statement that interested suppliers should express their 
interest in the procurement to the entity, and a contact point with the 
entity from which further information may be obtained. Furthermore, 
the abovementioned summary notice must be provided.287
The public entity shall subsequently invite all the interested 
potential suppliers and provide them the same information as in a 
notice of proposed procurement. Based on that information, the public 
entity shall get confirmation from the potential suppliers about their 
interest to participate.
  
288
In situations with selective tendering procedures, a public entity 
from Annex 2 or Annex 3 may use the notice regarding a 
qualification system as an invitation to participate. Using such a notice 
as invitation requires, in addition, that the public entity includes 
information about the nature of the products or services concerned and 
a statement that the notice constitutes an invitation to participate.
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The public entity shall, however, in a timely manner, provide the same 
information as in a notice of proposed procurement and the summary 
notice. 
3.8.2 Time Limits and Deadlines 
 
The public entity will not be allowed to apply a deadline that favours a 
specific supplier and at the same time makes it impossible for other 
potential suppliers to prepare a tender. The GPA has minimum 
standards for deadlines. In general, Article XI of the GPA requires 
that any prescribed time limit shall be adequate, and the public entity 
                                                          
286 Art. IX.8 of the GPA 
287 Art. IX.3 of the GPA. 
288 Art. IX.4 of the GPA. 
289 Art. IX.9 of the GPA. 
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shall take into account the complexity of the intended procurement, 
which, in the case of PPPs, often requires a long preparation time for 
the potential suppliers. Furthermore, the extent of subcontracting 
anticipated must be taken into account by the public entity, and the 
normal time for transmitting tenders by mail from foreign and 
domestic points shall be taken into account when the public entity 
prescribes the time limits.  
The GPA has different minimum time standards depending on the 
tendering procedure. 
In open tendering procedures, there must be a minimum of 40 
days between the date of publication of the notice of invitation and the 
date of receipt of the tenders.  
In selective tendering procedures, there are two different types of 
minimum periods for deadlines depending on whether the public 
entity applies a permanent list of qualified suppliers: 
 
1) In selective tendering procedures without a permanent list of 
qualified suppliers, there must be a minimum of;  
x 25 days between the date of the publication of the invitation 
and the date on which the interested potential suppliers who 
have submitted applications are invited to participate in the 
tender procedure; and 
x 40 days between the date of issuance of the invitation to 
tender and the date of receipt of the tenders.   
2) In selective tendering procedures with a permanent list of 
qualified suppliers, there must be a minimum of 40 days 
between the date of the initial issuance of invitation to tender, 
whether or not the date of initial issuance of invitation to tender 
coincides with the date of the publication notice of invitation, 
and the date of receipt of the tenders. 
 
In both the open tendering procedure and the selective tendering 
procedure, it is possible to make exceptions and apply shorter time 
periods, but only in four situations, and if certain requirement are met. 
The four situations are as follows:  
 
x The public entity has published a separate notice a minimum 
40 days and not more than 12 months in advance, and the 
notice contains at least as much information as mentioned in 
Article IX.6 and Article XI.8; see above in section 1.3.8.1; a 
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statement that interested suppliers should express their interest 
in the procurement; and a contact point where further 
information can be provided by the public entity. The period 
must be no less than 10 days;290
x In case of contracts of recurring nature, the public entity may 
use a time period of no less than 24 days for the second or 
subsequent publications;
   
291
x In case of urgent matters where the general period renders 
impracticable, and the impracticability has been duly 
substantiated by the public entity, the period may be reduced to 
no less than 10 days;
  
292
x In selective tendering procedures with a permanent list of 
qualified suppliers for procurements by entities listed in Annex 
2 or Annex 3, there may be a fixed period by mutual agreement 
between the public entity and the selected suppliers. If no 
agreement concerning the time period exists, the public entity 
may fix the time period. The time period shall be sufficiently 
long so as to enable responsive tendering, and shall in no case 
be less than 10 days.
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Article XI.4 concerns the delivery date of the procured good, service 
or construction service. The delivery date must be consistent with the 
needs of the public entity, which must take into account such factors 
as: the complexity of the intended procurement; the extent of 
subcontracting anticipated; and the realistic time required by the 
suppliers for production, de-stocking and transport of goods from 
points of supply or for supply of services.  
As PPPs often involve complex products and services, e.g. 
building, running, and maintaining infrastructure, it must be expected 
that the delivery date cannot easily be defined, and it must be expected 
that different delays, for example bad weather conditions, may occur. 
 
3.8.3 Tender Documentation 
 
Article XII of the GPA concerns the requirement that a public entity 
must meet when a potential supplier requests information concerning 
                                                          
290 Art. XI.3(a) of the GPA. 
291 Art. XI.3(b) of the GPA. 
292 Art. XI.3(c) of the GPA. 
293 Art. XI.3(d) of the GPA. 
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the different formalities to the tender and the award criteria. As seen 
above, in the notice inviting to participate in the tender procedure, the 
public entity must provide some information about the forthcoming 
procurement procedure.  
The potential supplier interested in the procedure may request 
further information. The forwarding of such information from the 
public entity to the potential supplier differs depending on the type of 
procedure. In open tendering procedures, the public entity shall 
forward the tender documentation at the request of any potential 
supplier participating in the procedure. In selective tendering 
procedures, the public entity shall forward the tender documentation 
at the request of any potential supplier requesting to participate. Under 
both procedures, the public entity must reply promptly to any 
reasonable request for explanations to the tender documentation. 
Furthermore, the public entity shall reply promptly to any reasonable 
request for relevant information submitted by a supplier participating 
in the tendering procedure, on condition that such information does 
not give that supplier an advantage over its competitors in the 
procedure for awarding the contract.294
The tender documentation shall include the information which is 
necessary to permit the potential suppliers to submit responsive 
tenders. That includes the information required to be published in the 
notice of the intended procurement and the following: 
 
 
(a) the address of the entity to which tenders should be 
sent;  
(b) the address where requests for supplementary 
information should be sent;  
(c) the language or languages in which tenders and 
tendering documents must be submitted;  
(d) the closing date and time for receipt of tenders and 
the length of time during which any tender should be 
open for acceptance;  
(e) the persons authorized to be present at the opening of 
tenders and the date, time and place of this opening;  
(f) any economic and technical requirement, financial 
guarantees and information or documents required from 
suppliers;  
                                                          
294 Art. XII.3 of the GPA. 
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(g) a complete description of the products or services 
required or of any  requirements including technical 
specifications, conformity certification to be fulfilled, 
necessary plans, drawings and instructional materials; 
(h) the criteria for awarding the contract, including any 
factors other than price that are to be considered in the 
evaluation of tenders and the cost elements to be 
included in evaluating tender prices, such as transport, 
insurance and inspection costs, and in the case of 
products or services of other Parties, customs duties and 
other import charges, taxes and currency of payment;295
(i) the terms of payment;  
  
(j) any other terms or conditions;  
(k) in accordance with Article XVII the terms and 
conditions, if any, under which tenders from countries 
not Parties to this Agreement, but which apply the 
procedures of that Article, will be entertained.296
  
 
If the public entity allows the potential suppliers to submit tenders in 
several languages, one of those languages shall be one of the official 
WTO languages, i.e. Spanish, English, or French.297
 
 
 
3.8.4 Dealing with the Tender 
 
Article XIII of the GPA concerns the submission, receipt and opening 
of the tenders and the award of the contract. 
Normally, the tenders are to be submitted in writing directly or by 
mail. It is not written into the provision whether mail also means e-
mail. However, since Article XIII.1 only prohibits tenders presented 
by telephone, it can be assumed that e-mail will be allowed. The 
public entity may also allow tenders by telex, telegram or facsimile. 
The public entity may also allow the potential suppliers to correct 
unintended errors of form between the opening of tenders and the 
                                                          
295 For example, if the supplier is importing products from a country imposed with 
an anti-dumping duty, the government must submit that information to the 
suppliers if that anti-dumping duty is reflected in the tender price. 
296 Art. XII.2 of the GPA. 
297 Art. XII.1 of the GPA. 
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awarding of the contract if it does not give any rise to discriminatory 
practice. 
If a tender is received after the deadline for submission of tenders, 
the potential supplier shall not be penalised if the delay is caused by 
the public entity’s handling of the tender and the tender has been 
submitted to the office designated in the tender documentation. In 
exceptional circumstances, a tender may also be considered if the 
public entity provides for such exceptions in the procedure. 
The receipt and opening of tenders must, under both the open and 
selective tendering procedures, be under conditions and procedures 
that ensure the regularity of the opening of the tenders. They shall be 
in accordance with the national treatment principle and the non-
discrimination principle.  
A supplier will be considered for the award if: 1) the supplier 
complies with the criteria to participate in the tendering procedure; 
and 2) the supplier’s tender is in conformity with the essential 
requirements the public authority has written into the notice of 
invitation or the tender documentation. 
If the supplier submits a tender that is abnormally lower than the 
other tenders, the public entity may enquire with that supplier in order 
to ensure that the supplier can comply with the conditions of 
participation and that the supplier is capable of fulfilling the terms of 
the contract.  
As mentioned in section 1.3.7, the public entity shall make the 
award to the supplier who is fully capable of undertaking the contract, 
and whose tender is either the lowest tender or the tender which, in 
terms of the specific evaluation criteria set forth in the notices or 
tender documentation, is found to be the most advantageous. The 
award shall be made in accordance with the criteria and essential 
requirements specified in the tender documentation. 
 
3.8.5 Post award period 
 
Once the public entity has made its decision about the award of the 
contract to enter the PPP, the public entity must promptly inform the 
other participants about the decision. It must be in writing if the if the 
participants so request.298
The public entity shall publish a notice about the award of the 
contract and other information in an appropriate publication media as 
 
                                                          
298 Art. XVIII.3 of the GPA. 
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mentioned in its Appendix II. The information must be provided not 
later than 72 days after the award of each contract. The notice shall 
contain the following:  
 
(a) the nature and quantity of products or services in the 
contract award; (b) the name and address of the entity 
awarding the contract; (c) the date of award; (d) the 
name and address of winning tenderer; (e) the value of 
the winning award or the highest and lowest offer taken 
into account in the award of the contract; (f) where 
appropriate, means of identifying the notice issued under 
paragraph 1 of Article IX or justification according to 
Article XV for the use of such procedure; and (g) the 
type of procedure used.299
 
 
Furthermore, if a supplier requests an explanation of the 
procurement practice and procedure, or why the supplier did not 
qualify, or information about why its tender was rejected, the public 
entity must provide such information promptly.300
If the public entity finds that some of the information would 
impede law enforcement; or be otherwise be contrary to the public 
interest; or would prejudice the legitimate commercial interest of 
particular enterprises, public or private; or might prejudice fair 
competition between suppliers, the public entity may withhold such 
information.
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299 Art. XVIII.1 of the GPA. 
300 Art. XVIII.2 of the GPA. 
301 Art. XVIII.4 of the GPA. 
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Chapter 4 
 
 
 
Public-Private Partnerships under the EU Public 
Procurement Rules 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
As explained in 2.1.2, the term public-private partnership (PPP) is not 
defined at the EU level. Therefore, it should be made clear at the 
outset that there is currently no specific piece of binding EU 
legislation on public procurement covering the formulation and 
operation of PPPs. Instead, EU public procurement rules that are 
relevant to PPPs derive from the following sources: 
 
x the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (hereafter TFEU);  
x EU public procurement directives; 
x Relevant case law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ); and 
x Interpretative Communications and other soft-law measures  
 adopted by the European Commission.  
 
While the first three sources are binding ‘hard law’, the fourth one is 
non-binding ‘soft law’, providing guidance for the application of the 
hard law, and reflecting the Commission’s understanding of the 
current law. Nevertheless, the Member States and the private sector 
have given great weight to the Communications adopted by the 
Commission over the years.  
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The application of EU public procurement rules to PPPs is not 
straight forward because of the complexity from both sides. On the 
one hand, while PPPs share a number of common characteristics, as 
explained in previous chapters, PPPs take many different 
format/models: some are based solely on contractual terms and some 
on institutionalised co-operative structure; some involve works or 
services only; and some involve the combination of both elements. On 
the other hand, while the EU Treaty’s application is almost universal, 
EU public procurement directives, which lay down detailed 
procedural rules, maintain different treatment towards service 
contracts versus works contracts; public contracts versus concessions; 
works concessions versus service concessions; and conventional 
procurement from private entities versus procurement from public 
bodies or public-private joint ventures.  
Therefore, in assessing whether a given PPP project complies with 
EU public procurement rules, regard must be had first of all to the 
categorisation of such a contract in order to determine which set of 
rules shall apply. Only then can one move on to look at how the rules 
shall be complied with.  
Taking into consideration the diversity of PPP practices 
encountered in the Member States, the Commission has used two 
major models for categorisation in assessing applicable legal rules:302
•  Contractual PPPs of a purely contractual nature, in which the 
partnership between the public and the private sector is based 
solely on contractual links; and 
  
• Institutionalised PPPs (IPPPs) of an institutional nature, 
involving co-operation between the public and the private 
sector within a distinct entity. 
Both of these categories raise specific issues regarding the 
application of EU procurement rules. Adopting this distinction for the 
discussion in this chapter, after a brief overview of the evolution of 
EU procurement rules in section 4.2, section 4.3 will assess the extent 
to which contractual PPPs are covered, firstly, by EU public 
procurement directives, and then by TFEU, as interpreted by the ECJ. 
Two sub-categories will be considered in this context: (i) contractual 
PPPs capable of being classified as public works or public services 
                                                          
302 Commission (EC), ‘Green Paper on Public-Private Partnerships and Community 
law on public contracts and concessions’ (Green Paper) COM (2004) 327 final,  30 
April 2004, at p. 8. 
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contract, a typical example of which is the Private Finance Initiative 
(PFI); and (ii) concessions including works and service concessions.  
Section 4.4 deals with IPPPs. While the coverage of IPPPs by EU 
procurement rules is largely similar to that of contractual PPPs, IPPPs 
do give rise to particular concerns, such as: whether they can be 
exempted from the application of procurement rules by virtue of the 
so-called ‘in-house’ exclusion; and whether the selection of a private 
partner for an IPPP and the award of the contract to that IPPP require 
two separate tendering process.  
After considering the coverage of EU procurement rules so far as 
various type of PPPs are concerned, Section 4.5 will provide an 
appraisal of the procurement procedures suitable for PPP projects 
developed under EU public procurement directives, with particular 
attention paid to the Competitive Dialogue procedure introduced in 
the 2004 reform. Section 4.6 concludes this chapter.  
It is widely accepted that the complexity of the coverage of PPPs 
by EU procurement rules has jeopardised legal certainty, hindering the 
further promotion of PPPs. However, different views have been 
expressed by stakeholders regarding the necessity for PPPs to be 
regulated at the EU level.  It is submitted that whatever form of further 
guidance to be provided by the Commission, be it a binding legislative 
instrument or soft-law measure, the core task of the Commission 
remains to strike the appropriate balance between legal certainty and 
accommodation of diverse Member States’ practices; and the balance 
between ensuring the observation of EU procurement rules and 
providing a sufficient incentive for the private sector to engage in 
partnerships with public bodies.  
 
2. Overview of the Relevant EU Public Procurement Rules 
 
2.1 Relevant Treaty Provisions 
 
The former EC Treaty, like its successor, the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the EU, contains general rules that, inter alia, prohibit 
Member States from discriminating against other Member States – for 
example, by reserving contracts for domestic firms. These rules apply 
in principle (but with limited exceptions) to all public procurement 
measures and all types of government contracts, including PPPs. 
These can be referred as the ‘negative’ obligations of the EU Treaty. 
These rules form an integral part of the EU procurement regime and 
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are applicable and enforceable in Member States without the need for 
any implementing measures. 
So far as PPPs are concerned, the most important provisions are 
those on freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services, 
which are found in Articles 49 and 56 TFEU ( ex. Articles 43 and 49 
EC respectively).303 The ECJ has made it clear that whenever a public 
authority ‘entrusts the supply of economic activities to a third party’, 
the action would need to be examined in the light of these 
provisions.304  Furthermore, as the Commission noted, certain general 
principles of EU law emerging from the ECJ's case law would also 
need to be observed, in particular the principles of transparency, 
equality of treatment, proportionality, and mutual recognition.305 
Some of these principles, namely transparency and equal treatment, 
have, arguably, gone beyond merely ‘negative’ obligations and 
amounted to ‘positive’ obligations covering all public procurement, 
including those outside the scope of the Public Procurement 
directives.306
 
 
 
2.2 EU Public Procurement Directives 
 
These Treaty principles alone were considered insufficient to open 
procurement markets. In particular, it was considered that it was 
necessary for contracts to be awarded by transparent procedures so 
that authorities awarding public contracts could not disguise any 
discriminatory behaviour under a cloak of discretion. Further, special 
provisions were considered desirable to ensure that the rules could be 
effectively enforced by aggrieved bidders.  
To ensure this, the EU has adopted directives which regulate 
award procedures for major contracts - these require, for example, that 
states should advertise their contracts across Europe and should award 
                                                          
303 Provisions on the free movement of goods are of relatively little relevance to 
PPPs.  
304 Case C-458/03 Parking Brixen GmbH v Gemeinde Brixen and Stadtwerke 
Brixen AG [2005] ECR I-08585, at para. 61. 
305 See Commission (EC), ‘Interpretive Communication of the Commission on 
Concessions under Community law’ (Communication) OJ C 121/2, 29 April 2000. 
306 See further section 4.3.2 below where discussion is based on Cases C-147/06 
and C-148/06 SECAP v Comune di Torino, ECJ judgment of 15 May 2008; and 
Case C-324/98 Telaustria Verlags GmbH and Telefonadress GmbH v Telekom 
Austria and Herold Business Data AG [2000] ECR I-10745.  
128 
 
them using only commercial criteria. It has also adopted a special 
directive on remedies. A directive is a form of legislation which 
requires each Member State to ensure that it has appropriate laws in its 
own legal system to implement the rules of the directive. Most 
Member States have had to adopt new legislation to give effect to the 
obligations contained in these directives.  
Procurement procedures are regulated by two main directives: 
x The Public Sector Directive 
Directive 2004/18/EC – hereafter the Public Sector Directive. 
This regulates most of the major contracts awarded by public 
bodies (government departments, local authorities etc).  
x The Utilities Directive  
Directive 2004/17/EC – hereafter the Utilities Directive. This 
regulates bodies engaged in certain activities in the sectors of 
water, transport, energy and postal services (‘utility activities’). 
Bodies whose procurement is, in general, covered by the Public 
Sector Directive are covered by the Utilities Directives where 
they engage in the utility activities. The Utilities Directive is 
not confined to the public sector but also applies to a number of 
other bodies engaged in ‘utility’ activities, including many in 
the private sector that can be classified as ‘public 
undertakings’. 
Remedies for enforcing the above rules are dealt with in two other 
directives: 
x The Public Sector Remedies Directive  
Directive 89/665/EEC – hereafter the Public Sector Remedies 
Directive – deals with remedies for enforcing the EU 
procurement rules applying to contracts governed by the Public 
Sector Directive. 
x The Utilities Remedies Directive 
Directive 92/13/EEC Directive 89/665/EEC – hereafter the 
Utilities Remedies Directive – deals with remedies for 
enforcing the EU procurement rules applying to contracts 
governed by the Utilities Directive. 
These directives on remedies have recently been significantly 
amended by Directive 2007/66/EC - hereafter 2007 Amending 
Remedies Directive.  
The current procurement directives were adopted only in 2004, 
and were required to be implemented in Member States by 1 January 
2006. The history of the directives regulating contract award 
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procedures goes back to 1971, when a directive was adopted to 
regulate public works contracts: Directive 71/305/EEC. In 1977, a 
directive was adopted applying similar rules to public supply 
contracts: Directive 77/62. The late 1980s and early 1990s saw a wave 
of reforms of the public procurement rules. These formed part of the 
European Commission’s drive to complete the single market by 1992. 
The various provisions on works and supplies were brought together 
in 1993 in two consolidated texts (which also introduced some small 
amendments): Directive 93/36/EEC on supply contracts; and Directive 
93/37/EEC on public works contracts. The regulatory system was also 
extended to works and supply contracts awarded in previously 
excluded ‘utilities’ sectors in 1990, by Directive 90/531/EEC; to 
public services contracts in 1992, by Directive 92/50/EEC; and to 
services contracts awarded by utilities in 1993, by Directive 
93/38/EEC. The two directives on remedies referred to above (in 1989 
for the public sector and 1992 for the utilities sector) were also 
adopted during this period.  
Immediately prior to the 2004 directives the main directives were 
thus: 
1. Directive 93/36 on public supply contracts; 
2. Directive 93/37 on public works contracts; 
3. Directive 92/50 on public services contracts; 
4. Directive 93/38 on utilities contracts (works, supplies and  
 services); 
5. Directive 89/665 on remedies for contracts governed by  
 Directives 93/36, 93/37 and 92/50; and 
6. Directive 92/13 on remedies for contracts governed by  
 Directive 93/38 (utilities).  
In the 1990s, an extensive reform programme occurred, leading to 
substantial revisions and consolidation. After a lengthy legislative 
process (of nearly four years), involving many amendments to the 
original proposals, and including a conciliation procedure, two new 
directives were adopted. These are the current Public Sector Directive 
and Utilities Directive referred to above. The basic approach and 
provisions of these are the same as the old directives and, thus, much 
of the old case law remains relevant. However, many important 
changes were introduced. Particularly relevant to PPPs, a new 
competitive dialogue procedure was introduced in the Utilities 
Directive, with a view to facilitating efficient and transparent 
procurement of PPPs (see further section 4.5 below). Despite these 
simplifying provisions, the rules remain complex and detailed. Since 
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the adoption of the 2004 directives, the EU has completed or 
commenced certain other initiatives for strengthening the procurement 
regime; in particular, the 2007 Amending Remedies Directive and a 
new directive on defence procurement have been created.  
 
 
2.3 Commission Initiatives to Provide Legal Guidance 
 
Over the years, the European Commission has produced a number of 
documents, mainly in the form of Communications, to provide 
guidance on the application of EU procurement rules to PPPs. These 
include:  
x Commission (EC), ‘Interpretive Communication of the 
Commission on Concessions under Community law’ 
(Communication) OJ C 121/2, 29 April 2000; 
x Commission (EC), ‘Green Paper on Public-Private 
Partnerships and Community law on public contracts and 
concessions’(Green Paper) COM (2004) 327 of 30 April 
2004;  
x Commission (EC), ‘Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions on Public-Private Partnerships 
and Community Law on Public Procurement and 
Concessions’ (Communication) COM (2005) 569 final, 
15 November 2005; 
x Commission (EC), ‘Interpretative Communication on the 
application of Community law on public procurement and 
concessions to Institutionalised Public-Private 
Partnerships (IPPPs)’ (Communication) C (2007) 6661, 5 
February 2008; 
x Commission (EC), ‘Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions: Mobilising private and public 
investment for recovery and long term structural change: 
developing Public Private Partnerships’ (Communication) 
COM (2009) 615 final, 19 November 2009.  
These documents are non-binding soft-law. They have, nevertheless, 
to a certain extent, clarified how EU public procurement rules shall 
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apply to different type of PPPs. Since these initiatives summarise the 
Commission’s understanding of the current legislation and case law, 
the Member States and the private sector have given great weight to 
them in order to minimise legal risks. The discussion in the following 
sections will also use such guidance whenever available as a starting 
point.  
It is noteworthy that the Commission has adopted different 
approaches towards concessions in contrast with IPPPs. On the one 
hand, regarding concessions, the Commission has announced and 
reinstated its intention to produce a proposal for a legislative 
instrument on concessions based on ongoing impact assessments,307 
despite the fact that there has been significant stakeholder opposition 
to a regulatory regime covering all contractual PPPs.308 On the other 
hand, regarding IPPPs, the Commission is satisfied at the moment 
with an Interpretative Communication as ‘the best way to encourage 
effective competition and to provide legal certainty’, since ‘a non-
binding initiative in this area would provide the required guidance 
without stifling innovation’.309
The proposed legislation will only cover concessions, rather than 
all contractual PPPs. It is quite likely that the proposal will include an 
award procedure similar to that of the negotiated procedure with 
regards to competition under the directives (see further section 4.5 
below). It is unclear whether making a distinction between the rules 
applied to concessions and other contractual PPPs, such as PFI 
projects, is the right way forward. They involve exactly the same 
problems: very long-term contracts; long award procedures; bids 
submitted mainly by consortia; high procedural costs; involvement of 
private finance; the need for discussions to design and adjust the 
project; etc. Nonetheless, since the proposal will be based on ongoing 
  
                                                          
307 See Commission (EC), ‘Green Paper on Public-Private Partnerships and 
Community law on public contracts and concessions’ (Green Paper) COM (2004) 
327, 30 April 2004; and Commission (EC), ‘Communication from the Commission 
to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Mobilising private and public 
investment for recovery and long term structural change: developing Public Private 
Partnerships’ (Communication) COM (2009) 615 final, 19 November 2009.  
308 See Commission (EC), ‘Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions on Public-Private Partnerships and Community Law on 
Public Procurement and Concessions’ (Communication) COM (2005) 569 final, 15 
November 2005, at 2.3.1.  
309 ibid., section 4.1. 
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impact assessments, the Commission will need to justify its approach 
by relying on concrete data subject to the scrutiny of stakeholders.  
 
3. Coverage of Contractual PPPs by EU Public Procurement 
Rules 
  
This section will examine the extent to which EU public procurement 
rules are applicable to two types of contractual PPPs, namely: 
concessions; and others that may be classified as public contracts 
under the directives, a typical example of which is the Private Finance 
Initiative (PFI) project. The choice and operation of the award 
procedure for contractual PPPs covered by Public Procurement 
Directives (mainly PFI projects) will be analysed in section 4.5.  
 
3.1 Concessions under EU Public Procurement Directives 310
 
 
Arrangements classified as works concessions or services concessions 
are covered by different rules from other procurement arrangements 
under the directives. In essence, services concessions are wholly 
excluded whilst works concessions are subject only to limited 
obligations. Since the treatment of concessions is identical under  the 
Public Sector Directive and the Utilities Directive, the following 
discussion will focus on the Public Sector Directive only.  
                                                          
310 See S. Arrowsmith, ‘The European Procurement Rules and Public Private 
Partnerships: EU Policies in Conflict?’ (2000) 37 Common Market Law Review 
709; S. Arrowsmith, The Law of Public and Utilities Procurement (2nd edn., 
London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2005), pp.320-331 (services concessions) and pp.818-
823; S. Arrowsmith and P Badcoe (eds.), Public Private Partnerships and PFI 
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1999), 8.039-8.056; C. Davis, ‘EC Proposals on 
Public Service Contracts for Passenger Transport’ (2002) 11 Public Procurement 
Law Review 114; F. Hausmann, ‘Public Private Partnerships and the Award of 
Concessions’ (1999) 8 Public Procurement Law Review 269; U. Neergaard, ‘Public 
service concessions and related concepts - the increased pressure from Community 
law on Member States' use of concessions’ (2007) 16 Public Procurement Law 
Review 387; U. Neergaard, ‘The Concept of Concession in EU Public Procurement 
Law Versus EU Competition Law and National Law’, in R. Nielsen and S. 
Treumer (eds.), The New EU Public Procurement Directives (Copenhagen: Djøf 
2005); J. Skilbeck, ‘The Private Finance Initiative and Public Procurement’ (1996) 
5 Public Procurement Law Review 148; C. Tvarnø, ‘Public Private Partnership in 
the European Union’, in R. Nielsen and S. Treumer (eds.), The New EU Public 
Procurement Directives (Copenhagen: Djøf 2005); R. Williams, ‘The European 
Commission’s Interpretative Communication on Concessions Under Community 
Law’ (2000) 9 Public Procurement Law Review NA105. 
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3.1.1 Definition of Concessions in the Directives 
 
A public works concession is defined in the Public Sector Directive, 
Article 1(3), as a contract… 
 
of the same type as a public works contract except for 
the fact that the consideration for the works to be carried 
out consists either solely in the right to exploit the work 
or in this right together with payment.311
 
  
An example of a works concession would be where a contractor who 
has built a road or bridge is remunerated by being permitted to collect 
tolls from users for a set period.  
A service concession is defined in the Public Sector Directive, 
Article 1(4), as a contract… 
 
a contract of the same type as a public service contract 
except for the fact that the consideration for the 
provision of services consists either solely in the right to 
exploit the service or in this right together with 
payment.312
 
  
Examples of services concession would be where a consortium is 
required to build and operate an urban tramway system, and is paid by 
being permitted to collect fares from users; or where a firm contracts 
to build and operate a leisure centre for a local authority and is 
remunerated by charging users of the facilities. 
Exploitation entails that the provider assumes the economic risk 
arising from the provision and management of the services.313
                                                          
311 A parallel definition is contained in the Utilities Directive Article 1(3)(a).  
 Under a 
typical service concession, the risk arises out of the fact that the 
service provider bears the cost of providing the service, and obtains 
income to cover those costs and make a profit only if it is successful in 
generating revenue by exploiting the services by selling them to the 
public. In such a case, a significant element of the economic risk is the 
demand risk – the risk concerning the extent to which third parties will 
312 A parallel definition is contained in the Utilities Directive Article 1(3)(b). 
313 It was stated by Advocate General Pergola, in Case C-360/96 Gemeente Arnhem 
v BFI Holding BV BFI/Arnhem) [1998] E.C.R. I-6821 (para. 26 of the Opinion), 
that exploitation entails that the provider ‘assumes the economic risk arising from 
the provision and management of the services’.  
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choose to use the service. An arrangement is not a concession if the 
terms of the contract remove or substantially limit any element of risk 
for the provider. For example, if an agreement were to provide a 
guaranteed reasonable level of income from the procuring entity in the 
case of the user fees not being sufficient, this might not be a service 
concession.314 The Commission’s Interpretative Communication on 
Concessions also suggests that if ‘recovery of expenditure’ is 
guaranteed, there is an insufficient element of risk for a concession.315
For a project to be considered as a concession it is also necessary 
that the remuneration for providing the services should not come from 
the contracting authority itself. The definition of a concession was 
considered in the UK by Beatson J in the High Court in the Legal 
Services Commission case,
  
316
As can be seen from the definition in the directives as stated 
above, an agreement can be a concession if only part of the income 
comes from exploitation, but it is not clear how great that part must 
be. In Legal Services Commission in the UK, the judge held it to be 
irrelevant that some payments came from clients, since these were not 
a ‘significant’ proportion (para. 68), but did not give guidance on what 
proportion would need to come from the public to make the 
arrangement a concession. Beatson J in Legal Services Commission 
 which concerned framework 
arrangements for appointing solicitors to deal with legal aid cases. The 
judge considered that the arrangements in that case did not meet the 
definition, since it is only if consideration does not pass from the 
contracting authority itself that the arrangement is a concession (para. 
65), and it did so in the case (in general, the Legal Services 
Commission, and not the clients, made payment for the work). 
Beatson J considered it an insufficient basis for a concession under 
this principle that the contractor bore the economic risk that the public 
would not choose the contractor’s services (para. 65). In other words, 
whilst economic risk is necessary for a concession, it is not sufficient 
– it is additionally necessary that the consideration should come from 
persons other than the contracting authority itself. 
                                                          
314 Case C-382/05 Commission v Italy [2007] ECR I-6657 (Italy waste processing 
contract); and Case C-437/07 Commission v Italy, ECJ judgment of 13 November 
2008. 
315 Commission (EC), ‘Interpretive Communication of the Commission on 
Concessions under Community law’ OJ C 121/2, 29 April 2000, fn. 9.   
316 R (on the application of the Law Society) v Legal Services Commission [2007] 
EWCA Civ 1264. 
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also held that – as seems very clear – it is not sufficient for a 
concession simply that the beneficiaries are the public (para.69).   
 
 
3.1.2 Current rules in the directives on concessions 
 
Services concessions are expressly excluded from the Public Sector 
Directive (Article 17) and the Utilities Directive (Article 18). There 
was no explicit exclusion until 2004.  
In Articles 56-61 of the Public Sector Directive, there are special 
rules for public works concession contracts.  
The award of a works concession by a contracting authority is not 
subject to the same rules as the award of other works contracts, but is 
subject only to an obligation to advertise the contract in the Official 
Journal, and to give at least 52 days (as a general rule) for firms to 
respond. As with open procedures, extensions may be required for on-
site visits, etc., and may be reduced by 7 days when the authority 
transmits the notice in the electronic form laid down in the directive. 
There are no explicit rules concerning, for example, the kind of 
procedure to be used – indeed there is not even any requirement to 
hold a competition - or the award criteria to be applied.  
Note also that, in addition, the Directive place obligations on a 
party holding a works concession when awarding its own works 
contracts (sub-contracts) for the purpose of the concession, even 
though the concessionaire is itself not a contracting authority (Articles 
62-65).  
A key reason why concessions have been treated differently under 
the directives is that, in the legal system of some Member States, they 
are not regarded as ordinary procurement, but as a different type of 
legal relationship altogether, and have not been regulated by public 
procurement law. However, this kind of contract is of particular 
interest to cross border trade as the contracts involved are very large, 
extending over a long period of time (25-30 years, or more in some 
cases), and potentially very profitable. It was argued that the lack of a 
coherent legal instrument co-ordinating the award of concessions 
across the EU provides contracting authorities with significant 
discretion which hinder the opening up of pan-EU competition; 
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discourage bidders; and deprive the internal market of healthy 
competition for PPPs.317
 
 
3.2 The EU Treaty and general principles of EU law 
 
As explained above, any act of a State laying down the terms 
governing economic activities, is subject to the EU Treaty’s 
fundamental free movement rules, including the free movement of 
goods, services and persons (establishment).318
While the EU Treaty does not restrict Member States' freedom to 
grant concessions, the methods used to do so must be compatible with 
Community law. There is nothing in the Treaty or in the Court's case 
law which implies that concessions would be treated differently under 
the EU Treaty.  
 
Indeed, not only concessions, but also other contractual PPPs or 
IPPPs that are outside of the scope of the Public Procurement 
Directives, must comply with Treaty rules and principles, provided no 
justification for derogation can be found in the grounds contained in 
the Treaty itself (or in ‘objective justifications’ if the measure is 
indistinctly applicable; see 4.3.2.3 below). Therefore, the discussion in 
this section is of wider relevance to all PPPs.   
The legal situation regarding public service concessions and PPPs 
outside of the scope of the directives has been summarised clearly by 
the ECJ in the ANAV case, which involved a public service concession 
awarded directly without completion to a company wholly owned by 
the procuring municipality: 
  
18 Notwithstanding the fact that public service 
concession contracts are excluded from the scope of 
[Public Sector Directive], the public authorities 
concluding them are, none the less, bound to comply 
with the fundamental rules of the EC Treaty, in 
general, and the principle of non-discrimination on the 
ground of nationality, in particular (…). 
                                                          
317 A. Calleja, The Legal and Policy Considerations in the Award of Public-Private 
Partnerships (2010)(2) European Public Private Partnership Law Review, at p. 
100.  
318 Commission (EC), Interpretive Communication of the Commission on 
Concessions under Community law (Communication) OJ C 121/2, 29 April 2000, 
at Section 3.  
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19 The provisions of the Treaty which are specifically 
applicable to public service concessions include, in 
particular, Article 43 EC and Article 49 EC (…). 
20 Besides the principle of non-discrimination on 
grounds of nationality, the principle of equal treatment 
of tenderers is also to be applied to public service 
concessions even in the absence of discrimination on 
grounds of nationality (…). 
21 The principles of equal treatment and non-
discrimination on grounds of nationality imply, in 
particular, a duty of transparency which enables the 
concession-granting public authority to ensure that those 
principles are complied with. That obligation of 
transparency which is imposed on the public authority 
consists in ensuring, for the benefit of any potential 
tenderer, a degree of advertising sufficient to enable the 
service concession to be opened up to competition and 
the impartiality of procurement procedures to be 
reviewed (…).319
 
 
The Commission also recognises that PPPs and concessions are 
subject not only to Treaty provisions on free movement but also to the 
principles emerging from the Court's case law, notably the principles 
of non-discrimination, equality of treatment, transparency, mutual 
recognition, and proportionality. 320
So far as concessions are concerned, we will firstly look at the 
application of basic ‘negative’ free movement obligations, in 
particular Articles 49 on establishment and 56 TFEU on services (ex. 
Articles 43 and 49 EC respectively); then the application of ‘positive’ 
obligations derived from the general principles of transparency and 
equal treatment to concessions will be examined.  
 
 
3.2.1 Article 56 TFEU on freedom to provide services 
 
Article 56 TFEU is concerned with opening the market for nationals 
of one Member State who wish to provide services (including 
                                                          
319 Case C-410/04 ANAV v Comune di Bari [2006] E.C.R. I-3303, at para.20, 
emphasis added and footnote omitted.  
320 Commission (EC), Interpretive Communication of the Commission on 
Concessions under Community law (Communication) OJ C 121/2, 29 April 2000, 
at Section 3.  
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construction) in another, whilst based in their home State. It covers 
both those who wish to base themselves temporarily abroad (for 
example, a consultant travelling to work on a project in another State) 
or send their employees abroad, as well as those who propose to carry 
out services in other States whilst remaining in their home State. The 
provision prohibits a Member State from preenting Community 
enterprises from other Member States from providing services within 
its territory. This will certainly cover any restriction adopted by one 
Member State preventing concessionaires of other Member States 
from participation in its public concession contracts.  
Article 56 TFEU may be infringed by three types of measures, 
which are set out below. 
 
3.2.1.1 Measures that discriminate directly on grounds of 
nationality of the service provider 
 
One example would be a rule that prohibits all foreign bidders from 
participating in a concession project; gives preferential treatment to 
domestic bidders in concession projects; or applies qualification 
conditions to firms from other Member States that are not also applied 
to domestic firms. Italian legislation requiring contractors for certain 
public works contracts to reserve a proportion of the works for 
subcontractors who had their registered office in the region of the 
works was held, by the ECJ, to be contrary to Article 49 EC (now 
Article 56 TFEU), since this discriminated directly against potential 
sub-contractors established outside Italy (it being irrelevant that some 
firms established in Italy were also affected).321
 
 
3.2.1.2 Measures which apply equally to domestic firms and those 
from other Member States but which have the effect of favouring 
domestic firms 
 
Indirectly discriminatory measures which apply equally to domestic 
firms and those from other Member States but have the effect of 
favouring domestic firms are also caught. For example, domestic 
legislation giving preferences to consortia and joint ventures involving 
the participation of firms whose main activity was in the region of the 
works was held, by the ECJ, as being contrary to Article 49 EC (now 
Article 56 TFEU), since it favoured enterprises established in Italy, 
                                                          
321 Case C-360/89 Commission v. Italy (1992] E.C.R. I-3401.  
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which were more likely than other enterprises to have their main 
activities in the region concerned.322
Article 56 TFEU also covers any limitations on bringing the 
provider's own labour force into the host state in order to work on the 
contract. In Storebaelt, a clause requiring use of Danish labour as far 
as possible, in a contract for the construction of a bridge, was also 
held to be contrary to this provision.
 
323
 
 
3.2.1.3 Measures that have an equal impact on domestic and non-
domestic firms 
 
In its general case law on Article 56 TFEU, the ECJ has taken the 
approach that all measures that have an impact on trade in services are 
prima facie covered, even when these do not discriminate directly or 
indirectly against service providers from other Member States, and 
can only be allowed if they are justified by Treaty derogations on 
public interest requirements.324
This approach seemed also to be applied by the ECJ in relation to 
procurement in the case of Contse.
  
325
 
 The ECJ seemed to assume, in 
that case, that any kind of restrictions on access to public contracts, 
such as conditions on the qualifications of bidders, must be justified 
(which will include showing that the measure was necessary and 
proportionate). For example, an authority might decide to set a 
condition that a firm should have 20 years experience to bid for a 
concession contract to provide tram services. If justification is 
necessary, this would be very difficult to justify on any grounds of 
quality, etc., and probably would thus breach the Treaty, even though 
it is a condition which affects domestic and foreign firms in the same 
way. However, it can be pointed out that all the measures considered 
in Contse had a greater impact on non-domestic firms than on 
domestic firms, i.e. they were indirectly discriminatory. 
                                                          
322 ibid.  
323 Case C-243/89 Commission v Kingdom of Denmark ("Storebaelt") [1993] ECR 
I-3353.  
324Case C–384/93, Alpine Investments B.V. v Minister van Financien [1995] ECR 
I–1141. 
325 Case C-234/03 Contse v Insulad [2005] I-9315. 
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3.2.2 Article 49 TFEU (ex 43 EC) on freedom of establishment 
 
Article 49 TFEU is concerned with the freedom of persons from one 
State to set up business (establish) on a permanent basis in another 
State: States must allow persons from other Member States both to 
establish in their territory and to operate under the same conditions as 
nationals.  
Measures that restrict access to public contracts, including 
concessions, for such persons may infringe this provision. In Re Data 
Processing, Italian legislation limiting participation in certain data 
processing contracts to firms wholly or mainly in Italian public 
ownership was held to infringe ex Articles 43 and 49 EC. Since, in 
practice, all data processing firms in Italian public ownership were 
Italian, the provision thus discriminated against non-nationals, both 
those established in Italy (ex Article 43 EC), and those in other 
Member States (ex Article 49 EC).326
 
  
3.2.3 Derogations and limitations on the Treaty free movement 
rules 
 
Restrictions on the freedom of establishment and the freedom to 
provide services are allowed only if they are justified by one of the 
reasons stated in Articles 51, 52 and 62 TFEU (ex Article 45, 46 and 
55 EC). Article 52 TFEU (cross-referred in Article 62) provides for 
express derogations on grounds of ‘public policy, public security or 
public health’. Article 51 TFEU allows restrictions on the freedom of 
establishment and the freedom to provide services in the case of 
activities connected, even occasionally, with the exercise of official 
authority.  
Article 51 TFEU is of particular interest to concessions since any 
activity delegated by the public authorities normally has a connotation 
of public interest, and one may wonder whether such activity 
necessarily involves exercising official authority. The ECJ has 
stressed that since it derogates from the fundamental rule of freedom 
of establishment, Article 51 TFEU ‘must be interpreted in a manner 
which limits its scope to what is strictly necessary in order to 
safeguard the interests which it allows the Member States to 
                                                          
326 Case C-3/88 Commission v Italy (‘Re Data Processing’) [1989] E.C.R. 4035. 
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protect’.327 The Commission is also very cautious about this 
exception, and stated that this exception ‘must apply only to cases in 
which the concessionaire directly and specifically exercises official 
authority’ and, therefore, ‘does not automatically apply to activities 
carried out by virtue of an obligation or an exclusivity established by 
law or qualified by the national authorities as being in the public 
interest’. 328
The ECJ dismissed the application of the Article 51 TFEU (ex 
Article 45 EC) in cases where the activities transferred remained 
subject to supervision by the official authorities, which had at their 
disposal appropriate means for ensuring the protection of the interests 
entrusted to them;
  
329 and where the activities transferred were of a 
technical nature and therefore not connected with the exercise of 
official authority.330
Even when no explicit Treaty derogation applies, the ECJ has 
recognised that an ‘indistinctly applicable‘ measure, which does not 
draw a direct distinction between domestic and imported products, is 
allowed if it can be justified on one of public interest grounds– 
referred to as ‘mandatory requirements’ under goods, and either 
‘imperative requirements’ or ‘objective justifications’ under services - 
recognised by the Court. These grounds, contained in a non-
exhaustive list to which the ECJ may add if it considers it to be 
appropriate, include protection of consumers, environmental 
protection, the effectiveness of fiscal supervision, and improvement of 
working conditions. 
 
331
The principle of proportionality, a general principle of EU law, 
requires that any derogation restricting the exercise of the fundamental 
freedoms, Treaty based or ‘imperative requirements’, should be both 
necessary and appropriate in the light of the objectives pursued. This 
implies, in particular, that, in the choice of the measures for achieving 
the objective pursued, the Member State must give preference to those 
 
                                                          
327 Case147/86 Commission v. Greece [1988] ECR 1637; Case 2/74 Reyners [1974] 
ECR 631. 
328 Commission (EC), ‘Interpretive Communication of the Commission on 
Concessions under Community law’ (Communication) OJ C 121/2, 29 April 2000, 
at Section 3.1.5.  
329 Case 147/86 Commission v Hellenic Republic [1988] ECR 1637 
330 C-272/91 Commission v Italian Republic (Concession for the lottery 
computerisation system, Lottomatica) ECR [1994] I-01409  
331 Case 21/88 Du Pont de Nemours Italiana SpA v Unita Sanitaria Locale No.2 Di 
Carrara [1990] E.C.R. I-889 
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which least restrict the exercise of these freedoms. In Re Data 
Processing mentioned above,332
 
 Italy claimed in their defence that the 
restriction on the participants being publicly owned can be justified 
under ex Article 46 and 55 EC because some of the systems related to 
the functions of public security (such as systems concerned with the 
fight against organised crime) and health (systems concerned with 
health-care service). This argument was rejected as the measure in 
question is disproportionate. The ECJ considered that the objective of 
safeguarding public security and health could be achieved by less 
restrictive measures, in particular by imposing a duty of secrecy on the 
provider's staff with possible criminal sanctions. The Court considered 
that the effectiveness of such measures would not be affected by 
whether or not the company was under Italian public ownership. 
3.2.4 Application of the principle of equal treatment  
 
In two Communications on procurement, the Commission put forward 
the view that there is a general equal treatment principle under the EC 
Treaty that is similar to that under the Directive and applies to all 
discriminatory treatment, not just discrimination on grounds of 
nationality.333
The jurisprudence cited by the Commission for its arguments
  
334
                                                          
332 Case C-3/88 Commission v Italy (‘Re Data Processing’) [1989] E.C.R. 4035. 
  
based on the principle of equality was, in fact, concerned with a 
principle of equal treatment derived from the directives, not from the 
Treaty itself. In particular, whilst the Commission in its arguments in 
the Walloon Buses cases, sought to locate the principle in issue in the 
Treaty rather than the directives, the Court of Justice in that case 
deliberately based its findings of the effect of the principle on the 
directives alone. This flaw in the Commission’s reasoning has led to 
criticism by many academics who have taken the view that no such 
principle exists under the Treaty, which imposes only an obligation 
333Commission (EC), Interpretive Communication of the Commission on 
Concessions under Community law (Communication) OJ C 121/2, 29 April 2000; 
and Commission (EC), ‘Interpretative Communication on the Community law 
applicable to contract awards not or not fully subject to the provision of the Public 
Procurement Directives’ (Communication) OJ C179/2, 23 June 2006. 
334 Case C-243/8, Storebaelt [1993] ECR I-03353, para. 37; Case C-87/94  
Commission v. Belgium (Walloon Buses) [1996] ECR I-02043.  
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not to treat firms unequally on grounds of nationality.335  However, 
recent ECJ jurisprudence accepts the Commission’s view that such a 
general principle exists in the public procurement context.336
 
 
3.2.5 Application of positive transparency obligation/duty  
 
For a long time it was assumed that the impact of the EU Treaty on 
public procurement was merely the laying down of ‘negative’ 
obligations, through basic free movement rules, prohibiting Member 
States from adopting measures that restrict access to contracts, such as 
discriminatory conditions for participating or discriminatory award 
criteria. However, Telaustria case337
The Telaustria case
  suggested that certain ‘positive’ 
obligations apply under the Treaty, including an obligation to 
advertise contracts. While the ECJ held the services concession 
contract concerned in the case to be outside the coverage of directives, 
the Court further stated that the Treaty non-discrimination principle 
implies an obligation of transparency, entailing ‘a degree of 
advertising sufficient to enable the services market to be opened up to 
competition and the impartiality of the procurement process to be 
reviewed’ (para. 61-62 of the judgment). 
338
                                                          
335 S. Arrowsmith, The Law of Public and Utilities Procurement (2nd ed., London: 
Sweet & Maxwell, 2005), at 4.16; P. Braun, ‘A Matter of Principle(s): the 
Treatment of Contracts Falling Outside the Scope of the European Public 
Procurement Directives’ (2000) 9 Public Procurement Law Review 39.  
 arose out of an award procedure by an 
Austrian procuring entity, Telekom Austria (a publicly owned 
telecommunications company), for a service concession contract for 
the compilation and production of telephone directories under which 
the service provider was not to be remunerated directly, but to be 
permitted to exploit the directories for commercial purposes. The 
Austrian Federal Procurement Office was required to decide whether 
the award procedure was regulated under the directives, either by the 
Services Directive 92/50, a predecessor to the current Public Sector 
336 Case C-410/04 ANAV v Comune di Bari [2006] ECR I-3303, at para.20, which 
provides that ‘[B]esides the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of 
nationality, the principle of equal treatment of tenderers is also to be applied to 
public service concessions even in the absence of discrimination on grounds of 
nationality’.  
337 Case C-324/98 Telaustria Verlags GmbH and Telefonadress GmbH v Telekom 
Austria and Herold Business Data AG [2000] ECR I-10745.  
338 Case C-324/98 Telaustria Verlags GmbH and Telefonadress GmbH v Telekom 
Austria and Herold Business Data AG [2000] ECR I-10745.  
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Directive, or the Utilities Directive 93/38, a predecessor to the current 
Utilities Directive 2004/18.  
In answering the questions referred by the Austrian review body, 
the ECJ concluded that the Utilities Directive did not apply to services 
concessions.339
 
 The Court also stated, however, in order to assist the 
national review authority, that services concessions must be awarded 
in accordance with the principles of the EC Treaty, including the 
principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality, which 
implies ‘in particular’ an obligation of transparency. According to the 
Court, this transparency obligation… 
consists in ensuring, for the benefit of any potential 
tenderer, a degree of advertising sufficient to enable the 
services market to be opened up to competition and the 
impartiality of the procurement process to be reviewed. 
(para. 62). 
 
This case is a landmark because it overturned the presumption that as 
mentioned above, the EU Treaty only lays down ‘negative’ 
obligations, through basic free movement rules, prohibiting Member 
States from adopting measures that restrict access to public contracts, 
such as discriminatory conditions for participating or discriminatory 
award criteria.340 The existence of this duty of transparency has 
subsequently been confirmed by the ECJ in the ANAV case341 and the 
Parking Brixen case342
However, it is not clear what is necessary to satisfy this 
requirement of transparency in the context of concessions (which were 
the subject of Telaustria), or in the context of other contracts that are 
outside the directive but covered by the Treaty, in particular non-
priority services contracts (see section 4.3.4 below).  
.    
                                                          
339At that point, service concessions were not explicitly excluded by the directives. 
The exclusion introduced in the current directives codified the Court’s finding in 
this case.  
340 It is noteworthy that the ECJ noted in an earlier case (Case C-275/98 Unitron 
Scandinavia [1999] ECR I-08291) that ‘the principle of non-discrimination on 
grounds of nationality cannot be interpreted restrictively. It implies, in particular, 
an obligation of transparency in order to enable the contracting authority to satisfy 
itself that it has been complied with’ (para 31). However, the Court did not 
elaborate any further.  
341 See Case C-410/04 ANAV v Comune di Bari [2006] ECR I-3303, at para. 21.  
342 Case Ĉ458/03 Parking Brixen [2005] ECR I-0000, at para.49. 
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First, it is not clear whether contracts must be advertised in 
Europe-wide media, such as the Official Journal.  
Secondly, it is not clear what information is required in the 
advertising. It seems unlikely that each individual contract needs to be 
advertised since, for some covered entities, this is not even required 
by the directives - a general notice of contracts or a notice of a 
qualification system will suffice.  
Third, it is not clear what obligations follow after the contract has 
been advertised – whether a formal competition must be held, and in 
what form.  
Some guidance has been provided by the Commission. It 
considers that this obligation to ensure transparency, implied by the 
principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality, can be met 
‘by any appropriate means’ and, in particular, under the following 
circumstances:  
x Advertising depending on, and to allow account to be taken of, 
the particularities of the relevant sector; and 
x The advertisement can be done through, for example, 
publishing a tender notice or pre-information notice in the daily 
press or specialist journals or by posting appropriate notices; 
and  
x The advertisement shall contain the information necessary to 
enable potential concessionaires to decide whether they are 
interested in participating (e.g. selection and award criteria, 
etc.), including the subject of the concession and the nature and 
scope of the services expected from the concessionaire.343
 
   
3.3 Other Contractual PPPs under EU Public Procurement  
Directives   
 
In contractual PPPs, other than concessions, the private partner is 
called on to carry out and administer an infrastructure for the public 
authority (for example, a school, a hospital, a penitential centre, a 
transport infrastructure). The most typical example of this model is the 
‘Private Finance Initiative’ (PFI) set-up. In this model, the 
remuneration for the private partner does not take the form of charges 
paid by the users of the works or of the service, but of regular 
                                                          
343 Commission (EC), Interpretive Communication of the Commission on 
Concessions under Community law (Communication) OJ C 121/2, 29 April 2000, 
at Section 3.1.2.  
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payments by the public partner. These payments may be fixed, but 
may also be calculated in a variable manner, on the basis, for example, 
of the availability of the works or the related services, or even the 
level of use of the works. 
The PFI was formally launched in November 1992 in UK 
(although private finance had been used to some extent before then). It 
began in central government but has now been increasingly used in 
local government and in the National Health Service (the health 
service run and funded by the public sector).344
In assessing the coverage of PFI contracts by the directives, regard 
must be had firstly to the definition of categorisation of public 
contracts. The Directives apply to ‘public contracts’ defined as: 
 
 
contracts for pecuniary interest concluded in writing 
between one or more economic operators and one or 
more contracting authorities and having as their object 
the execution of works, the supply of products or the 
provision of services 
 
within the meaning of the Directives.345
                                                          
344 See further S. Arrowsmith, The Law of Public and Utilities Procurement (2nd 
ed., London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2005), sections 2.16-2.20; HM Treasury, PFI: 
strengthening long-term partnerships (London: Treasury, 2006), at 
<
 The term, economic operator, 
a simplified term for contractor, supplier and service provider, covers 
‘any natural or legal person or public entity or group of such persons 
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/bud06_pfi_618.pdf> accessed 30 November 
2010); National Audit Office, Improving the PFI Tendering Process (London: 
National Audit Office,2007), at: 
<http://www.nao.org.uk/publications/0607/improving_pfi_tendering.aspx> 
accessed 30 November; National Audit Office, Making Changes in Operational 
PFI Projects (London: National Audit Office, 2008), at: 
<http://www.nao.org.uk/publications/0708/making_changes_operational_pfi.aspx> 
accessed 30 November 2010 
345 Council Directive 2004/18 of 31 March 2004 on the coordination of procedures 
for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service 
contracts OJ L134/114-240 (classic sector), Article1(2) (a); and Council Directive 
2004/17 of 31 March 2004 coordinating the procurement procedures of entities 
operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors OJ L134/1-113 
(utilities sector), Article.1(2) (a). 
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and/or bodies which offer on the market, respectively, the execution of 
works and/or a work, products or services’.346
Public contracts can be further divided into works, supply and 
service contracts. Works contracts are contracts for carrying out works 
or a work. A works contract also covers a contract for procuring ‘by 
any means’ a complete work to the authority's specification. This 
brought within the directive contracts under which an authority 
appoints a firm to let contracts as agent on behalf of the authority. It 
also covers contracts under which a developer or landowner builds on 
land not owned by the authority, but to specifications set by the 
authority, and then transfers the land. A supply contract is one for the 
acquisition (purchase, lease etc) of products. The concept of a services 
contract covers procurement contracts which are not works or supply 
contracts, and have as their object services listed in Annex II of the 
directive.  
 
The main rules that apply to the three different types of public 
contracts are almost identical. The directives apply the same 
framework of rules to all three types of contracts, leaving Member 
States to draw any appropriate distinctions between them – for 
example, over the types of award procedures suitable for different 
contracts. (Member States may also leave this to procuring entities, as 
the UK has done). There are, however, some differences between the 
different types, in particular: 
 
i) Much higher thresholds apply to works contracts than to 
supplies and services; 
ii) There are some differences in the availability of the negotiated 
procedure with a notice for the different types of contracts (see 
section 4.5 below); and 
iii)Some services contracts are not fully regulated but subject only 
to very limited obligations. 
 
Services contracts are further divided into: 
 
1. ‘Priority’ services, which are subject to the full rules under the 
directives, as outlined below, and  
                                                          
346 Directive 2004/18, Article 1(8); Directive 2004/17, Article1(7) contains a 
similar provision referring to ‘contracting entities’ which include contracting 
authorities.  
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2. ‘Non-priority’ services, which are subject only to the rules on 
technical specifications, award notices (at the discretion of the 
purchaser), and certain obligations on provision of statistics. 
Categories of ‘priority’ services are listed in Annex IIA. This 
category includes things such as maintenance of vehicles and 
refuse collection, as well as professional services such as 
accountancy, IT services and consultancy. All those not listed, 
which includes, for example, legal and medical services, are 
non-priority. These rules are set out in Articles 20-21 of the 
Public Sector Directive. The priority services have been 
selected on the basis of the potential scope for cross-border 
trade; the potential savings; and the availability of information 
on the service. Contracts for both are classified as priority if the 
value of the consideration attributable to the priority services 
exceeds that of non-priority ones (Article 22).  
 
Services are classified by comparing the activities to be undertaken 
with those listed under the relevant CPC codes, and not by looking at 
the purpose of the contract, as established by the ECJ in Felix.347
                                                          
347 Case C-411/00 Felix Swoboda v Osterreichische Nationalbank [2002] ECR I-
105670. 
 That 
case arose out of proceedings before an Austrian review body relating 
to a contract awarded by the Austrian Central Bank for removal 
services. The Bank had considered that the full rules of the Services 
Directive did not apply, on the basis that the contract was a contract 
mainly for non-priority services, namely ‘supporting and auxiliary 
transport services’. Swoboda challenged this view, claiming that the 
contract mainly involved various logistic and planning services 
relating to the move, and was, therefore, one for priority services. The 
ECJ ruled that it was necessary to classify the various services 
involved in the contract individually as belonging to the priority or 
non-priority categories, and to classify the contract as a whole 
according to their relative value, rejecting an alternative approach of 
identifying the ‘main purpose’ of the contract and then classifying the 
contract by reference to that purpose. In some cases what might 
appear naturally to be a single service must be broken down into its 
component activities for classification purposes. For example, in Case 
C-76/97 Walter Tögel v Niederösterreichische Gebietskrankenkasse, 
the ECJ ruled that the provision of services consisting of the transport 
of sick and injured persons with a nurse in attendance to provide 
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medical assistance contains both services within the priority category 
(the transport element, categorised as ‘land transport’) and services 
within the non-priority category (the medical element, categorised as 
‘health and social services’). Such a contract must then be classified as 
either a priority or non-priority services contract according to the 
relative value of the different types of services.348
Some contracts are mixed in the sense that they contain work, 
supplies, and/or services in a single contract. Before 2004, there were 
no explicit provisions on mixed works/services contracts. However, 
the new Public Sector Directive contains an explicit provision on 
contracts containing both works and services, in Article 1(2)(d), third 
paragraph. This provides: 
 
 
A public contract having as its object services within the 
meaning of Annex II and including activities within the 
meaning of Annex I that are only incidental to the 
principal object of the contract shall be considered to be 
a public service contract. 
 
This makes it clear that, at least for cases in which the contract has a 
principal object, classification is to be based on a main object test 
rather than (as with priority/non-priority services contracts) a test 
based on the relative value of the services/works. However, it is not 
inconsistent with this new provision to apply a relative value test 
when the contract has no main object. This approach was confirmed 
by the ECJ, which stated that such a mixed contract is to be classified 
by considering the main purpose of the contract, and that the relative 
value of the works and the services is just one factor in determining 
the contract’s main purpose.349
Given the different treatment of various types of public contracts, 
it remains relevant to examine whether a particular PFI contract is 
works or service contract; and if a service contract, whether it is for 
priority or non-priority services.  
 
As long as a PFI contract is not on non-priority services, the 
whole set of rules contained in the directives must be complied with. 
There is no room to discuss in detail here the rules on advertisement, 
                                                          
348 Case C-76/97 Walter Tögel v Niederösterreichische Gebietskrankenkasse 
[1998] ECR I-5357. 
349 Case C-412/04 Commission v Italy, ECJ judgment of 21 February 2008 
(concerning the pre-2004 directives). 
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technical specification, selection and award criteria, and so forth.350
 
 
Only the choice of procurement procedures that are most relevant to 
PPPs will be discussed below in section 4.5.  
 
3.4 Other Contractual PPPs under the EU Treaty and general  
principles of EU law 
 
There are several possibilities that a public contract, other than a 
concession, may be outside the scope of directives:  
• contracts the value of which are below the financial thresholds 
of the directives;  
• non-priority services contracts; and 
• contracts which the directive itself exempts from the 
obligations of advertising and competition (e.g. on grounds of 
urgency). 
 
Such contracts were deliberately omitted from the directives, in part 
because it was considered that they are NOT always of interest to 
cross border trade. It is, therefore, unlikely that a PFI contract, 
normally of high value and long procuring period, will fall under any 
of these three categories. Nevertheless, should a contractual PPP falls 
outside of the coverage of the directives, the Treaty rules and positive 
obligations explained above in 4.3.2 are equally relevant.  
The European Commission has set out its own views on what 
obligations apply to contract awards not or not fully subject to the 
provision of the Public Procurement Directives.351
According to the Commission, the obligations for most contracts 
include not just an obligation to advertise but also an obligation to 
hold a competition (although not necessarily a formal tender). 
According to the Commission the competition must be held in 
accordance with the general principle of equal treatment, similar to 
that of the directives (see further the section on equal treatment 
above), which includes requirements for things like reasonable time 
limits, disclosure of award criteria, etc. similar to those found in the 
  
                                                          
350 For a comprehensive guide on these rules, see S. Arrowsmith, The Law of 
Public and Utilities Procurement (2nd ed., London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2005).  
351 Commission (EC), ‘Interpretative Communication on the Community law 
applicable to contract awards not or not fully subject to the provision of the Public 
Procurement Directives’ (Communication) OJ C179/2, 23 June 2006.  
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directives – although it considers that not all of the rules in the 
directives will apply in the same way under the Treaty.  
Even if there is no obligation to advertise and hold a competition 
in a particular case, the equal treatment principle will no doubt apply 
to govern the conduct of any competition that is held, and may again 
involve many obligations similar to those in the directives.  
The Commission’s views on this are controversial. The 
Communication has been the subject of a legal challenge by the 
German government for the reason, inter alia, that it involves 
‘legislation’, which is beyond the powers of the Commission – the 
complaint is that the Commission is setting out detailed legal rules 
that have no foundation in the text or case law of the Treaty.352 There 
has been extensive academic criticism of the transparency principle as 
developed in Telaustria.353
  
The main criticisms are: 
1. That it exceeds the bounds of acceptable judicial interpretation 
and amounts to legislative activity that undermines the proper 
division of responsibility between legislative and judicial 
branches of the EU (and is particularly inappropriate since the 
rules created are directly contrary to specific decisions of the 
legislature to exclude certain types of contracts from detailed 
regulation); 
2. That it creates significant uncertainty for procuring entities, 
Member States and tenderers; and 
3. Potentially, at least, it imposes unreasonable constraints on 
Member States’ freedom of action to ensure value for money, 
                                                          
352 Case T-258/06 Germany v Commission [2006] O.J. C-294/52, noted by Brown 
in ‘Case Comment: Case T-258/06: The German Challenge to the Commission's 
Interpretative Communication on Contracts not Subject to the Procurement 
Directives’ (2007) 16 Public Procurement Law Review NA84. 
353 S. Arrowsmith, The Law of Public and Utilities Procurement (2nd ed., London: 
Sweet & Maxwell, 2005), at 4.16; A. Brown, ‘Seeing Through Transparency: the 
European Court’s Case Law on the requirement to Advertise Public Contracts and 
Concessions under the EC Treaty’ (2007)16 Public Procurement Law Review 1; P. 
Braun, ‘A Matter of Principle(s): the Treatment of Contracts Falling Outside the 
Scope of the European Public Procurement Directives’ (2000) 9 Public 
Procurement Law Review 39; P. Horijk and M. Meulenbelt, ‘A Bridge Too Far: 
Why the European Commission’s Attempts to Construct an Obligation to Tender 
outside the Scope of the Public Procurement Directives should be Dismissed’ 
(2005) 14 Public Procurement Law Review 123; D. McGowan, ‘Clarity at Last? 
Low Value Contracts and Transparency Obligations’ (2007) 16 Public 
Procurement Law Review 274 
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etc. in the manner they think fit for contracts excluded by the 
directives – especially since judges are ill-suited to balance the 
different policy considerations involved in public procurement. 
 
However, despite the criticism, the Telaustria line of case law has 
been confirmed by a Grand Chamber of the ECJ in Coname.354
 
  
4. Coverage of IPPPs by EU Public Procurement Rules355
 
 
IPPPs are understood by the Commission as ‘a co-operation between 
public and private parties involving the establishment of a mixed 
capital entity which performs public contracts or concessions’.356
In practice, an IPPP is usually set up: 
 The 
private input to the IPPP consists – apart from the contribution of 
capital or other assets – in the active participation in the operation of 
the contracts awarded to the public-private entity and/or the 
management of the public-private entity. Conversely, simple capital 
injections made by private investors into publicly owned companies, 
do not constitute IPPP.  
 
x either, by founding a new company, the capital of which is held 
jointly by the contracting entity and the private partner – or, in 
certain cases, by several contracting entities and/or several 
private partners – and awarding a public contract or a 
concession to this newly founded public-private entity;  
x or, by the participation of a private partner in an existing 
publicly owned company which has obtained public contracts 
or concessions ‘in-house’ in the past. 
                                                          
354 Case C-231/03 Consorzio Aziende Metano (Coname) v Comune di Cingia de’ 
Botti [2005] E.C.R. I-7287. 
355 See, in general, C. D. Tvarno, ‘A critique of the Commission's interpretative 
communication on Institutionalised Public-Private Partnerships’ (2009) 18 Public 
Procurement Law Review NA11-23; R. Williams, ‘The Commission Interpretative 
Communication on the Application of Community Law on Public Procurement and 
Concessions to Institutionalised Public Private Partnerships (IPPPs)’ (2008) 17 
Public Procurement Law Review NA115 
356 Commission (EC), ‘Interpretative Communication on the Application of 
Community Law on Public Procurement and Concessions to Institutionalised 
Public-Private Partnerships (PPP)’ (Communication) C (2007) 6661, 5th February 
2008. 
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The coverage of IPPPs by EU public procurement rules is even more 
complex since the application of the so-called ‘in-house providing’ 
exception, and affiliated undertaking exception, also need to be 
considered.   
 
 
4.1 IPPPs under EU Public Procurement Rules 
 
If the task assigned to the public-private entity is a public contract 
fully covered by the Public Procurement Directives, the procedure for 
selecting the private partner is determined by these Directives. If the 
task is a works concession or a public contract that is only partially 
covered by the Directives, the fundamental principles derived from the 
EC Treaty apply in addition to the relevant provisions of the 
Directives. In cases of services listed in Annex II B of Directive 
2004/18/EC, the fundamental principles of the EC Treaty, as set out in 
Articles 49 and 56 TFEU, apply if these contracts can be expected to 
be of a certain interest to undertakings located in a different Member 
State to that of the relevant contracting entity. Finally, if it is a service 
concession or a public contract not covered by the Directives, the 
selection of the private partner has to comply with the principles of the 
EC Treaty. Therefore, the discussion below in section 4.3 remains 
relevant in the context of IPPPs.  
It is noteworthy though that the Commission does not consider a 
double tendering procedure — one for selecting the private partner to 
the IPPP and another one for awarding public contracts or concessions 
to the public-private entity — to be practical. 357
 
 
4.2 IPPPs and ‘in-house providing’ exception  
 
When the public entities in question are legally unified, i.e. forming 
part of the same department, the ECJ has clarified that there will be no 
public contract involved and therefore no need to apply procurement 
                                                          
357 Commission (EC), ‘Interpretative Communication on the Application of 
Community Law on Public Procurement and Concessions to Institutionalised 
Public-Private Partnerships (PPP)’ (Communication) C (2007) 6661, 5th February 
2008., at 2.2 
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rules.358
 
 The underlying rationale is that the procuring public entity 
should have… 
 the possibility of performing the tasks conferred on it in 
the public interest by using its own administrative, 
technical and other resources, without being obliged to 
call on outside entities not forming part of its own 
departments.359
 
  
Therefore, the ECJ put a limit on the application of EU procurement 
rules excluding purely ‘in-house’ procurement.  This exception has far 
reaching impact on setting up IPPPs.  
The scope of this exception depends on how big the ‘house’ is. 
Apart from two branches from the same government department, can 
two government departments, legally distinct from each other but 
nonetheless affiliated to the same State, be regarded as being ‘in the 
same house’? It is apparent that different States have contradicting 
views on this. On the one hand, the Norwegian Ministry of 
Modernisation argued that ‘the state must be regarded as one legal 
person, and that it should be able to procure supplies and services 
from its own departments and directorates without competition’; on 
the other hand, Denmark only regards purchasing arrangements within 
the same sphere of authority as in-house procurement.360 It is observed 
that in the Swedish courts, all government authorities are considered 
as being part of the same legal entity regardless of how independently 
they may act, while municipalities and county councils are considered 
to be separate legal entities.361
The ECJ has made it clear that the ‘house’ can neither be as big as 
equating with the State nor be as small as within one legal entity, in 
 
                                                          
358 Case C-26/03, Stadt Halle, RPL Recyclingpark Lochau GmbH v 
Arbeitsgemeinschaft Thermische Restabfall- und Energieverwertungsanlage TREA 
Leuna [2005] E.C.R. I-0001, at  para. 48.  
359 ibid.  
360 Letter from the Ministry of Modernisation of 18 January 2005 to the Ministry of 
Finance regarding the state's centre for economic governance and its participation 
in procurement procedures. This was quoted in K. Weltzien, ‘Avoiding the 
Procurement Rules by Awarding Contracts to an In-house Entity-Scope of the 
Procurement Directives in the Classical Sector’ (2005) Public Procurement Law 
Review 237 at 238. Canada takes a view similar to that of the Norwegian Ministry 
of Modernisation.  
361 K. Pedersen and E. Olsson, ‘Commission v Germany - a new approach to in-
house providing?’ (2010)_Public Procurement Law Review 33-46, at 41.  
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the landmark Teckal case.362 As a starting point, in the absence of an 
express exception,363 the ECJ ruled that it is sufficient in principle, for 
a public contract to exist, that the contract has been concluded 
between ‘two separate persons’,364 or ‘a local authority on the one 
hand and a person legally separate from the latter on the other 
hand’.365
 
  However, purchasing arrangements between two legally 
distinct public entities may nevertheless be outside the scope of EU 
procurement rules in the case where the contracting authority 
exercises over the supplying public entity: 
a control which is similar to that which it exercises over 
its own departments and, at the same time’, the 
supplying public entity ‘carries out the essential part of 
its activities with the controlling local authority or 
authorities.366
 
 
Therefore, through Teckal and a long line of subsequent case law,367
                                                          
362 Case C-107/98 Teckal Srl v Comune di Viano (Reggio Emilia) [1999] E.C.R. I-
8121. 
 
the ECJ has established, and continues to fine-tune, one of most 
significant exceptions to the EU procurement rules - the so called ‘in-
363 The available express exceptions are addressed below.  
364 Case C-107/98 Teckal Srl v Comune di Viano (Reggio Emilia) [1999] E.C.R. I-
8121, at para. 49-50.  
365 Case C-349/97 Commission v Spain [2003] E.C.R. I-3851 at para. 204. 
366 Case C-107/98 Teckal Srl v Comune di Viano (Reggio Emilia) [1999] E.C.R. I-
8121, at para. 50.  
367 Case C-107/98 Teckal Srl v Comune di Viano [1999] ECR I-8121; Case C-94/99 
ARGE Gewässerschutz v Bundesministerium für Land- und Forstwirtschaft [2000] 
ECR I-11037; Case C-349/97 Commission v Spain [2003] ECR I-3851; Case c-
26/03 Stadt Halle [2005] ECR I-0001; Case C-84/03 Commission v Spain [2005] 
ECR I-139; Case C-231/03 Consorzio Aziende Metano (Coname) v Comune di 
Cingia de'Botti [2005] ECR I-7287; Case C-458/03 Parking Brixen GmbH v 
Gemeinde Brixen, Stadtwerke Brixen AG [2005] ECR I-8585; Case C-29/04 
Commission v Austria (Mödling) [2005] ECR I-9705; Case C-410/04 Associazione 
Nazionale Autotransporto Viaggiatori (ANAV) v Comune di Bari, AMTAB Servizio 
SpA [2006] ECR I-3303; Case C-340/04 Carbotermo v Comune di Busto Arsizio 
[2006] ECR I-4137; Case C-220/05 Jean Auroux v Commune de Roanne  [2007] 
ECR I-385; Case C-337/05 Commission v Italy (Augusta Bell Helicopters) [2008] 
ECR I-2173; Case C-220/06 Asociación Profesional de Empresas de Reparto y 
Manipulado de Correspondencia v Administración General del Estado [2007] 
ECR I-12175; Case C-295/05 Asemfo v Tragsa [2007] ECR I-2999; Case C-324/07 
Coditel Brabant SA v Commune d'Uccle and Région de Bruxelles-Capitale, 
Judgement of 13 November 2008. 
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house providing’ exception. The exception is twofold. Firstly, it 
excludes from the application of procurement rules purely ‘in-house’ 
contracts - those performed with a contracting authority’s own internal 
resources. Secondly, it also excludes ‘quasi-in-house’ arrangements - 
contracts performed by a public entity legally distinct from the 
contracting authority but i) under its control, similar to that which it 
exercises over its own departments and, at the same time, ii) the in-
house provider must carry out the essential part of its activities with 
the controlling contract authority or authorities. Whenever both 
requirements are met, the services are awarded on account of the 
control exercised by a public authority over a provider who is only 
‘formally’ and not ‘substantially’ a third party; whose mission is to 
provide services for its controller, or on behalf of it, regardless of the 
fact that the provider is subject to public or private law; and 
established pursuant to contract, statute, regulation or administrative 
provisions. While the exclusion of purely in-house procurement can 
arguably be derived from the definition of public contracts contained 
in the Directives, the exclusion of ‘quasi-in-house’ arrangements does 
not have formal legal basis in the procurement Directives and has 
encountered difficulties in its codification.  
Attention can now be turned towards the detailed analysis of the 
two cumulative conditions required for the ‘in-house providing’ 
exception to apply, namely the ‘similar control’ test and the ‘essential 
part of its activities’ destination’ test as interpreted by the constantly 
refining case law. It can be argued that these conditions have been 
interpreted by the ECJ, in many respects, in such a way as to make it 
difficult to rely on the in-house provision. 
 
4.2.1 The ‘Similar Control’ Test  
 
The ‘similar control’ requirement provides that the in-house provider 
‘has no discretion’ whatsoever and that, in the end, the public 
authority is the only one to make decisions concerning that company. 
Moreover, use of the expression ‘in-house’ indeed reveals the 
intention to make a distinction between activities which the authority 
carries out directly – by means of internal structures ‘belonging to the 
house’ – and those that it will entrust to a third-party operator.368
                                                          
368 Opinion of Advocate General Bot in Case C-220/06 Asociación Profesional de 
Empresas de Reparto y Manipulado de Correspondencia v Administración del 
Estado [2007] ECR I-12175, at 75. 
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The ‘similar control’ requirement identifies the powers of 
influence required by the parent contracting authority in order to fully 
pursue ‘its public interest objectives’, regardless of whether this 
influence is exercised by means of private or public law powers, or by 
means of a single power or the joint effects of different powers. 
Therefore, the ‘similar control’ requirement represents the parent 
public authority’s ability to make the most relevant decisions on the 
management and manufacturing process of the in-house provider, thus 
excluding a bilateral negotiation on terms and conditions of the supply 
of works, products or services. This ‘similar control’ implies the 
power of the parent contracting authority to set unilaterally – in 
pursuing its own (public) interests – the manufacturing and supplying 
conditions to the extent of precluding full management discretion on 
the part of the in-house provider.369 The right of the provider to put an 
end to the contract with the contracting authority at any time seems to 
have been considered to be a decisive factor in not finding an in-house 
arrangement.370
It appears that the ‘similar control’ requirement, as developed by 
ECJ case law, does not imply a direct shareholding of the controlling 
authority in the in-house provider’s capital. Sometimes, the 
intervention of an intermediary holding company ‘may, depending on 
the circumstances of the case, weaken any control possibly exercised 
by the contracting authority’,
 
371 whereas at other times, the 
intermediary holding company is not relevant to the determination of 
whether the ‘similar control’ requirement is met.372
When the in-house provider’s capital is wholly owned by the 
controlling authority that appoints it to carry out its services, this 100 
per cent shareholding, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, is an 
indication that the ‘similar control’ requirement is met, especially 
where the in-house provider carries out all of its activity solely for the 
 
                                                          
369 Case C-295/05 Asociación Nacional de Empresas Forestales (Asemfo) v 
Transformación Agraria SA (Tragsa) [2007] ECR I-2999, at 59. 
370 Case C-220/06 Asociación Profesional de Empresas de Reparto y Manipulado 
de Correspondencia v Administración del Estado [2007] ECR I-12175. 
371 Case C-340/04 Carbotermo, Consorzio Alisei v Comune di Busto Arsizio [2006] 
ECR I-4137, at 39. 
372 Opinion of Advocate General Sixt-Hackl in Case C-26/03 Stadt Halle and RPL 
Lochau GmbH v TREA Leuna [2005] ECR I-0000, at 6-10, 59. 
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controlling authority.373
In a situation where a group of contracting authorities holds shares 
in the in-house provider’s capital, a deeper examination as to whether 
the powers of influence in the in-house entity management entitle each 
contracting authority to exert a ‘similar control’ over it is required, 
insofar as only some of the shareholding authorities might exercise a 
‘similar control’, while others may not participate in the in-house 
relationship, thus being unable to dispose of direct awards to the in-
house organisation in compliance with EC law.
 The absence of other shareholders permits the 
presumption of a lack of ‘external’ interests that may prevent the 
controlling authority from pursuing the public interests within this in-
house context. 
374 An excessive 
fragmentation of capital shareholdings does not prevent each 
shareholder from exerting a ‘similar control’; it only requires an in-
depth analysis of whether the minority shareholders are entitled to 
influence the provider’s decision-making375
The holding of in-house provider capital shares by entities other 
than the parent public authorities introduces economic interests which 
may affect and interfere with the exercise of ‘similar control’ by the 
parent public authorities, thus harming the pursuit of the above-
mentioned public interests.
. 
376
                                                          
373 See Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Case C-458/03 Parking Brixen 
GmbH Case C-458/03 Parking Brixen GmbH v Gemeinde Brixen, Stadtwerke 
Brixen AG [2005] ECR I-8585, at  74-75.  
 The actual presence of a third-party 
private shareholder must be considered when ascertaining whether the 
‘similar control’ requirement is met; if satisfied, the relationship 
374 Case C-107/98 Teckal v Comune di Viano [1999] ECR I-8121; Case C-231/03 
Consorzio Aziende Metano (Coname) v Comune di Cingia de'Botti [2005] ECR I-
7287; Opinion of Advocate General Cosmas in Case C-107/98 Teckal v Comune di 
Viano [1999] ECR I-8121, at 16. 
375 Case C-324/07 Coditel Brabant SA v Commune d'Uccle and Région de 
Bruxelles-Capitale, Judgement of 13 November 2008, at 31; Case C-340/04 
Carbotermo, Consorzio Alisei v Comune di Busto Arsizio [2006] ECR I-4137, at 37 
and Case C-295/05 Asociación Nacional de Empresas Forestales (Asemfo) v 
Transformación Agraria SA (Tragsa) [2007] ECR I-2999 at 57. 
376 Advocate General Kokott in her Opinion in Case C-458/03 Parking Brixen 
GmbH Case C-458/03 Parking Brixen GmbH v Gemeinde Brixen, Stadtwerke 
Brixen AG [2005] ECR I-8585,at 74, argued that ‘if a private third party has a 
holding, even a minority holding, in an undertaking, the consideration given to the 
economic interests of that undertaking may prevent the public body from fully 
pursuing its public-interest objectives’. 
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between the awarding contracting authority and the public-private 
company would fall within the in-house exception under EC law377
According to ECJ case law, the ‘similar control’ condition fades if 
the private minority shareholder acquires considerable rights of veto 
over important decisions, or the power to appoint one of two 
managing directors having identical rights;
.  
378 or whenever the by-laws 
decree a wide breadth of business objectives, the possibility of 
expansion of the geographical scope of a company’s activities to the 
whole of a national and foreign territory and the opening of the 
company to other capital.379 Equally, it seems that the ‘similar control’ 
requirement will not be met by the mere holding of majority in a 
company’s general assembly or the power to appoint more than half of 
the managerial or administrative board members – irrespective of 
whether this power is provided for by the company by-laws or by a 
corporate agreement – where the managing director is appointed by 
the private minority shareholders.380
                                                          
377 In Case C-26/03 Stadt Halle and RPL Lochau GmbH v TREA Leuna [2005] 
ECR I-0000, at 19, the circumstances that the private minority shareholder had 
‘certain specific rights’ seemed to be decisive.  
 A shareholders agreement or the 
applicable national company law may render the majority shareholder 
powers of control ineffective, binding, or limiting the power to 
appoint the managerial board or narrowing the managing director’s 
378 Such powers, entitled to the private shareholder, prevent the City of Mödling 
from exerting a ‘similar control’ even if the latter has the majority of votes in the 
general assembly: Opinion of Advocate General L.A. Geelhoed in Case C-29/04 
EC Commission v Austria [2005] E.C.R. I-9700, at 36, 39 and 46. 
379 Case C-458/03 Parking Brixen GmbH Case C-458/03 Parking Brixen GmbH v 
Gemeinde Brixen, Stadtwerke Brixen AG [2005] ECR I-8585, at 65-7.  
380 Unless the public authorities were entitled to exert decisive management 
instruction over the in-house entity: Case C-94/99 ARGE Gewasserschutz v 
Bundesministerium für Land-und Forstwirtschaft [2000] ECR I-11037, commented 
by M. Ohler, ‘The Position of Semi-Public Tenderers in an Award Procedure under 
the E.C. Procurement Directives: A Note on Case C-94/99’ (2001) Public 
Procurement Law Review NA54; Case C-29/04 E.C. Commission v Austria [2005] 
ECR I-9705; Case C-458/03 Parking Brixen GmbH Case C-458/03 Parking Brixen 
GmbH v Gemeinde Brixen, Stadtwerke Brixen AG [2005] ECR I-8585, at 64. 
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discretion, thus blunting public authority influence381 on the in-house 
provider’s strategic objectives and significant decisions.382
The ‘similar control’ exercised over the in-house provider must be 
effective, but it need not be exercised individually. Therefore, where a 
number of public authorities own a sole in-house provider 
organisation, to which they entrust the performance of one of their 
tasks, the control which those public authorities exercise over that 
entity may be exercised jointly.
 
383 It follows that the form of pure co-
operation or association among local authorities taken by the in-house 
provider must be evaluated in conjunction with the effective ‘similar 
control’ exercised by the awarding authority: the ‘similar control’ 
requirement is thus met when the contracting authorities enjoy 
detailed powers of influence over the in-house provider, sufficient to 
support a finding of an in-house provision relationship.384
 
  
4.2.2 The destination of the essential part of an in house 
provider’s activities 
 
The in-house provider must carry out the essential part of its activities 
for its parent and controlling public authority, thus limiting its 
economic freedom and autonomy as an enterprise and market 
competitor, in the sense that only a very small portion of its activities 
can be pursued outside the in-house relationship, in order to reap the 
benefit of economies of scale and scope.385
                                                          
381 Case C-26/03 Stadt Halle and RPL Lochau GmbH v TREA Leuna [2005] ECR 
I-0000, at 19 where ‘the private minority shareholding exceeded the threshold of 
10 per cent above which, in accordance with the German legislation on limited 
companies, there is a minority with certain specific rights’.  
 
382 Case C-324/07 Coditel Brabant SA v Commune d'Uccle and Région de 
Bruxelles-Capitale, Judgement of 13 November 2008, at 34; Case C-458/03 
Parking Brixen GmbH Case C-458/03 Parking Brixen GmbH v Gemeinde Brixen, 
Stadtwerke Brixen AG [2005] ECR I-8585, at 65; Case C-340/04 Carbotermo, 
Consorzio Alisei v Comune di Busto Arsizio [2006] ECR I-4137, at 38. 
383 M. Dischendorfer, ‘The compatibility of contracts awarded directly to “joint 
executive services” with the Community rules on public procurement and fair 
competition’(2007) Public Procurement Law Review NA129. 
384 Case C-371/05 EC Commission v Italy, judgment of 17 July 2008, at 25; Case 
C-324/07 Coditel Brabant SA v Commune d'Uccle and Région de Bruxelles-
Capitale, Judgement of 13 November 2008, at 41. 
385 R. Cavallo Perin and D. Casalini, ‘In house providing: un’impresa dimezzata’ 
(2006) Diritto Amministrativo 51. According to F. Avarkioti, ‘The application of 
EU public procurement rules to “in house” arrangements’ (2007) Public 
Procurement Law Review 22, at 33: ‘there is no fear that such undertaking may 
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The wording of the examined criterion is not univocal in ECJ 
decisions and in the Advocate General’s Opinions, where it is referred 
to as the ‘main part’ as well as the ‘essential part’ of the activities 
carried out by the in house provider.386
The starting point in assessing the requirement should be the 
activities effectively performed by the in-house provider, as opposed 
to the potential activities which another third entity could undertake – 
according to the law, its own by-laws, or the act of delegation issued 
by the controlling authorities – which should not form the basis of 
calculation. Therefore, in cases of several controlling authorities, the 
activities to be taken into account are those effectively carried out for 
all of these authorities taken together.
 It follows that any other 
activity towards third entities may only be of accessory, ancillary, 
secondary, or marginal significance. Notwithstanding some 
uncertainty in assessing the criteria eligible to meet this requirement, 
there are some fixed points in its still developing interpretation.  
387
Moreover, the measurement of the main or essential part of the in-
house provider’s activity has to be performed both from a qualitative 
and quantitative point of view. Considering the qualitative 
perspective, it seems to be necessary to examine what kind of tasks 
the company is entitled to carry out. It is doubtful whether the 
circumstances that the provider is operating in a competitive market or 
that it is carrying out entrusted tasks based on a concession or 
delegation which transfers a granted and protected demand to the 
provider could be relevant, as the ECJ has clearly stated that it does 
not matter who is the beneficiary (the contracting authority or the 
users); who pays for the services (the contracting authority or the 
customers); and where those services are provided
 
388
                                                                                                                                                    
compete (in favourable terms) with other undertakings in tender procedures for 
public contracts’. 
.     
386 F. Avarkioti, ‘The application of EU public procurement rules to “in house” 
arrangements’ (2007) Public Procurement Law Review 22, at 32; T. Kaarresalo, 
‘Procuring in-house: the impact of the E.C. procurement regime’ (2008) Public 
Procurement Law Review 242, at 252. 
387 Case C-340/04 Carbotermo, Consorzio Alisei v Comune di Busto Arsizio [2006] 
ECR I-4137, at 69-72; Case C-295/05 Asociación Nacional de Empresas 
Forestales (Asemfo) v Transformación Agraria SA (Tragsa) [2007] ECR I-2999, at 
65; C-324/07 Coditel Brabant SA v Commune d'Uccle and Région de Bruxelles-
Capitale, Judgement of 13 November 2008, at 27; Case C-371/05 EC Commission 
v Italy, judgment of 17 July 2008. 
388 Case C-340/04 Carbotermo, Consorzio Alisei v Comune di Busto Arsizio [2006] 
ECR I-4137 
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From a quantitative perspective, the income or turnover of the 
entity turns out to be decisive in assessing the essential part of the in-
house provider’s activities: considering all the activities performed, 
those awarded by the controlling authorities must be predominant. To 
that extent, it appears impossible to define a percentage threshold in 
advance as a general rule to apply automatically; a case by case 
approach seems more suitable.  
The destination of the essential part of the in-house provider’s 
activities is meant to express a very close functional and economic 
dependence of the latter on the controlling authorities so that the 
repeal of the entrusting of works, products and services deprives the 
in-house provision relationship of its own consideration and averts the 
in-house provider’s permanence as an economic operator, even on the 
markets where it used to carry out subsidiary or secondary activities.   
 
 
4.3 IPPPs and ‘Affiliated Undertakings’ and ‘Joint Venture’  
Exemptions in the Utility Sector Directive389
 
 
The Utilities Directive (2004/17) contains an additional provision 
(Article 23), excluding from the application of the utility Directive 
only: 
i) contracts awarded by a contracting entity or a joint venture 
formed exclusively by such entities to carry out a utility 
activity, towards an affiliated undertaking (the so-called 
‘affiliated undertaking exemption’);  
ii) contracts awarded by such a joint venture to one of its partners, 
as well as contracts awarded by a contracting entity to such a 
joint venture, of which it forms part (the so-called ‘joint 
venture exemption’).  
Both are relevant to IPPPs. 
For the ‘affiliated undertaking exemption’ to apply, two 
cumulative criteria must be fulfilled. The first is the requirement of an 
‘affiliation’ (Article 23(1)). An undertaking will be regarded as 
affiliated to a contracting entity if: 
i) its annual accounts are consolidated with those of the 
contracting entity; or 
ii) the contracting entity has control over the undertaking; or  
                                                          
389 See S. Arrowsmith, The Law of Public and Utilities Procurement (2nd ed., 
London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2005), at 15.13.9. 
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iii) the undertaking has control over the contracting entity; or  
iv) both are subject to the control of another undertaking.  
It is noteworthy that the ‘control’ test here means dominant influence 
by virtue of ownership, financial participation, or the rules which 
govern it. This test differs significantly from the ‘similar control’ test 
in the ‘in-house providing’ exception in the sense that the control test 
to establish affiliation includes reverse control and mutual third party 
control, and is much easier to fulfil.  
The second criterion is the so-called ‘80 per cent rule’ (Article 
23(2)). It requires that at least 80 per cent of the average turnover of 
the affiliated undertaking with respect to services, supplies or works, 
depending on the contracts being considered for exclusion in question, 
for the preceding three years derives from the provision of such 
services, supplies or works, to undertakings with which it is affiliated. 
This criterion also differs from the ‘destination of the essential part of 
activities’ test in the ‘in-house providing’ exception discussed above, 
in the sense that the ‘80 per cent rule’ test is more straightforward and, 
arguably, easier to fulfil. 
The European Commission is empowered to monitor the 
application of both the ‘affiliated undertaking exemption’ and the 
‘joint venture exemption’, by requiring the undertakings concerned to 
notify the nature and the value of the contracts involved (Article 
23(5)).   
 
5. Award Procedure and PPPs 
 
As noted by the Commission, in awarding PPPs contracts that are 
fully covered by the Public Sector Directive, the open and restricted 
procedures defined in that Directive may, due to the particular 
financial or legal complexity of such contracts, not offer sufficient 
flexibility. For cases like this, the Public Sector Directive introduced a 
new innovative procedure – the competitive dialogue – the aim of 
which is not only to preserve competition between economic 
operators, but also to take into account the contracting authorities' 
need to discuss all aspects of the contract with each candidate. It is 
still possible to award public contracts fully covered by the Public 
Sector Directive through the negotiated procedure with publication of 
a contract notice; however, its use is limited to exceptional cases. 
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5.1 Competitive Dialogue390
 
  
Competitive dialogue is a new procedure introduced for the first time 
in the Public Sector Directive to provide more flexibility in procedures 
for complex contracts. The need for more flexible procedures was 
perceived in the United Kingdom since at least the late 1980s, most 
notably for contracts under the PFI. The reason for the introduction of 
this new procedure was the need of Member States PFI projects, and, 
also, the EU’s own policy of promoting PPP for European transport 
infrastructure. Open and restricted procedures are unsuitable for many 
such projects for a number of reasons, including: their limits on 
iterative procedures, in particular for eliminating participants during 
the procedure through discussions/outline tenders; the need for at least 
5 tenderers in restrictive procedures, which is disproportionate in 
high-cost PFI procedures; and the limited scope for post-tender 
dialogue in these procedures. The negotiated procedure with a notice 
is suitable, but there remained some uncertainty over whether it was 
available for PFI projects; the European Commission had cast doubt 
on the UK practice of using the negotiated procedure with a notice in 
the contact of PFI.  
 
There are a number of sources of guidance on this procedure: 
1. From the Commission (EC) , Explanatory Note – Competitive 
Dialogue – Classic Directive (2005), available at 
<http://simap.eu.int> (accessed 30 November 2010). This is useful, 
in particular, for indicating some uses and practices that 
Commission staff consider to be acceptable. 
                                                          
390See S. Arrowsmith, The Law of Public and Utilities Procurement (2nd ed., 
London: Sweet & Maxwell 2005), Chapter 10; A. Brown, ‘The Impact of the New 
Directive on Large Infrastructure Projects: Competitive; Dialogue or Better the 
Devil You Know’ (2004) 13 Public Procurement Law Review 160; C. Kennedy-
Loest, ‘What Can be Done at the Preferred Bidder stage in Competitive Dialogue?’ 
(2006) 15 Public Procurement Law Review 317; A. Rubach-Larsen, ‘Competitive 
Dialogue’, in R. Nielsen and S. Treumer (eds.), The New EU Public Procurement 
Directives (Copenhagen: Djøf 2005); P. Trepte, Public Procurement in the EU: a 
Practitioner’s Guide (Oxford: OUP 2007), p. 445-453; S. Treumer, ‘Competitive 
Dialogue’ (2004) 13 Public Procurement Law Review 178; S. Treumer, ‘The Field 
of Application of Competitive Dialogue’ (2006) 15 Public Procurement Law 
Review 307; S. Verschuur, ‘Competitive Dialogue and the Scope for Discussion 
after Tenders and Before Selecting the Preferred Bidder—What is Fine-Tuning 
Etc?’ 15 Public Procurement Law Review 327.  
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2. In the UK, HM Treasury has recently produced guidance 
covering both legal and strategic considerations in using 
competitive dialogue that takes into account the early 
experience of the procedure in the UK: HM Treasury, 
Competitive dialogue in 2008, July 2008, available at 
<www.ogc.gov.uk> (joint Treasury/OGC publication) 
(accessed 30 November). There was also other guidance issued 
when the procedure was first implemented in the UK that is 
still relevant, such as: Competitive Dialogue Procedure: OGC 
Guidance on the Competitive Dialogue Procedure in the new 
Procurement Regulations, Jan 2006; and the guidance Practical 
Guidance on the Use of Competitive Dialogue, July 2006. 
There is also various other guidance such as sector-specific 
guidance which is referred to on the website above and (as it 
existed at that time) listed in the 2008 guidance referred to 
above also. 
Many states that have implemented Directive 2004/18 have included 
the competitive dialogue procedure. In general, states have simply 
added the procedure to their laws largely in the form that it appears in 
the Directive itself, without elaborating on the way in which it is to be 
applied by contracting authorities beyond what is stated in the 
Directive itself – for example, they have not put in place detailed rules 
on how the ‘dialogue’ phase is to be conducted by contracting 
authorities. This applies not only in states whose traditional approach 
is to simply copy out the directives – for example, the United 
Kingdom – but also to other states which have traditionally regulated 
procurement procedures through their own rules (such as Spain). An 
exception is Portugal, which has adopted its own precisely elaborated 
version of the procedure. 
The United Kingdom has been the largest user of the competitive 
dialogue procedure so far. This is not surprising since it is a large 
member state and the procedure quite closely reflects previous UK 
practice in awarding major infrastructure projects under the old 
negotiated procedure (although there are important differences – 
notably the need for a fully complete tender at final tender stage in the 
competitive dialogue procedure). By the end of August 2009, there 
had been well over 1500 procedures advertised in the Official Journal. 
Other significant users of the procedure include France, Germany, 
Poland, and (especially in proportion to its size) Denmark. On the 
other hand, some states that have the procedure in their laws have not 
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yet used it, or used it only in a very few cases (e.g. Lithuania and 
Portugal).  
 
5.1.1 Grounds for using the procedure 
 
The procedure is available for ‘particularly complex contracts’. These 
are defined as contracts for which the entity is ‘objectively’ unable to 
define the technical means capable of satisfying its objectives, or to 
specify the legal and/or financial make-up of the project.391
It can be argued that this refers to the case in which the authority 
is unable to find the best solution itself. This can be deduced from the 
fact that the purpose of the dialogue is stated to be to enable the 
authority to identify the means best suited to its needs, as stated in 
Article 29(3) of the Directive – thus a reading of Article 1(9) in 
context suggests that this is the appropriate interpretation.  
 These 
grounds appear to overlap with, but in some respects are broader than, 
the situations covered by the negotiated procedure.  
An authority may also only use the competitive dialogue 
procedure to award a complex contract as defined above where it 
‘considers that the open or restricted procedure will not allow the 
award’ (Article 29(1) of the Directive). 
Unfortunately, the legislation does not make clear whether 
competitive dialogue is an exceptional procedure that is to be 
interpreted and applied strictly (like the negotiated procedure without 
a notice – as discussed further below), or a ‘standard’ procedure like 
the open and restricted procedures. This could be very important in 
interpreting the extent of the provision. For example, this could be 
relevant to answering many of the questions discussed in the 
literature, such as whether it can be used in cases where using other 
approaches would involve excessive costs; and, also, whether the 
suggestion above is correct that the procedure can be used to allow the 
authority to determine what is the best solution. 
The grounds for using this procedure have not yet been subject to 
judicial interpretation and their precise meaning, therefore, remains a 
matter for theoretical debate.  
The main cases in which the procedure has been commonly used 
in the UK in practice, are: 
1. Privately financed infrastructure projects. However, as 
guidance from the OGC emphasises, the procedure cannot be 
                                                          
391Article 1(9) of Directive 2004/18 
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used simply because the project is of this type – it is necessary 
to consider why the conditions for its use are met in the specific 
case. 
2. Where an authority is seeking to install a complex bespoke 
information technology (IT) system to deal with a new 
problem, for which IT has not been used before. The authority 
may not be able to draw up a precise specification because it 
does not know what type of system would work best, or how it 
should best be operated – for example, what sort of functions 
can and cannot be carried out by the system; how easily it can 
be integrated with other systems operated by the authority; or 
whether it should be operated by the private contractor, or by 
the authority’s own employees. Thus it may be appropriate to 
issue just a broad description of the function of the system, and 
leave tenderers to propose their own specifications based on 
their knowledge and technical capabilities. 
Whatever the nuances of the legal rules, a very important point to 
consider when using this procedure is the value of a clear audit trail 
that shows: 
 
i) that the procuring entity has addressed its mind to the relevant 
conditions; that is, whether the definition of a particularly 
complex contract is met, and whether the open or restricted 
procedure could be used; and  
ii) that it has some good evidence that these conditions are met 
(which should be recorded).  
 
This should point to matters specific to the project, and not just repeat 
the wording of the directive that the authority is not able to define the 
technical means, etc. For example, the documentation will need to 
explain why the procuring entity cannot define the technical means. In 
a project for providing a school, for example, this might be because 
the procuring entity does not know what sites of their own, if any, 
potential tenderers can offer for the school, and/or what the merits of 
different possible solutions are (for example, use of tenderer’s own 
sites; refurbishing existing buildings on an existing site; demolishing 
existing buildings and building on the new site; or using other land 
owned by the authority).  
Such an audit trail can help defend the procuring entity against 
challenges and reduce the likelihood of a challenge being successful. 
 
168 
 
5.1.2 The rules of the competitive dialogue procedure 
 
The procedure to be followed in competitive dialogue is set out in 
Article 29 of Directive 2004/18. The form of the procedure and its 
different phases are specified in more detail than in the negotiated 
procedure. An example of one way in which it is very often applied in 
practice in the UK is set out below in the diagram, Competitive 
dialogue procedure: a common approach in the UK. 
It should be noted that, to a large extent, the rules that apply in the 
different phases (e.g. selection and award) are the same as, or very 
similar to, those of the restricted procedure. There has, as yet, been no 
case law of the ECJ or the UK courts dealing with the interpretation of 
these rules on competitive dialogue – although there have been cases 
in some other EU Member States (e.g. Denmark). 
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Competitive dialogue procedure: a common approach in the UK 
 
 COMPETITIVE DIALOGUE 
ADVERTISING Phase Contract notice in O.J. 
SELECTION Phase 
(technical and/or 
professional ability; 
economic and financial 
standing; Article 45 criteria) 
Articles 44-52 
Suitability 
(Qualification) 
Selection of candidates to tender from suitable 
ones 
AWARD Phase 
(choice of lowest price or 
most economically 
advantageous tender 
[MEAT]) 
 
Article 53 
Dialogue Phase  
i) Outline proposals from e.g. 3-6 participants 
(often no or limited financial information) 
ii) Authority chooses e.g. 2-3 to submit further 
proposals 
iii) Discussion of proposals with the 2-3 chosen 
iv) Submission of detailed financial and 
technical proposals from the chosen 2-3 
v) Further discussions if required 
Submission of final tenders by 2-3 tenderers 
Clarification, supplementation or fine-tuning of 
final tenders 
Choice of lowest price or MEAT (and 
notification to all tenderers) 
POST-TENDER Phase Clarification and confirmation stage with “preferred bidder” 
STANDSTILL Phase 3 
CONCLUSION of 
contract 3 
POST-CONTRACT Contract award notice 
 
 
The above diagram illustrates the way in which competitive dialogue 
is often operated in practice in the UK in relation to privately financed 
infrastructure projects. Taking a typical example of a PFI project, one 
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to provide school facilities, the way in which the dialogue phase is 
structured can be explained as follows: 
i.  Outline proposals from, e.g. 3-6 participants (often no or 
limited financial information). 
The authority will first invite outline proposals from a limited 
number of suitable providers. These will set out providers’ 
solutions for the project. For example, in the case of a school 
these might include (depending on the conditions laid down by 
the contracting authority): refurbishing an existing school on an 
existing site; demolishing the existing school and constructing a 
new one on the same site; or constructing  a new school on 
other sites (which could be owned by the authority or by 
tenderers or others) and using the existing site for other 
purposes - these might generate revenue for the provider that 
can be used to enable it to offer favourable terms for providing 
the school or benefits for the authority. These proposals may or 
may not include some financial information (e.g. authorities 
may ask for some indication of this if the affordability of the 
project is in question). 
ii. Authority chooses e.g. 2-3 to submit further proposals. 
Applying the pre-stated contract award criteria, the authority 
then selects a smaller number of providers to submit fuller 
proposals. The number tends to be limited, often to 2, because 
of the very cost of submitting fuller proposals. (For example, 
the authority might decide not to take forward some of the 
providers who are offering alternative sites for the school 
development because it does not consider that these sites are 
suitable, e.g. because of their distance from the catchment area, 
or because of access problems). 
iii Discussion of proposals with the 2-3 chosen. 
There then follow discussions on the chosen 2-3 providers’ 
outline proposals so that they can refine their basic proposals, 
e.g. to better adjust them to the authority’s priorities (e.g. to 
determine exactly what kind of services and facilities should be 
provided beyond those specified as essential), and the 
applicable contract terms can be developed. 
iv. Submission of detailed financial and technical proposals from 
the chosen 2-3 
It is then common, prior to the formal final tender stage, for 
providers to first submit fully detailed and costed proposals that 
are not treated as the final tenders under the 
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directive/regulations. This ensures that no problems emerge in 
the final tenders, given that the scope for adjustment after the 
formal final tender stage in the directive is both limited and 
uncertain. 
v. Further discussions if required 
Further discussions will then be held if needed, e.g. to consider 
how aspects of the full proposals that are not considered 
satisfactory to the authority can be amended. 
 
The authority will then call formally for final tenders, which are fully 
detailed and costed proposals.392
Article 29(3) of the new directive states: 
 
  
The contracting authorities may not reveal to the other 
participants solutions proposed or other confidential 
information communicated by a candidate participating 
in the dialogue without his/her agreement.  
 
This was inserted so that bidders are not deterred from participating 
by a fear that the public entity might reveal confidential information 
and, in particular, details of its proposed solutions that might be used 
by other tenderers. 
It is not entirely clear whether Article 29(3) covers only 
information classified as confidential under domestic law (such that its 
disclosure would violate the provider's existing legal rights), or 
establishes an independent ‘EU’ requirement for confidentiality, 
especially insofar as a provider's ‘solutions’ are concerned. The 
Commission’s Explanatory Note seems to take the former view. This 
leaves much uncertainty about what information is confidential and 
what information is not confidential under the provision. Clearly 
solutions might be based on ‘ideas’ that are not protected by any kind 
of intellectual property, some of which are obvious and some less so – 
and it is not clear which of these may and may not be used. There is 
no case law on this provision. 
Another question is what is sufficient ‘agreement’ to exclude the 
confidentiality requirement. This clearly leaves it open for a 
                                                          
392 Fuller details of UK actual practice and what is considered ‘good practice’ in 
these projects can be found in HM Treasury, Competitive dialogue in 2008, July 
2008, available at <www.ogc.gov.uk> (joint Treasury/OGC publication), accessed 
30 November 2010. 
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participant to agree, for example, that all others should be asked to 
tender on the basis of that participant's solution (for example, in return 
for payment). It can also be argued that, if the authority makes it clear 
in the notice or contract documents that it reserves the right to reveal 
certain information and that this is a condition of participation, 
participants are, in this case, also considered to have agreed to 
disclosure.393
A practical approach, which has often been adopted in the UK to 
deal with this situation, is to ask tenderers to designate which specific 
information they regard as confidential and not for disclosure, whilst 
maintaining a principle of general openness and information sharing. 
This policy will need to be made clear in the contract documents. The 
extent of confidentiality may need to be discussed, however – for 
example, it would not be appropriate for a tenderer to designate as 
confidential information all material that it submits. The lack of clarity 
in the law will still create problems if no agreement can be reached in 
such cases. 
 
Article 29(8) of the new Directive states expressly that ‘The 
contracting authorities may specify prices or payments to the 
participants in the dialogue’.  This provision was included in the 
directive to recognise that the costs of participating in some award 
procedures for complex contracts can be very high, and that entities 
may thus wish to make some payment to participants to induce 
participation and improve competition. Entities may also wish to 
compensate providers whose proposals are incorporated into 
requirements presented to the other participants, as discussed above. 
Nothing in the directives, in fact, prevents entities from making 
such payments in any award procedure, and they thus appear possible 
in all types of procedures, not just competitive dialogue. The fact that 
such an explicit provision is included for competitive dialogue does 
not appear to mean that payments are precluded in other award 
procedures; probably the provision merely clarifies the possibility in 
competitive dialogue, because it was a particular concern in the 
context of this procedure. Another possible interpretation of this 
provision is that, in the specific case of competitive dialogue (but not 
in other procedures), it prevents Member States from prohibiting such 
payments by their individual procuring entities.  
                                                          
393 S. Treumer, ‘Competitive Dialogue’ (2004) Public Procurement Law Review 
178-186, at p.182. 
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5.2 Negotiated Procedure with a Notice 
 
Authorities are permitted to use the negotiated procedures – both with 
a notice and without a notice - only in specific cases, which are laid 
down in the directives (as stated by Article 28 of the Public Sector 
Directive). The grounds and the conditions for the use of the 
negotiated procedure with a notice are laid down in Article 30 of the 
Public Sector Directive.   
Whilst the negotiated procedure with a notice still requires the 
contract award to be made on the basis of objective criteria that are 
generally related to the contract, it does not provide the same 
guarantees as other procedures for monitoring objectivity – in 
particular, the submission of formal tenders to a set specification - and 
is confined, therefore, to exceptional cases.  
It should first be noted that in cases concerning the negotiated 
procedure, without either a notice or competition, the ECJ has set out 
two important principles governing the grounds for use, namely that 
they should be interpreted strictly, and that the purchaser has the 
burden of proving the circumstances justifying their use. 
The ECJ has not yet considered whether these principles apply to 
the negotiated procedure with a notice. The Court’s statements are not 
expressly confined to procedures without a notice; however, the 
position of a negotiated procedure with a notice was not in issue in the 
cases, and it is a very different procedure from single source 
procurement, involving – as we will see - both publicity, competition, 
and a significant degree of transparency (for example, regarding use 
and disclosure the selection criteria and award criteria). It can be 
argued that the above principles should not apply as:  
 
This form of the procedure is not truly a derogation from 
the directives' general principles, but merely a modified 
application of those principles, that takes account of the 
special features of some procurements.394
 
  
On the other hand, it should be acknowledged that the 
organisation of the provisions in the 2004 Public Sector Directive 
                                                          
394 S. Arrowsmith The Law of Public and Utilities Procurement (2nd ed., London: 
Sweet & Maxwell, 2005), chapter 8. 
174 
 
could support a different view. In this respect, Article 28 of the 
Directive sets out the general rule that entities must use open or 
restricted procedures; it then states that in ‘the specific circumstances 
expressly provided for in Article 29’, entities may use the competitive 
dialogue and, in the ‘specific cases and circumstances referred to 
expressly in Articles 30 and 31’, the negotiated procedure. The ECJ 
might deduce from the fact that competitive dialogue is treated 
separately, and the two negotiated procedures are treated together, 
that, whilst competitive dialogue may be a non-exceptional procedure, 
both negotiated procedures are exceptional. 
A second general issue of interpretation to consider is whether 
there is any formal ‘hierarchy’ of procedures. It is conceivable that the 
ECJ might adopt a concept of hierarchy of procedures based on the 
transparency principle, which requires use of the most transparent 
procedure that is suitable for the case. If that is the case, the negotiated 
procedure with a notice could then be used only when other suitable 
procedures, including the competitive dialogue procedure introduced 
in 2004, are not available. Against this view, it can be argued that the 
Directive indicates quite clearly, in its explicit terms, the availability 
of the different procedures and, in certain cases, a choice between 
them when more than one is available – for example, it allows a free 
choice between open and restricted procedures. Where no choice is 
intended this is indicated specifically in the Directive (for example, 
the Directive specifically indicates that competitive dialogue is 
available only when a contract cannot be awarded by open or 
restricted procedure). However, there are some limited cases in which 
the availability of the negotiated procedure with a notice is affected by 
the existence and availability of other procedures, including the new 
competitive dialogue procedure, either under explicit rules in the 
Directive or by implication or analogy. 
When entities choose the negotiated procedure, the record of the 
procedure must include the reasons why the procedure was selected 
(Article 43(f) of the Public Sector Directive). As in all cases in which 
the legality of procurement decisions is subject to review, maintaining 
a detailed audit trail that includes detailed reasons and evidence may 
be a significant help in preventing challenges being brought, and in 
defending them successfully.395
                                                          
395 The value of such an audit trail is emphasised, for example, in the OGC’s 
guidance concerning use of negotiated procedures on PFI projects, Competitive 
Dialogue Procedure: OGC Guidance on the Competitive Dialogue Procedure in 
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An entity may always use a more stringent procedure than 
required. Thus, for example, a procuring entity may decide to make its 
final choice in a negotiated procedure with a notice based on final 
tenders without negotiations, even though the regulations permit some 
negotiations after any final tender phase. 
The Directive first allows use of the negotiated procedure insofar 
as – in the words of the directives: 
 
the nature of the services to be provided is such that 
contract specifications cannot be established with 
sufficient precision to permit the award of the contract 
by selection of the best tender according to the rules 
governing open or restricted procedures 
(Article30(1)(c)). 
 
The difficulty in formulating specifications does not provide a reason 
to dispense with a competition altogether, but makes a formal and 
rigid procedure inappropriate.  
A point of principle that is not addressed explicitly in the 
Directive, and that is related to the discussion above, is whether this 
ground for using the negotiated procedure with a notice is available 
when the contract could be awarded using the competitive dialogue 
procedure. We have already noted above the possibility that the ECJ 
might adopt a formal general hierarchy of procedures and if that were 
the case then reliance on this ground for using the negotiated 
procedure would depend on showing that the competitive dialogue 
procedure, also, is not suitable for the award of the contract. However, 
no such hierarchy exists currently. Nevertheless, even if there is no 
general hierarchy of procedures it might be argued that it is to be 
implied into the Directive – by analogy from the explicit provisions 
making the procedure subject to the use of the open and restricted 
procedures - that this ground for using the negotiated procedure is also 
subject to the non-availability of the more transparent competitive 
dialogue procedure. It might be argued that the failure to make use of 
the negotiated procedure explicitly subject to non-availability of 
competitive dialogue when competitive dialogue was introduced is a 
mere oversight (the issue simply was not considered), rather than 
indicating any positive intention to provide for a broad overlap 
                                                                                                                                                    
the new Procurement Regulations (Jan 2006), <www.ogc.gov.uk>, accessed 30 
November 2010, section 2. 
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between the negotiated procedure and competitive dialogue; and that 
the scheme of the provision in permitting negotiated procedures only 
as a ‘last resort’ when open and restricted procedures cannot be used 
also requires that it be considered subject to the non-availability of 
competitive dialogue. It seems likely that such an argument will find 
some sympathy with the courts. However, even if this is the case, it 
seems likely that the procedure will still be widely available in cases 
of the type of services –financial services and intellectual services - 
for which the Directive and regulations expressly envisage its use.   
Even if the non-availability of competitive dialogue is not a 
formal condition for using this ground for the negotiated procedure, it 
seems likely that the introduction of competitive dialogue will lead the 
ECJ to give this ground for the negotiated procedure a rather narrower 
interpretation than it might otherwise have had, taking the view that 
the ground is only available in extreme cases of unsuitability of the 
open or restricted procedures, rather than whenever the open or 
restricted procedures are not commercially suitable. 
A question of particular interest is how, in light of the legal 
principles outlined above, the procedure remains relevant to projects 
conducted under the UK’s Private Finance Initiative and other Public-
Private Partnerships. The width of this ground (and others) for 
negotiated procedures became important in the United Kingdom in the 
context of privately financed infrastructure projects, under the PFI. 
The general practice, at least in the 1990s before a standardised 
approach had been developed to the main types of PFI contract, was to 
use the negotiated procedure with a notice; this was influenced by 
Treasury Taskforce advice that this procedure was generally available 
for PFI contracts. They were generally awarded through a process that 
involved commencing with a broad output specification that is 
gradually refined and completed, taking into account the results of a 
first stage of tendering and/or of discussions during the award phase, 
in a manner similar to that envisaged by the new competitive dialogue 
procedure. The application of the procedure to such cases has never 
been considered by the ECJ.  
However, the question was addressed in the English courts – prior 
to the adoption of the 2004 Directive, when competitive dialogue was 
still not available - by Richards J. in R. v Rhondda Cynon Taff County 
BC Ex p. Kathro.396
                                                          
396 R. v Rhondda Cynon Taff County BC Ex p. Kathro [2001] EWHC Admin 527; 
[2002] Env LR 15, QBD 
 This case concerned a local authority PFI project 
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for a variety of facilities, including schools, community learning 
facilities, and arts and leisure facilities. Certain decisions, including 
the decision to use the negotiated procedure, were challenged by a 
community council and individual residents who opposed the PFI 
scheme. Richards J. concluded that the council was entitled to 
conclude that the circumstances justified use of the negotiated 
procedure. However, he did not set out his reasoning on this point. 
The Kathro case now needs to be considered in light of the new 
competitive dialogue procedure. This is particularly the case in view 
of the fact that it was because of doubts over the availability of the 
negotiated procedure for privately financed projects that competitive 
dialogue was conceived.  
Since 2006, the Office of Government Commerce (OGC) 
guidance has suggested that the negotiated procedure is available for 
PFI only in ‘very exceptional circumstances’. In practice, the number 
of negotiated procedures with a notice has declined significantly in the 
UK since Directive 2004/18 was implemented in 2006, and this 
decline corresponds closely with a rising use of the new competitive 
dialogue procedure. It seems likely that this reflects the guidance 
given by the OGC to the effect that competitive dialogue should 
generally be used for PFI projects and that the negotiated procedure is 
not normally available.  
It is noteworthy, however, that speaking at the Partnerships UK 
annual conference in London in October 2009, the Treasury's Head of 
Partnerships, Charles Lloyd, indicated that there may be an imminent 
review of government policy in this area. The aim of the review would 
be ‘to understand better when and how competitive dialogue is being 
used, how well it's working and how it compares to the negotiated 
procedure’. Mention was made in this context of the fact that ‘one or 
two other countries are using the negotiated procedure as opposed to 
competitive dialogue’ [for PFI-type projects]. 
It will be interesting to see whether the advice put out by the OGC 
regarding the availability and desirability of the negotiated procedure 
for PFI changes in any way in the near future, and leads to this 
procedure once again being widely used for PFI projects in the UK – 
or at least to greater use than at present. 
It can finally be mentioned that the ‘no specifications’ ground 
does not apply to works and services contracts. The assumption that 
specifications can always be drawn up with precision for works and 
supply contracts can be criticised. However, the availability of the 
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competitive dialogue procedure to some extent ameliorates the 
problems that previously existed in these cases. 
Under the Public Sector Directive, a contract may also be awarded 
by the negotiated procedure with a notice where the nature of the 
goods, work(s) or services, or the risks attaching to performance, are 
such ‘as not to permit prior overall pricing’ (Article30(1)(b)). 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The EU Treaty does not restrict Member States' freedom to grant 
contractual PPPs or establish IPPPs. The focus is on ensuring that the 
methods used to do so are compatible with Community law. The 
relevant Community rules include those on competition, state aid, as 
well as public procurement. This chapter has examined the treatment 
of different types of PPPs, namely concessions, other contractual PPPs 
(typically PFI) and IPPPs under the EU procurement rules, which 
consist of EU Treaty free movement rules, principles developed in the 
case law and the backbone of EU procurement regime, the Public 
Procurement Directives.  
It is clear from the above discussion that the procurement rules, 
both those on coverage and those on procurement procedure, 
applicable to PPPs, need to be further clarified. The Commission has 
taken a number of initiatives to provide guidance through adoption of 
non-binding soft-law measures. Given the diversity of Member States’ 
practice on PPPs, it is not easy for the Commission to enhance legal 
certainty in such a dynamic and economically significant area. The 
case for a binding legislative instrument and its scope remain unclear, 
although the Commission has declared its intention for 6 years.  
It is arguable that the Commission should focus its limited 
resources on striking the right balance between legal certainty and 
Member States’ discretion; between transparency and commercial 
flexibility; and between public and private partners in a PPP co-
operation.  Urgent work should also be done to clarify the relationship 
between the main procurement procedures for PPPs, namely 
competitive dialogue and the negotiated procedure with a notice.  
It can be argued that the current EU procurement legal framework 
on PPPs remains focused on non-discrimination, equal treatment and 
transparency, and, to a large extent, neglects the need for public and 
private partners to engage in commercial viable co-operations based 
on trust.  This is highlighted by the Commission’s ‘trust-breaking’ 
recommendation in its recent Interpretative Communication on IPPPs, 
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that the statutes and articles of association of a PPP ‘should be so 
formulated that it is possible to change the private partner in the 
future’.397
 
  
 
                                                          
397 Commission (EC), ‘Interpretative Communication on the Application of 
Community Law on Public Procurement and Concessions to Institutionalised 
Public-Private Partnerships (PPP)’ (Communication) C (2007) 6661, 5th February 
2008, at 2.2 
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Chapter 5 
 
 
 
PPP in China 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The development of the private sector in China has been gaining 
momentum following a series of centrally-issued, encouraging 
political and policy initiatives in the past few years.398
Along with this development comes the third wave of Chinese 
public procurement reform and regulation - the emerging regulatory 
framework governing the procurement of privately financed 
infrastructure project (PFIP), and the distinctive legislative 
development of concession regulation in urban infrastructure and 
utilities sectors.  
 The private 
sector is allowed to engage in service provision in almost all sectors 
traditionally monopolised by government or state owned enterprises 
(SOEs). 
This chapter will present a review of these policy and legal 
developments in order to explore the emerging legal framework for 
                                                          
398 For example,  National Planning Commission, Notice on Publishing the 
Opinions on Promoting and Guiding Private Investment, issued on December 11, 
2001; National Planning Commission, Some Opinions On Some Policy Measure 
To Increase The Development Of Service Sectors In The 15th Five Year Period, 
issued in January 2002; Ministry of Construction, Opinion On Promoting The 
Marketization Of Urban Public Utilities, issued on December 27, 2003; Ministry of 
Construction, Measures On Urban Public Utilities Concession, issued in 2004; 
State Council, State Council Decision Regarding The Investment System Reform, 
issued in July 2004; State Council, Opinions On Encouraging, Supporting And 
Guiding The Development Of Non-State Sector Economies, issued in 2005.  
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the new public private partnerships and the main regulatory issues 
concerned. 
Part 2 will present a brief review of the development of policy and 
regulation to encourage private provision of public service in China. 
Part 3 will present some insights on what the current regulations could 
contribute to the future legislative framework and the new regulatory 
issues to be addressed. Part 4 concludes this chapter. 
The purpose of this chapter is to review whether appropriate 
regulatory objectives have been established by the new Regulations, 
and to what degree the substance of the new Regulations have helped 
to achieve these objectives. This chapter also seeks to explore what 
issues remain and need to be addressed by future regulation to create a 
more favourable legal framework for private finance in infrastructure 
in China.  
 
 
2. Recent legislative initiatives 
 
Despite its ups and downs, the Chinese private sector has managed a 
steady and sustainable development after the initiation of the Chinese 
economic reform. It could be observed that the time for political and 
ideological restriction of private sector development has passed, and 
constitutional and legal barriers have been removed.399
However, private development in the public service sector is not 
as smooth. This is possibly due to the fact that public service 
traditionally falls under the monopoly of the government and SOEs. 
 The private 
sector enjoys full autonomy in its development in competitive and 
commercial sectors. 
Even when this domain is opened up to private sector, it is foreign 
investors that are preferred, for various policy and practical reasons. 
                                                          
399 During a considerable period of time before 1978, the non-state sector economy 
was severely restricted or even prohibited. However , the constitutional position of 
the non-state sector economy has gradually changed through several amendments 
to the Chinese Constitution Law, especially noteworthy is the 1999 Amendment to 
the Chinese Constitution Law, which establishes the non-state sector economy as 
an important component of the socialist market economy and supports its equal 
legal status with the state sector economy. The 2004 Amendment to the Chinese 
Constitution Law further establishes that ‘the State protects the legitimate rights 
and interests of the individual, private and other non state sector economy. The 
State encourages, supports, and guides the development of the non state sector 
economy and supervises and manages the non state sector economy, according to 
the law.’ 
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For example, local governments may be keen to engage foreign 
investment to raise the local government’s profile, particularly when 
the indicators of success for local government are based on GDP 
development and the amount of foreign investment employed; or the 
management of SOEs may like to use its foreign partner as leverage to 
resist governmental control and maintain some degree of autonomy. 
Amongst the few privately financed infrastructure and utilities 
projects, most are regulated on a case-by-case basis through contracts. 
There is no sectoral or general legislation governing the awarding of 
contracts and supervision of the project’s operation, except for in a 
few cases, where a specific local regulation is enacted governing the 
operation of one particular privately financed infrastructure project 
(PFIP). 
This situation has been changing dramatically, with recent policy 
and legal developments encouraging private engagement in public 
service provision. A number of policies at ministerial and State 
Council level have been issued in the past few years, declaring a 
policy of liberalisation in the sectors traditionally monopolised by the 
state or SOEs. Especially noteworthy are the State Council Opinions 
on Encouraging, Supporting and Guiding the Development of the 
Non-State Sector Economy.400
The Opinions have liberalised wide sectors of the economy, 
including the traditionally monopolised sectors such as 
telecommunication, civil aviation, oil, and rail transportation, etc., 
urban infrastructure and utilities, social sectors and, to some degree, 
the military sector. They also provide for the various ways that private 
investment can be employed, including shareholding, joint ventures 
and project finance. 
  
The Opinions have had profound policy and practical implications 
for private engagement in public service provision in China. Domestic 
private investors are now accorded equal rights with foreign investors, 
and some implementing government measures, and Regulations of a 
general nature, have been initiated. Amongst these is the distinctive 
legal development of the Concession Regulations, which govern the 
formation and operation of a new type of public private partnerships 
relationship. Within three years, one ministerial provision was 
                                                          
400 State Council, The Opinions on Encouraging, Supporting and Guiding the 
Development of Non-State Sector Economies, issued in 2005.  
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promulgated and four provincial provisions later followed, governing 
urban utilities concessions.401
The Beijing Municipal Government is also following this 
approach, but is taking a different path; its Regulations refer not to 
utilities, but rather to infrastructure concessions.
  
402 However, the 
coverage of the Regulations is somewhat the same and it is arguable 
that the term of utilities and infrastructure in these Regulations could 
be used interchangeably.403
This chapter will examine the three Congress-made Regulations,  
namely the Beijing Regulation, Shenzhen Regulation and Xinjiang 
Regulation; the Ministerial Provision is also referred to where 
relevant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
401 Ministry of Construction, Provisions on Urban Public Utilities Concession, 
issued in 2003 (hereafter referred to as the Ministerial Provisions); Shenzhen 
Municipal Government, Shenzhen Municipal Provision on Urban Public Utilities 
Concession, issued in 2004, later upgraded to a Congress-made law; People’s 
Congress of Shenxhen Municipality, Shenzhen Municipal Regulation on Urban 
Public Utilities Concession (hereafter referred to as the Shenzhen Regulation), 
enacted in December 2005, effective on March 1, 2006; People’s Congee of 
Xinjiang Autonomous Region, Regulation on Public Utilities Concession of 
Xinjiang Autonomous Region (hereafter referred to as the Xinjiang Regulation), 
issued in 2005; another two provincial provisions are found in Guizhou province 
and Tianjin municipality (hereinafter referred to as Guizhou Provision and Tianjin 
Provision).   
402 Municipal Government, The Urban Infrastructure Concession Provision of 
Beijing Municipality, issued in 2004, and later upgraded to People’s Congress of 
Beijing Municipality, The Urban Infrastructure Concession Regulation of Beijing 
Municipality (hereafter referred to as the Beijing Regulation), passed on December 
1, 2005, effective on March 1, 2006. A review of the Beijing Regulation can be 
found in C. Fuguo, ‘The Emerging Legal Framework in Private Finance in 
Infrastructure in China: a Review of the Beijing Concession Regulation’(2006) 15 
Public Procurement Law Review 62. 
403 The term of infrastructure and utilities are also used interchangeably in other 
context. For example,  Gómez-Ibáñez uses the terms ‘infrastructure industries’ and 
‘public utilities’ interchangeably. See J. A. Gómez-Ibáñez, Regulating 
Infrastructure: Monopoly, Contracts, and Discretion (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 2003). 
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3. The legal framework and main regulatory issues for PFI 
project: a review of current regulations in China 
 
3.1 Regulatory objectives 
 
Various policy objectives can be found in the regulation of 
infrastructure and utilities, including: the protection of social interests, 
and the interests of the market operator and consumers; the 
improvement of the level of public service, enhancing the process of 
infrastructure marketisation and promoting competition; increasing the 
efficiency of allocation of public resources; enhancing the 
transparency of the regulatory process; and encouraging public 
participation in regulation.404 Some of these are related to overall 
infrastructure/utilities regulation, while others are specific to the PFIP 
regulation. For example, an Act of UK legislation on utilities requires 
the protection of the utility consumers’ interests as the primary 
objective of the regulator;405
However, PFIP regulation may have a more immediate regulatory 
objective, as is discussed in the UNCITRAL Guide on PFIP 
Legislation.
 all other policy concerns, such as 
effective competition and efficient allocation of resources, quality of 
service, etc. only serve as policy tools towards the higher policy 
objective of consumer protection. This presumably applies to all 
utilities operators, whatever the means of utilities provision. 
406
                                                          
404 The objectives of infrastructure Regulations are discussed in a study report ‘A 
Study on the Legislative Framework and Regulatory Issues in Regulating Beijing 
Municipal Infrastructure’, commissioned by the Beijing Municipal Government, 
and conducted by the author and colleagues in 2004.  
 The UNCITRAL Guide has explicitly declared that 
‘the purpose of the Guide is to assist in the establishment of a legal 
framework favourable to private investment in public 
405 Utilities Act 2000, ss.9 and 13, laying out the principal objective and general 
duties of the Secretary of State and the Authority, provides that ‘the principal 
objective of the Secretary of State and the Gas and Electricity Markets Authority in 
carrying out their respective functions under this Part is to protect the interests of 
consumers in relation to gas conveyed through pipes, wherever appropriate by 
promoting effective competition between persons engaged in, or in commercial 
activities connected with, the shipping, transportation or supply of gas so 
conveyed’. 
406 UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on PFIP, (Fifty-fourth session, 
Supplement No. 17, New York: United Nations, 2001), (hereafter referred to as the 
UNCITRAL Guide). 
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infrastructure’,407 and that ‘the constitutional, legislative and 
institutional framework should ensure transparency, fairness, and the 
long-term sustainability of projects’.408
Three issues are raised with respect to the establishment of 
appropriate regulatory objectives in the new Chinese Regulations. 
 
 
3.1.1. Employment of private capital vs. market reform in 
infrastructure sectors 
 
Some of the Chinese Regulations make it clear that the purpose of the 
PFIP legislation is to ‘expand the means of financing’ of public 
infrastructure. This is particularly the case with regards to the Beijing 
Regulation, where an advocate for the Regulation states that one of the 
primary objectives of the Regulation is ‘to expand the channel of 
finance in urban infrastructure and to attract domestic and 
international investment’.409 This is understandable when one 
considers the investment pressure imposed by the ever-increasing 
infrastructure demand generated by both the 2008 Olympic Games 
and the metropolitan population. However, it would be a mistake 
simply to employ private capital and award monopoly rights to private 
enterprise.410
A key aim in awarding concession rights is to encourage market 
reform and competition. It could be argued that, only when fair market 
rules are established, can private finance be genuinely motivated. 
Therefore, even in legislation governing the narrow issue of 
concessions, the objective of wider market reform and competition 
should be established. The issues of competition or monopoly, public 
or private monopoly, actually fall within the government policy 
options in the context of private finance in infrastructure,
  
411
                                                          
407 UNCITRAL Guide, Introduction, at para.4. 
 as is 
discussed in the UNCITRAL Guide: 
408 Consolidated Legislative Recommendation, included in the UNCITRAL Guide. 
409 D. Xiangyang, ‘‘Explanations on the BeijingRegulation’’ (draft), presented to 
the Beijing Municipal Congress accompanied with the Draft; this objective is 
provided in Art. 1 of the former Government provisions and Art. 2 of the Beijing 
Regulation 
succeeds.  
410 J. Stieglitz, ‘‘Enhancement of Regulation and Competition Policy: the Case of 
Network Industry’’, in The Theory and Policy of Chinese Regulation and Policy 
(Z. Xinzhu ed., Social Science Documentary Press, 2000) p.364. (In Chinese). 
411 Actually one of the World Bank Policy Papers has recommended that 
government should consider the introduction of competition through reform of 
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Essential elements of national policies include the level 
of competition sought for each infrastructure sector, the 
way in which the sector is structured and the 
mechanisms used to ensure adequate functioning of 
infrastructure markets. National Policies to promote 
private investment in infrastructure are often 
accompanied by measures destined to introduce 
competition between public service providers or to 
prevent abuse of monopolistic conditions where 
competition is not feasible.412
 
 
The Guide also provides a detailed discussion of the competition 
policy in relation to private finance in infrastructure, policies 
concerning the reformation of the infrastructure sector, and relevant 
experience.413 While recognising the fact that some countries may feel 
it necessary to provide for temporary exclusivity rights, limitation in 
the number of public service providers, or other restrictions on 
competition to encourage private investment, the Guide also 
recommends that these should only be temporary or transitional 
measures and ‘the transition from monopoly to market needs to be 
carefully managed’.414
Bringing the discussion back to the Chinese context, the 
endorsement of a wider objective of market reform in the new PFIP 
Regulation does not seem to be easy to achieve in practice. For 
example, during the legislative process for the Beijing Regulation, the 
leading driving force behind this Regulation, the Beijing Municipal 
Development and Reform Commission (BMDRC), was very keen to 
promote marketisation and reform of the whole infrastructure sector 
and to establish a fair market order through wider coverage for the 
new Regulation. A wide consensus was also reached among working 
group members to establish as a primary regulatory objective the 
promotion of infrastructure marketisation. However, the issue turned 
 It can be argued that the UNCITRAL Guide 
has clearly embraced the policy of competition and market reform in 
infrastructure with private finance. 
                                                                                                                                                    
market structure before the award of concession contract. See K. Michel, R. David 
Gray, T. Irwin, C. Levesque, and R. R. Taylor, Concession For Infrastructure: a 
Guide to their Design and Award, World Bank Technical Paper No.399, at p.7.  
412 UNCITRAL Guide, Introduction, at para.21.  
413 ibid.  
414 UNCITRAL Guide, Introduction, at para.44.  
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out to be subtle and complicated, and enacting such a provision would 
perhaps have substantially delayed the legislative process; an explicit 
declaration of such a marketisation policy in the objective chapter 
was, unfortunately, dropped.415
However, the policy objective of marketisation is found in other 
Regulations. For example, the Ministerial Provision by the Ministry of 
Construction declares as one of the regulatory objectives the 
promotion of market reform and the establishment of an open and 
competitive municipal utilities market; the Tianjin Provision 
governing public utilities concessions also follows this approach. 
 
 
3.1.2 Balancing of public and private interests: the principle of the 
precedence of the public interest 
 
Another objective of PFIP Regulation is to achieve a balance between 
private and public interests. 
As is discussed in the UNCITRAL Guide: 
 
a fair legal framework takes into account the various 
(and sometimes possibly conflicting) interests of the 
Government, the public service providers and their 
customers and seeks to achieve an equitable balance 
between them.416
 
 
Thus:  
 
the advice provided in the Guide aims at achieving a 
balance between the desire to facilitate and encourage 
private participation in infrastructure projects, on the one 
hand, and various public interest concerns of the host 
country, on the other.417
 
 
All current Chinese Regulations declare a similar balance of interests 
objective. For example, the Beijing Regulation aims at protecting 
social and public interests; ensuring quality provision of public goods 
and services; and protecting the legitimate rights of concessionaire. In 
                                                          
415 See People’s Congress of Beijing Municipality, Report on the Review Opinions 
of the Draft Beijing Regulation, by the Finance and Economic Commission. 
 
416 UNCITRAL Guide, Chapter 1, at para.5.  
417 UNCITRAL Guide, Introduction, at para.4.  
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practice, however, the structure of the various interests is an issue of 
negotiation; thus, the achievement of the balance of interests 
objectives depends very much upon the selection and negotiation 
process, and the resulting contract between the contracting parties. 
The legislature has been greatly concerned that the government 
may, on some occasions, be vulnerable to exploitation by the private 
operator seeking excessive profits. This is particularly true where 
there is no accountable political system in place: the Regulations are 
poor; the project implementation process can be easily manipulated; 
and a sound supervisory system is yet to be established. These 
situations are very likely to exist in the Chinese context. Therefore, 
while accepting the importance of private interest protection, 
regulators are also keen to safeguard public interests. All Regulations 
establish the ‘principle of public interest precedence’, which means 
that when conflicting interests arise, public interests should be 
assigned a priority for protection.418
While the issues of public interest protection are mostly associated 
with the obligations of the concessionaires,
 
419
There are also measures throughout the Regulation that are 
designed to protect the interest of investors, including: transparency of 
laws and Regulations in the award process, and predictability and 
impartiality in their application;
 they also concern the 
duties on public authorities as created by the new Regulations. For 
example, in order to protect the public interest, the Xinjiang 
Regulation imposes a duty on the Municipal Government not to sell 
public property to the private sector. This is intended to curb the 
allegedly expanding practice at local level of selling public service 
facilities cheaply to the private sector as a means of relieving the 
government of a financial burden. Some Regulations also require the 
supervisory authority to keep an emergency plan in place to ensure the 
continuous supply of public services in the case of irregularities. 
420 in respect of concession contracts 
by the Government,421 on strengthening the co-ordination between 
government bodies;422 on government support and commitment;423
                                                          
418 Beijing Regulation, Art. 5. 
 on 
419 See the discussion below in section 3.6.1.  
420 e.g. Art. 11 of the Beijing Regulation. 
421 e.g. ibid., Art. 19.  
422 e.g. ibid., Arts 6 and 18.  
423 e.g. ibid., Arts 15, 16 and 17.  
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the protection of commercial secrets;424 and, on compensation payable 
in the case of policy change.425
The Beijing Regulation also restates the right for the aggrieved 
concessionaire to resort to formal proceedings
 
426
 
 provided by other 
laws. However, no separate challenge and dispute resolution system is 
provided for by the Regulation itself.   
3.1.3 Consumer interest protection as a primary objective? 
 
The ultimate objective of infrastructure/utilities regulation is to 
increase consumer welfare. In addition, consumers can play an 
important role in supervising the operation of public services. 
Recognising the government’s primary objective of consumer 
protection and the consumer input mechanisms that exist in other 
jurisdictions, advocates of the new Regulations propose similar 
provisions and mechanisms for the new Concession Regulations. 
However, the issue is so closely related to the development of a 
consumer society that it is no surprise that the effort to declare 
consumer protection as a primary regulatory objective failed in the 
case of the Beijing Regulation. 
However, some welcome advances have been achieved — some 
Regulations require the establishment of a utilities committee, a new 
consumer mechanism similar to its British counterpart.427
 
 
 
3.2 The concept of a concession 
 
The concession is a basic concept that is the focus of the Regulations, 
and which affects the legal arrangement of the fundamental rights and 
obligations between the parties concerned. All of the Regulations 
discussed in this chapter provide an explicit chapter dealing with the 
definition of a concession.428
                                                          
424 e.g. ibid., Art. 29.  
 A typical example defines a concession 
as ‘a contractual arrangement’ under which enterprises and other 
425 e.g. ibid., Arts 30 and 32.  
426 e.g. ibid., Art. 33.  
427 In the United Kingdom, several consumer voice mechanisms are established in 
relevant Utilities Regulations; for example, the Voice of Water in the water 
industry.  
428 The Beijing Regulation, Art. 2; Shenzhen Regulation, Art. 3; and the Xinjiang 
Regulation, Art. 2. 
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economic organisations are granted the right, through fair competition 
offered by the Government, to operate defined urban infrastructure 
and provide public goods or services, within a certain period of time 
and in a certain geographical area.429
One distinctive feature of a concession more generally is that 
revenue is generated from user fees, not from general public finance. 
For example, in France, the common feature of the legal arrangement 
termed a concession is that the revenue of the concessionaire must be 
linked with the collection of user fees.
 However, this definition does not 
itself indicate the way in which such an operation is remunerated as 
well as other fundamental features of concessions that can be found in 
definitions from other jurisdictions. 
430 Such a user-pay feature can 
also be found in the United Kingdom context, where one Act of 
Parliament defines a concession agreement as an agreement entered 
into by a highway authority under which a person (the 
concessionaire), in return for undertaking such obligations as may be 
specified in the agreement with respect to the design, construction, 
maintenance, operation, or improvement of a special road, is 
appointed to enjoy the right (conferred or to be conferred by a toll 
order) to charge tolls in respect of the use of the road.431
 
 The EU 
Directive defines a concession as a contract under which: 
the consideration for the works to be carried out consists 
either solely in the right to exploit the construction or in 
this right together with payment.432
 
 
Other documents further clarify that:  
 
exploitation means that the provider carrying out the 
work, instead of being paid directly by the awarding 
authority initiating the procedure, earns revenue from the 
                                                          
429 Beijing Regulation, Art. 2.  
430 See P. Boeuf, ‘Public-private Partnerships for Transport Infrastructure Projects 
Annex 1’, paper delivered at ‘Transport Infrastructure Development for a Wider 
Europe’, Paris, November 27–28, 2003.  
431 New Roads and Street Works Act 1991 (UK), s 1(1).  
432 Council Directive (EC) 2004/18 on the co-ordination of procedures for the 
award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service 
contracts [2004] OJ L134/114Art. 1.  
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fees charged to users of the construction when it is 
complete.433
 
  
Therefore, there is a widely shared understanding that the fundamental 
feature of a concession is the financing mechanism of user-pay, which 
distinguishes itself from the other private finance arrangements of 
public service provision, such as,  for example, some types of PFI 
arrangement in the UK context, such as prisons and hospitals, which 
are not financed on a user-pay basis.434
Referring back to the Chinese context, the definition in the 
Chinese Regulations does not help much in clarifying the meaning and 
legal arrangement of a concession. However, it could be observed 
from other places in the Regulation that remuneration in a concession 
project may include: user payments; a right to develop and operate 
facilities related to the particular urban infrastructure; government 
subsidies; and other means of remuneration agreed by the 
government.
 
435 Article 17 of the Beijing Regulation, which mainly 
concerns government support and guarantees, further provides that 
such remuneration may also be in the form of government 
procurement of the products and service provided by the 
concessionaire.436 However, the government shall not, in any case, 
undertake to guarantee a fixed rate of return on the investment, or 
commit itself to commercial risk.437
                                                          
433 Commission (EC), ‘Draft Commission interpretative communication on 
concessions under Community law on public contracts’ (Communication) O.J. 
C94/4, 7 April 1999.  
 The feature of user-pay in a 
concession arrangement could further be implied by the form of the 
concession arrangements of BOT (built-operate-transfer) and TOT 
(transfer-operate-transfer) when the Government is designing a 
concession project. 
434 See S. Arrowsmith and P. Badcoe (eds.), Public Private Partnerships and PFI 
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1999); S. Cirell, J. Bennett and R. Hann, Private 
Finance Initiative and Local Government (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1997); G. 
Lindrup and E. Godfrey (eds.), Butterworth’s PFI Manual: Law, Practice and 
Procedure Relating to the Private Finance Initiative and Public/Private 
Partnerships (London: Butterworths, 1998); N. Morrison and N. Owen, Private 
Finance Initiative: A Specially Commissioned Report (London: FT Law & Tax, 
1996); J. Fox and N. Tott, The PFI Handbook (Bristol: Jordans, 1999).  
435 e.g. Beijing Regulation, Art. 15; and Shenzhen Regulation, Art. 22.  
436 Beijing Regulation, Art. 17.  
437 e.g. ibid.  
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Furthermore, the Chinese definition does not address the role that 
project risk can play in determining whether the procurement 
arrangement is a concession. The European Commission has made it 
clear that: 
 
[E]ven though the origin of the resources - directly 
paid by the user of the construction - is, in most 
cases, a significant factor, it is the existence of 
exploitation risk, involved in the investment made 
or the capital invested, which is the determining 
factor, particularly when the awarding authority 
has paid a sum of money.’’438
 
 
Therefore in EU law, whether the project risk is transferred to the 
concessionaire is a crucially important factor in determining the nature 
of the contract and application of government procurement law. For 
example, based on this risk criteria, if the government undertakes to 
guarantee the project payment, or is committed to a fixed return on the 
investment, it is not a concession contract. It is also argued that a 
concession does not cover the situation where payments are made to 
the provider from the authority’s funds based on public u - for 
example, where the authority pays a road operator based on the 
number of road users (shadow tolls).439
Similar risk issues may also arise in the Chinese context, given 
that government support to the project may include government 
payment in the form of subsidies, development rights for related 
facilities, etc. However, the Regulations provide little guidance in this 
respect, except for imposing a duty on the authority not to guarantee 
any fixed rate of return on the investment nor to be committed to any 
commercial risk, which itself is by no means clear. Therefore, the role 
 
                                                          
438 See the Commission (EC), ‘Interpretive Communication of the Commission on 
Concessions under Community law’ (Communication) OJ C 121/2, 29 April 2000, 
at p.8. Similar indications can be found in other official documents: it should be 
noted that it is the criterion of the right of exploitation, and its corollary, the 
transfer of the risks inherent in the exploitation, which distinguish public contracts 
from concessions. Commission (EC), ‘Green Paper On Public-Private Partnerships 
And Community Law On Public Contracts And Concessions’ (Green Paper) COM 
(2004) 327 final, 30th April 2004, at p.36.  
439 S. Arrowsmith, ‘Public Private Partnerships and the European Procurement 
Rules: EU Policies in Conflict?’ (2000) 37 Common Market Law Review 709.  
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of the project risk in determining a concession project remains to be 
seen. 
 
 
3.3 The application of the Regulations 
 
The Regulations only cover situations where the infrastructure or 
utilities service are provided in the form of a concession.440
However, this does not appear to be problematic in the application 
of the Regulation since the Government generally agrees on a 
concession arrangement at an earlier stage in the project proposal 
(possibly based on private finance and user pay test), and when it 
decides to proceed with the project in the form of concession, the 
Regulation will then automatically apply. 
 Therefore,  
it is important to decide what constitutes the definition of a concession 
for the purpose of the Regulation’s application; as discussed above, 
this is not quite clear. 
The Regulations leave open several crucial policy issues with 
regard to the definition of concession and the regulation. First, a 
concession is only one of the policy tools that the Government may 
employ to provide a public service. At least in theory, the Government 
may still choose to provide the public service itself, or through a state 
owned enterprise; or it may choose to provide the service through 
government procurement, or other forms of private finance (PFI in 
United Kingdom, for example). Secondly, the decision to provide an 
infrastructure service through a concession arrangement is an 
important issue of public policy. It is submitted that the Regulation 
should provide some guidance to aid such a public choice. A good 
example is the Beijing Regulation, which places an emphasis on the 
procedures governing the proposal and determination of a concession 
project. The Xinjiang Regulation also provides for some principles 
governing the determination of a concession project.441
                                                          
440 Beijing Regulation, Art. 3; Xinjiang Regulation, Art. 2; and Shenzhen 
Regulation, Art. 3.  
 Thirdly, it is 
good practice for the Government to specify the criteria and standards 
that will be employed to evaluate the merits of using the concession 
approach and to decide whether to use it. However, the current 
Regulations simply say nothing on this. 
441 Xinjiang Regulation, Art. 4.  
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The Regulations also set out the specific sectors where 
concessions may be employed as a means to provide infrastructure 
services. These sectors include supply of water, gas and heating; 
treatment of sewage and solid refuse; and public transport. This could 
be extended to include additional sectors under the possible scope of 
coverage of the Regulations, either through a decision of the 
Municipal Government in the case of Beijing, or through provisions in 
laws and Regulations.442
 
 It could be observed that despite the 
difference in terminology between an urban infrastructure concession 
and an urban utilities concession, the sectors covered by the law are 
largely the same. 
 
3.4 Allocation of government functions and their co-ordination 
 
The successful delivery of the concession project is very dependent on 
the effective support from, and co-ordination amongst, different parts 
of government. This is important because the concession project may 
involve several government functions; alongside the concession 
project some new government functions may also arise, such as the 
contracting and regulatory functions. Current Regulations have shown 
considerable concern over this issue. For example, the Shenzhen 
Regulation places the delegating power443 and contracting authority444 
with the Municipal Government itself, and the supervisory power with 
the competent authority in charge of the utilities sector, although, as a 
measure to co-ordinate the relevant supervisory functions among 
government departments, it further provides that other relevant 
departments are to assist with the performance of the supervisory 
functions within their respective authority.445 The Xinjiang Regulation 
is different from the Shenzhen Regulation in that it places both the 
contracting and supervisory functions with the authority in charge of 
the utilities sector.446
The issue of allocation of government functions and their co-
ordination is also of legislative concern in the Beijing Regulation, a 
concern which is reflected in several Articles. One Article establishes 
 
                                                          
442 Beijing Regulation, Art. 3; Xinjiang Regulation, Art. 2; and Shenzhen 
Regulation, Art. 3.  
443 Shenzhen Regulation, Art. 7.  
444 Shenzhen Regulation, Art. 15.  
445 ibid., Art. 6.  
446 Xinjiang Regulation, Art. 7.  
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the competent sectoral departments447 as being both the contracting 
and supervisory authorities.448 However, the Beijing Regulation is 
under a different banner from the Shenzhen and Xinjiang Regulations, 
and it allocates a much larger role to the Beijing Municipal 
Development and Reform Commission (BMDRC) - while embracing 
its traditional leading roles in infrastructure related functions, it adds 
more roles on co-ordination and supervision of concession projects.449
In addition, the Beijing Regulation provides for a specific measure 
to co-ordinate government functions for concession projects. It 
requires relevant competent authorities to provide early reviews on the 
project implementation plan (PIP) for the project and present official 
comments.
 
450 These relevant authorities are not supposed to conduct a 
second review on the same issue once the concession agreement is 
concluded and the concessionaire is finalising proceedings with the 
relevant authorities. The Regulation further requires that the review of 
other issues at this stage may not cause any substantive change to the 
concession agreement.451
Another important element of concession projects is related to 
price regulation. Since this is an issue dealt with in the primary 
Chinese Price Law, recent Regulations maintain the status quo with 
regards to the authority over price regulation. However, it is 
worthwhile observing how the newly established supervisory 
authority will co-ordinate with the old price regulatory body located in 
other parts of government, particularly the Development and Reform 
Commission.  
 This is a measure specially designed both to 
co-ordinate the different internal functions of government, and to 
honour the commitment by the government, which may help to 
encourage a well-prepared PIP for the concession project and 
accelerate the project implementation process. 
 
 
                                                          
447 e.g. the Municipal Transportation Commission is in charge of the transport 
industry. Similar sectoral authorities in Beijing are the Municipal Water Authority, 
the Municipal Administration Commission, etc.   
448 Beijing Regulation, Art. 6.  
449 See C. Fuguo, ‘The Emerging Legal Framework in Private Finance in 
Infrastructure in China: a Review of the Beijing Concession Regulation’(2006) 15 
Public Procurement Law Review 62. 
450 Beijing Regulation, Art. 10.  
451 ibid., Art. 18.  
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3.5 The selection procedure 
 
3.5.1 The pre-selection stage and preparation 
 
3.5.1.1 Determination of a concession project 
 
The initial decision about whether to provide the infrastructure or 
service by means of a concession project involves an important area of 
public policy. Considerations as to whether a concession should be 
used include whether the project should be provided through public 
finance or private finance, and, if the latter, what forms of private 
finance, whether through SOEs or private enterprise. The decision 
whether to proceed by way of a concession project in the first place 
may involve a review of all of the alternative policy options, possibly 
supported by a cost-benefit analysis, as well as a study of the 
feasibility of the project, which is traditionally required when a 
government project is proposed to the authority for approval. Further, 
the decision to undertake a concession project may be more than an 
economic and technical issue; rather, it may be a political and social 
one, and, therefore, may involve issues of public participation and 
transparency requirements, which are important elements for the 
sustainability of the project.  
As far as the current Regulations are concerned, the Shenzhen 
Regulation simply says nothing on this important issue. The Xinjiang 
Regulation provides for a general principle, requiring the decision on 
a concession project be based on ‘reasonable site selection and 
effective allocation of public resources’,452 and further requires a 
public hearing or other forms of public participation to be managed 
before a decision is made.453
The Beijing Regulation provides for detailed procedures guiding 
the proposal and the determination of a concession project. While the 
BMDRC and the sectoral authorities can propose a concession 
project,
 
454 a decision on whether or not to use the concession approach 
is generally made by the BMDRC, with a few key projects subject to 
the Municipal Government’s further approval.455
                                                          
452 Art. 4.  
 The Regulation also 
453 Art. 10.  
454 Beijing Regulation, Art. 7.  
455 ibid., Art. 8.  
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provides for a general principle requiring the decision of a concession 
project to be in line with the city’s planning and development 
requirements. It should be noted that regulators envisaged that all 
project proposals are initiated by government alone, and that a move 
to address the issue of unsolicited offers in the Regulation was not 
accepted.456
 
 A procedure to involve the public voice and public 
participation in the project decision was also omitted. 
3.5.1.2 Project implementation plan 
 
After a concession project is determined, the contracting authority 
shall prepare a project implementation plan (PIP),457 which lays out 
the basis for the award process458 and provides for the substance of the 
concession agreement.459 This is the most important preparatory work 
before the formal award procedure is initiated. Some of the 
Regulations provide particular Articles for dealing with the content of 
the PIP, and its review and approval. For example, both the Beijing 
and Shenzhen Regulations contain Articles specifying the required 
content for PIP.460 The Beijing Regulation also contains an Article 
specifying the power of relevant authorities and the procedure for the 
review and approval of the PIP. Both the Beijing and Xinjiang 
Regulations require approval from the Municipal Governments.461 The 
Shenzhen Regulation further requires a public hearing to be held 
concerning the relevant issues contained in the PIP;462
                                                          
456 For a discussion on the appropriate policy for unsolicited offers, see 
UNCITRAL Guide, Ch.3, at paras 97–117. The issue of transparency in dealing 
with an unsolicited offer is an important aspect of the evaluation on concession 
regulations in East European countries. See European Bank For Reconstruction and 
Development Office of the General Counsel, Report on the Quality of Concession 
Legislation in Early Transition Countries, June 2005, at: 
 and the 
Xinjiang Regulation requires the public voice to be heard through 
public hearings or some other open procedure before the PIP is 
 <www.ebrd.com/country/sector/law/index.htm> accessed 30 November 2010.  
457 Art 9 of Beijing Regulation; Art. 9, Shenzhen Regulation; Art. 14, Xinjiang 
Regulation, Art. 9.  
458 e.g. Art. 9 of the Beijing Regulation; a similar requirement is found in Art. 14 of 
the Shenzhen Regulation.  
459 e.g. Art. 13 of Beijing Regulation.  
460 Beijing Regulation, Art. 9; and Shenzhen Regulation, Art. 14.  
461 Beijing Regulation, Art. 10; and Xinjiang Regulation, Art. 9.  
462 Shenzhen Regulation, Art. 14.  
198 
 
approved.463 The draft Beijing Regulation initially provided for a 
similar Article requiring public consultation when the BMDRC deems 
necessary. Though this Article was, unfortunately, removed, a 
requirement for objective verification of the key PIPs by professional 
experts is instead included.464
 
 However, the Beijing Regulation does 
not further provide for the timescale and phasing of such a review and 
verification—it could be at an early phase before the contracting 
authority submits the PIP to the BMDRC for internal review; at a later 
stage before the BMDRC submits the PIP to the Municipal 
Government for approval; or at both phases. 
3.5.1.3 Types of concession and the scope of the concession right 
 
Both the Beijing and Shenzhen Regulations allow for concession 
arrangements similar to BOT, TOT,465or an arrangement of delegation 
to a concessionaire of certain public service provisions.466
Under the Xinjiang Regulation concession, rights may exist in the 
form of a complete right to invest, construct and operate a facility, or 
alternatively a single right of operation.
  
467
The Shenzhen Regulation provides that two or more concession 
rights shall be awarded in one sector except if this is not practical due 
to the limitation of the sector or area.
 This indicates that the form 
of the concession arrangement under the Xinjiang Regulation is 
similar to those under the Beijing and Shenzhen Regulations. It is 
worth noting that other forms of concession arrangement may be 
employed, provided they are further authorised by government 
provision (Beijing Regulation), or law and Regulations. 
468 Further, the Xinjiang 
Regulation prohibits the transfer of public ownership rights to private 
operators, except for terminal facilities in water, gas or heating supply, 
or means of public transportation of small or medium capacity.469
                                                          
463 Xinjiang Regulation, Art. 10.  
 This 
is a means to restrict the concession right, and curb the local practice 
of simply selling the public facilities to a private operator at a cheap 
price to relieve the government of a financial burden. 
464 Beijing Regulation, Art. 10.  
465 Shenzhen Regulation, Art. 12; and Beijing Regulation, Art. 4.  
466 Shenzhen Regulation, Art. 12 ; and the old Beijing Government Provision, Art. 
3.  
467 Xinjiang Regulation, Art. 13.  
468 Shenzhen Regulation, Art. 11.  
469 Xinjiang Regulation, Art. 25.  
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3.5.2 The procedures for selecting the concessionaire 
 
Successful delivery of a concession project depends on whether an 
appropriate concessionaire is selected. Therefore, the selection 
procedure lies at the heart of a Concession Regulation; international 
organisations all prefer competitive selection procedures.470 
Competitive procedures not only help to achieve value for money for 
both the contracting authority and the general public users of the 
infrastructure, but also help to prevent corruption. All Chinese 
Regulations establish as a principle the need for fair and competitive 
selection procedures, and some accord a preference for an open 
bidding procedure.471 However, many regulatory issues remain to be 
addressed concerning the selection procedure, due to limited 
regulatory experience and other reasons.472
One of the legislative issues to be addressed is what award 
procedures are to be included in the new Regulation and how to apply 
them in certain specific situations, a seemingly simple but in fact 
rather complex issue for all legislators. 
 
The Xinjiang legislators consider it be a simple job, and the 
Regulation provides for ‘tendering and other fair procedures’ for the 
selection of concessionaire.473 The Shenzhen Regulation has 
substantially changed its policy on legislative design of concession 
award procedures from that in the old government provision. The old 
government provision contains three procedures for the award - 
tendering, auction and ‘Zhao Mu’,474
                                                          
470 For example, UNIDO, ‘Guidelines for Infrastructure Development through 
Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) Projects’ (Vienna: UNIDO, 1996), at p.96. 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, ‘Procurement under 
IBRD and IDA Loans’ (Washington, D.C: World Bank, 1996), at para. 3.13(a); 
UNCITRAL Guide at para.98.  
 which means solicitation, but in 
471 Shenzhen Regulation, Art. 8.  
472 See the following discussion in section 4.3.  
473 Xinjiang Regulation, Art. 10.  
474 The term ‘zhao mu’ is literally used in the Chinese context, in personnel 
management practice, to mean the ‘recruitment’ of talent or, in fund management, 
practice as ‘solicitation’ for funds. The invention of this legal term in the earlier 
government provision is supposed to be a combination of limited tendering and the 
idea of private solicitation for funds (with little public disclosure of information), 
which is presumably a negotiation procedure with little transparency and 
competition. During the legislative process in the Municipal Congress, there was 
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practice means a negotiated procedure - and each was accorded equal 
status in its application. The new Regulation prefers use of ‘such fair 
and competitive procedure as tendering and auction’, except when this 
is not practical, in which case the Open Zhaomu, the negotiated 
procedure, may be used.475
The earlier government provision in the Beijing Regulation 
requires that the tendering procedure be used in selecting a 
concessionaire, except in a limited situation where concession may be 
delegated directly, presumably to the incumbent SOEs. During the 
new legislation process, there was a consensus among the working 
group members that the requirement for a tendering procedure is too 
rigid. 
 The second change is that ‘Zhao Mu’, the 
negotiated procedure, was substantially improved upon in terms of 
transparency and, arguably, competition. First, there is presumably a 
requirement of justification for the use of the procedure of Zhao Mu; 
secondly, the conditions and procedure to be followed as part of this 
procedure must be made in advance and published; thirdly, an 
evaluation committee must be specifically set up for each case, to 
ensure some degree of objectivity in choosing the preferred candidate 
with which to finalise the negotiation. 
Thus consideration was given to designing some more flexible 
procedures to reflect both regulatory requirements and commercial 
reality. Two options were seriously considered in this regard. One was 
the awarding procedures proposed in the UNCITRAL Guide,476
                                                                                                                                                    
much pressure to improve the transparency and competition of this procedure, and 
the procedure was substantially improved in the new Regulation.  
 and 
the other was the solicitation procedure invented in the Shenzhen 
Government provision. In a draft proposal presented to the Municipal 
Government by the working group, ‘public solicitation’, an improved 
Shenzhen version of ‘solicitation’, was proposed, with the 
considerable enhancement of transparency requirements that can be 
seen now in the Shenzhen Regulation. However, there were two 
different views on the award procedures among decision-makers: one  
view preferred to maintain the position of tendering in the old 
government provision, and the other argued for more flexibility in the 
Regulation. The final provision reflects a compromise, requiring the 
contracting authority to use ‘tendering and other forms of fair and 
475 Shenzhen Regulation, Art. 8.  
476 UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on PFIP, (Fifty-fourth session, 
Supplement No. 17, New York: United Nations, 2001),, Pt III, selection of 
concessionaire, and the Model Provisions accompanied therein, Arts 10–19.  
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competitive procedures’ in concessionaire selection.477
 
 It is worth 
noting that the method of direct contracting or delegation was 
fortuitously removed, a symbol that the legislators may not want to 
accord incumbent SOEs any special treatment when awarding the 
concession. 
 
3.6 The legal framework for the concession agreement and the 
structure of rights and obligations 
 
The concession agreement is a legal instrument through which the 
public and private relations are defined, and rights and obligations are 
balanced. In the absence of concession laws, a mechanism of 
regulation through a contract is generally employed to protect the 
legitimate interest of the concessionaire and safeguard the public 
interest. Whereas the concession law is general, much of the work of 
regulation is also maintained through the concession agreement. 
Though the content of the concession agreement depends on the 
negotiation involved in each case, the agreement is generally aimed at 
achieving a balance of interests between the parties concerned. 
 
3.6.1 The balance and structure of rights and obligations 
 
The legal framework of both the regulation and the concession 
agreement are structured to achieve a balance of interests between the 
parties concerned. The Regulations generally provide for the basic 
rights and obligations in the Preamble, and these are then followed in 
detail throughout the Regulations. 
 
3.6.1.1 Rights of concessionaire 
 
One basic right of the concessionaire is to invest, construct, and 
operate the infrastructure facility, and provide relevant services to the 
general public according to the scope of the concession. By doing so, 
the concessionaire also enjoys the right to charge fees to the service 
users as a means to compensate it for its cost in providing the service. 
It also has the right to government subsidies and other related interests 
promised by the government, depending on the substance of the 
agreement. Besides, it has a right to compensation in case of a 
                                                          
477 Beijing Regulation, Art. 11.  
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government policy change or a government breach of contract. In case 
of grievance, it also has the right to resort to formal proceedings for 
remedies. 
 
3.6.1.2 Main concessionaire obligations 
 
The Regulations generally impose some basic obligations on the 
concessionaire which are crucially important to safeguard the public 
interest. 
 
3.6.1.2.1 The obligation to provide essential public service 
effectively  
 
An essential concessionaire obligation under the agreement is to 
provide a safe and high-quality product or service, and to do so 
effectively.478
In order to fulfil this obligation, the concessionaire must also 
provide a universal and non-discriminatory service to the consumers 
within the area defined by the concession agreement.
 
479 When new 
users request connection to the infrastructure facilities supplying 
water, gas or heating, or for sewage disposal, the concessionaire 
operating such facilities may not charge them connection fees.480 A 
concessionaire also undertakes to provide the service in a continuous 
way. Even in the case of a take-over on the basis of a government 
decision or provision in the agreement, the obligation of maintaining 
the infrastructure facility bona fide and normal service is not fulfilled 
until the take-over is complete.481
                                                          
478 Beijing Regulation, Art. 19; Xinjiang Regulation, Art. 5; Shenzhen Regulation, 
Art. 4.  
 Meanwhile, related to its obligation 
to provide continuous service, the concessionaire must maintain an 
emergency plan to ensure the normal operation of the infrastructure, to 
the maximum extent possible, in the case of natural disaster, war, 
accidents, and such public incidents as public sanitary and security 
479 Beijing Regulation, Art. 20; Xinjiang Regulation, Arts 5 and 21; Shenzhen 
Regulation, Art. 34. 
480 Beijing Regulation, Art. 20; Xinjiang Regulation, Art. 26; Shenzhen Regulation, 
Art. 29.  
481 Beijing Regulation, Art. 21; Shenzhen Regulation, Art. 36.  
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crises.482 Concessionaires are also obliged not to abuse their 
concession rights to impinge on the legitimate rights of consumers.483
 
 
3.6.1.2.2 The obligation to pay a concession fee and implement 
government set price  
 
A concessionaire is also obliged to pay a concession fee to the 
contracting authority when it is awarded the concession right; the fee 
may be waived depending on the particular situation or sector.484 The 
concessionaire also undertakes to charge user fees at a rate set by the 
government through an open procedure.485
 
 
3.6.1.2.3 An obligation to maintain the public facilities  
 
Another obligation related to the provision of an infrastructure service 
is to maintain the infrastructure well. To fulfil this obligation, the 
concessionaire must undertake regular checks, maintenance and 
regeneration of the infrastructure; must ensure its sound operation; 
and must report on the conditions of operation to the contracting 
authority.486
The concessionaire is also under an obligation not to dispose of 
the concession or related assets without the prior consent of the 
contracting authority, regardless of whether this disposal is in the form 
of assignment, lease, security, or any other forms.
 
487 In addition, the 
concessionaire may not use the project facilities or related land 
beyond the purpose of the project.488
 
 
3.6.1.2.4 Obligation to accept supervision and disclose information 
 
A fourth concessionaire obligation is to accept supervision from 
competent authorities, and to undertake to disclose information 
concerning the service or product, or the infrastructure facilities and 
                                                          
482 Beijing Regulation, Art. 34.  
483 Shenzhen Regulation, Art. 27.  
484 Xinjiang Regulation, Art. 22; Shenzhen Regulation, Art. 20.  
485 Xinjiang Regulation, Art. 20; and Shenzhen Regulation, Art. 38.  
486 Beijing Regulation, Art. 26; Xinjiang Regulation, Art. 23; and Shenzhen 
Regulation, Art. 32.  
487 Beijing Regulation, Art. 25.  
488 Art. 25 of Beijing Regulation; Art. 25 of Xinjiang Regulation’ Arts 24 and 28 of 
Shenzhen Regulation.  
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their operation.489 This is especially essential to assist the government 
in supervising the operation of the concession activities. To fulfil this 
obligation, the concessionaire is not only obliged to report to the 
contracting authority concerning its regular checks, and maintenance 
and regeneration of the infrastructure, but also to file to the 
contracting authority, in a timely and complete manner, its current 
annual operation report, annual financial report and other affairs of 
importance,490 which may include changes to the enterprise’s name 
and address or changes to top management.491 In addition, the 
concessionaire is obliged to collect, classify and keep a file of, all 
relevant materials concerning the construction, operation, repair and 
maintenance, and transfer this to the contracting authority in the 
manner and procedure and for the duration defined in the concession 
agreement.492 Concessionaires are also obliged to publish information 
on public interest and security concerns such as service quality, 
technical standards,493 and its audited financial report for the previous 
year.494 To ensure day-to-day supervision, one Regulation requires the 
concessionaire to improve its IT management system and have it 
connected to the regulatory authority.495
 
 
3.6.1.3 The main governmental obligations 
 
The Beijing Regulation generally provides that the contracting 
authority shall fulfil its obligations in accordance with the concession 
agreement, and other relevant authorities shall, within their 
competence, honour their promises provided in the agreement.496
However, the Regulations do provide for certain key 
governmental obligations to protect the investor’s interest. For 
example, as a general principle, the Xinjiang Regulation provides that 
the contracting authority must undertake to adhere to a general 
principle that it will be open, fair and equitable; that it will take into 
 
Therefore, government obligations in a concession arrangement 
depend on the particular provisions in the agreement. 
                                                          
489 Shenzhen Regulation, Art. 23.  
490 Beijing Regulation, Arts 26 and 28; and Shenzhen Regulation, Art. 32.  
491 Beijing Regulation, Art. 28; and Shenzhen Regulation, Art. 25.  
492 Beijing Regulation, Art. 27.  
493 ibid., Art. 39.  
494 Shenzhen Regulation, Art. 26.  
495 ibid., Art. 33.  
496 Beijing Regulation, Art. 19.  
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account the public interest as precedence in the award of concession; 
and that it will also protect the legitimate rights of the 
concessionaire.497 The Government may not cancel or restrict the 
concession right provided in the concession agreement unless there is 
a legitimate reason of public interest, in which case compensation 
shall be provided.498 In addition, the contracting authority, including 
its staff, is also under an obligation to keep confidential the 
commercial secrets of the concessionaire learned in the course of 
project operation and supervision.499
The Regulations also confirm the Government’s obligation to 
compensate for loss caused by government acts such as: government 
withdrawal of the concession; termination of agreement; acquisition of 
the concession facility in the name of public interest;
 
500 and change of 
policy.501 If the level of user fee is set by the government, 
concessionaires may also ask for compensation when the 
reimbursement cannot cover their investment during the concession 
period in the normal course of operation. However the conditions for 
such compensation, and method and base for its calculation, shall be 
agreed in the Agreement.502
The supervisory authority is also under an obligation not to 
interfere in the normal operation of the concessionaire when it is 
conducting supervision and evaluation.
  
503 In addition, under the 
Shenzhen Regulation, the supervisory authority is obliged to keep an 
emergency plan in place to ensure the steady and continuous supply of 
public products and services in the event of irregularities specified the 
Regulation.504
 
 
 
3.6.2 Duration and extension of the concession 
 
The duration of the concession is to be provided for in the concession 
agreement depending on the nature of the sector, the scope of project, 
the form of the concession and other relevant factors, but in no case 
                                                          
497 Xinjiang Regulation, Art. 4.  
498 Beijing Regulation, Art. 32; and Xinjiang Regulation, Art. 27.  
499 Beijing Regulation, Art. 29.  
500 Beijing Regulation, Art. 32; and Xinjiang Regulation, Art. 33.  
501 Beijing Regulation, Art. 30.  
502 Xinjiang Regulation, Art. 24.  
503 Beijing Regulation, Art. 36; and Shenzhen Regulation, Art. 52.  
504 Shenzhen Regulation, Art. 50.  
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shall last for more 30 years.505 However, the concessionaire may 
request an extension of the concession period subject to the evaluation 
and approval of the municipal government.506
 
 
3.7 The regulatory institution 
 
3.7.1 Regulators and their duties 
 
3.7.1.1 The regulator 
 
One key issue concerning the regulatory institution is whether one 
separate regulatory body, either comprehensive or sector-specific, 
independent of the contracting authority, is established to supervise 
the whole process of the concession. It seems difficult to maintain an 
arm’s length between these two authorities at this early stage of the 
Chinese Regulations. For example, under the Xinjiang Regulation, the 
contracting and regulatory functions are held by the same government 
authority.507
It appears that the Shenzhen Regulation achieves some distance 
between the two authorities by placing the contracting function with 
the municipal government, and the regulatory function with the 
competent sectoral department in charge of utilities.
 
508
In the case of the Beijing Regulation, it was initially conceived 
within the cross-government working group that the BMDRC, which 
is not a contracting authority itself, could play a major role as a 
regulator. However, it seems that more of a consensus is needed for 
such an endeavour. Therefore, the Regulation maintains the status quo 
of the administrative structure as a supervision mechanism; this 
provides that the relevant departments of the administration shall 
conduct checks, reviews, and audit within their competence on the 
concession.
 
509 It is further required that contracting authorities: keep 
records of the concession projects; conduct timely surveillance and 
analysis of the operation of the projects; and publish periodic (annual 
or bi-annual) reviews of the operation of the projects.510
                                                          
505 Beijing Regulation, Art. 13.  
 This may 
indicate that the main regulatory mechanism for the operation of the 
506 Beijing Regulation, Art. 22. 
507 Xinjiang Regulation, Art. 7.  
508 Shenzhen Regulation, Art. 6.  
509 Beijing Regulation, Art. 35.  
510 ibid., Art. 36.  
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concession is the regulation through the contract by the contracting 
authority.  However, the BMDRC may still play an important 
regulatory role in the concession project. This is partly because of its 
traditional role in regulating price, and partly because one more 
function of ‘supervision’ was added to the Article concerning 
administrative co-ordination during the concession before the 
Regulation was finally passed.511
 
 This function which could be 
defined broadly as supervision of the whole concession process 
including deciding a concession project, awarding process, and 
operation period, but alternatively as narrow as simply a recognition 
of its traditional role in regulating price. 
3.7.1.2 Duties of the regulator 
 
The Regulations seem to place the regulatory duties with the utilities 
or sectoral authority. However, this perception is misleading since 
many regulatory functions, such as price and environmental 
Regulations, are with other authorities. It would appear to be best 
practice, therefore, to specify the duties of the newly established 
regulator to avoid confusion and inconsistency. The Shenzhen 
Regulation in this regard has provided some insights into the typical 
functions that the regulator is supposed to perform, namely:512
 
 
(1) Specifying the quality standard of public products 
and services, and supervising and checking the quality of 
the product and service provided by the operator. 
(2) Supervising the operator’s performance of 
obligations provided in the authorization certificate and 
agreement. 
(3) Handling the subject of consumer complaints. 
(4) Advising on the concessionaire’s operational plan 
and supervising its implementation. 
(5) Reviewing the operator’s annual report. 
(6) Reporting to the Municipal Government over the 
annual supervisory report of the operator. 
(7) Taking over the operation of utilities in case of 
emergency. 
                                                          
511 Beijing Regulation, Art. 6.  
513 Xinjiang Regulation, Art. 17; and Shenzhen Regulation, Art. 39.  
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(8) Assisting the competent price authority to prepare 
the price plan. 
(9) Other duties provided by law and Regulations.
 
  
3.7.2 Price regulation 
 
The price of utilities products and services in China is generally 
regulated by the Chinese Price Law (CPL). This provides that the 
Government may, as necessary, fix or provide guidelines for the 
pricing of public utilities’ products and services when the product or 
service is of significance to national economic development and 
people’s lives, or when the provision of the product or service is the 
subject of a monopoly. The Regulations further provide, within the 
framework of the Chinese Price Law, for issues concerning the price 
regulator, government pricing, the principle governing pricing and the 
formation of price, the periodic price review mechanism and the price 
hearings system.  
 
3.7.2.1 The price regulator 
 
The Regulations confirm the current system of price regulation 
established by the CPL, which lays out the authority and procedure for 
formulation, adjustment and supervision of price. While recognising 
the current price regulation framework, the Regulations also require 
the supervisory authority to assist the competent price authority to 
verify and supervise the operational cost, and to prepare the price plan 
for the municipal government’s approval.513
 
   
3.7.2.2 Prices set by the government 
 
The Regulations reiterate the operator’s obligation to charge user fees 
at a rate set by the Government, or by following the Government’s 
direction when delivering the product or service to the public.514
 
 
3.7.2.3 Principles to set the price and formulation of the price 
 
The Regulations also provide for the principle by which the fixed or 
guided price is formulated - a mixture of compensation for cost, 
                                                          
513 Xinjiang Regulation, Art. 17; and Shenzhen Regulation, Art. 39.  
514 Beijing Regulation, Art. 23.  
209 
 
reasonable return on investment, conservation of resources, and 
proportionality to social endurance.515
 
 
3.7.2.3.1 The principle of compensation for cost  
 
There is a general requirement in the Regulations that the price should 
be formulated based on the principle of compensation for the cost of 
providing the public products and services.516 By the principle of cost 
compensation, the operational cost should be based on the average 
social cost, and those costs irrelevant to the concession product and 
service may not be included.517 There is also a requirement for the 
price regulator to entrust a qualified auditor with the task of auditing 
the operator’s cost and investigating the average social cost,518 and to 
hold a public hearing before a price adjustment plan is accepted.519
 
 
3.7.2.3.2 The principle of reasonable profit  
 
There is a general provision on the level of profit for the operator, the 
principle of reasonable profit,520
 
 which indicates that excessive profit 
in public service provision is unlawful. However it is not an easy job 
to determine what is a reasonable profit and, as such, this is an area 
where further guidance is required. 
 
3.7.2.3.3 The principle of proportionality to social endurance  
 
A pricing policy needs also to take into consideration social factors. 
Some Regulations require the competent price authority to conduct a 
‘social endurance’ investigation and to hold public hearings before a 
new price is set.521
                                                          
515 Beijing Regulation, Art. 37; Xinjiang Regulation, Art. 17; and Shenzhen 
Regulation, Art. 40.  
 The Government may also wish to direct the 
operator to provide products and services to disadvantaged groups. In 
this case, the requirement must be specified in the bidding document 
516 Shenzhen Regulation, Art. 14; and Xinjiang Regulation, Art. 18.  
517 Xinjiang Regulation, Art. 18; and Beijing Regulation, Art. 37.  
518 Shenzhen Regulation, Art. 42.  
519 Shenzhen Regulation, Art. 45.  
520 Xinjiang Regulation, Art. 17; Beijing Regulation, Art. 37; Shenzhen Regulation, 
Art. 40.  
521 Shenzhen Regulation, Art. 45.  
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and the concession agreement; when an operator suffers a loss due to 
following this social policy, it has the right to government 
compensation.522
In addition, the Shenzhen Regulation also requires the operator to 
maintain the price at a relatively steady level and the government may 
set up a special fund for the purpose of price regulation.
 
523
 
 
3.7.2.3.4 The principle of resource conservation  
 
This principle is set out in the Beijing Regulation and it requires the 
price regulator to take into consideration environmental factors in its 
pricing policy. This is particularly the case in Beijing, where water 
and other resources are limited, and pricing decisions generally 
incorporate environmental factors.  
 
3.7.2.4 Price review and the public hearings system 
 
The Beijing Regulation requires that the competent price authority set 
up a cost databank and a periodic price review mechanism to conduct 
effective price regulation of the service or product provided by the 
concessionaire.524 A similar requirement can be found in other 
Regulations being discussed.525
 
 
 
3.7.3 Regulatory tools 
 
3.7.3.1 Compulsory information disclosure and evaluation 
 
Information provides the basic tools for effective regulation. The 
Beijing Regulation provides an obligation for information disclosure 
by the concessionaire to both the government authority,526 and the 
public.527
                                                          
522 Xinjiang Regulation, Art. 21.  
 In addition, some systems also depend on a regulator’s 
review and evaluation mechanism to ensure effective regulation. For 
example, the Beijing Regulation requires that the contracting authority 
keeps records for the concession projects as a basis for supervision, 
523 Shenzhen Regulation, Art. 48.  
524 Beijing Regulation, Art. 38.  
525 Xinjiang Regulation, Art. 19; and Shenzhen Regulation, Art. 42.  
526 Beijing Regulation, Arts 26, 27 and 28.  
527 ibid., Art. 39.  
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and that it conducts timely surveillance and analysis of the operation 
of the concession projects, a periodic comprehensive review, and 
evaluation of the concession projects.528 It also provides effective 
tools to ensure proper project operation. A similar evaluation 
mechanism is also found in the Xinjiang Regulation.529
 
 It can be 
generalised that, while the Shenzhen Regulation mainly relies on 
information disclosure and the Xinjiang Regulation on evaluation, 
Beijing employs both means to ensure effective regulation. In 
addition, considering the importance of the regulatory function, it is 
also worthwhile to consider a periodic evaluation on the effectiveness 
of the regulatory institution itself, to ensure that government improves 
the system in a timely manner to achieve the regulatory objectives. 
During the legislative process for the Beijing Regulation an attempt 
was made to include a requirement for this, but this failed. 
3.7.3.2 Compulsory administrative enforcement mechanisms 
 
Another regulatory tool consists of compulsory administrative 
enforcement mechanisms, including those aimed at operators and 
regulators themselves. 
 
3.7.3.2.1 Administrative penalties  
 
An example of such an administrative mechanism relating to operators 
can be found in the Shenzhen Regulation, which includes directives 
on both correction within a designated time, and cancellation of the 
concession rights. Conduct giving rise to such administrative 
enforcement measures includes: obtaining the concession rights 
through improper means; serious breaches of contract; and unlawful 
conduct.530
 
 
3.7.3.2.2 Regulation of the contracting authority and regulators  
 
The Xinjiang Regulation provides an example of regulatory measures 
directed towards contracting authorities and regulators, as a 
compulsory administrative enforcement mechanism.531
                                                          
528 ibid., Art. 36.  
 Conduct that 
529 Xinjiang Regulation, Art. 29.  
530 Shenzhen Regulation, Art. 55.  
531 Xinjiang Regulation, Art. 39.  
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can lead to such administrative measures includes, but is not limited 
to: 
(a) ignorance of qualified concession applications and extension 
requests; 
(b) neglect of legal duties in publishing notices, keeping records, 
verifying compensation requests, handling extension requests, 
etc.; 
(c) not selecting the concessionaire through bidding, or selecting 
through false bidding; 
(d) neglect of the duty of supervision on operators or not 
conducting an evaluation of the concession’s operation; 
(e) not accepting supervision or enquiries from the supervisory 
committee, or not listening to the comments and advice of the 
supervisory committee; and 
(f) unlawful cancellation of the concession rights or unlawful 
termination of the concession agreement. 
 
3.7.3.3 Public participation in regulation 
 
As the consumer of public products and services, the general public is 
a key stakeholder in the concession project. In addition, the ultimate 
goal of concession regulation is to maximum the welfare of consumers 
of public products and services. Therefore, the general public should 
be accorded the rights to participate in concession project decisions 
and to play an important role in concession regulation. Some Chinese 
Concession Regulations have achieved encouraging developments in 
public participation in key concession decisions and regulation, 
although the development is not so successful in certain Regulations. 
In the Beijing Regulation, for example, the early draft envisages a 
greater role for public participation in the concession process, for 
example, in deciding a concession project, through the publication of 
the results of the annual review of the operation of the project; and in 
establishing an appropriate mechanism to facilitate public 
participation. However, these provisions were unfortunately dropped, 
and the law itself only provides for an obligation on the 
concessionaire to publish to the public information of public interest 
and information on safety concerns.532
                                                          
532 Beijing Regulation, Art. 39.  
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In contrast with the Beijing Regulation, however, many of the 
ideas of public participation proposed in the Beijing Regulation are 
realised in the Xinjiang and Shenzhen Regulations. 
Firstly, these Regulations confirm the fundamental rights for 
public service users,533
Secondly, these Regulations establish new mechanisms to ensure 
an effective public role in concession regulation and key decisions. 
Both Regulations require the establishment of a mechanism to 
facilitate public participation in regulation;
 as are accorded to consumers by the Chinese 
Consumers Law. These include the right to know, the right to provide 
comments and advice, and the right to challenge conduct and lay a 
complaint when legitimate rights are impinged. 
534 these are the 
Supervisory Committee for Concession (SCC) in the Xinjiang 
Regulation,535 and the Public Supervisory Committee for Utilities 
(PSCU) in the Shenzhen Regulation536
The committee may collect public opinions through public 
hearings, seminars, questionnaires, etc. and present legislative, 
regulatory opinions and advice in key concession decisions of public 
interest. 
 respectively. These committees 
are assigned a legal function of supervision over concession activities, 
representing the general public, and there is also a component 
requirement for the committee that a minimum of three quarters of its 
members should be non-government experts and representatives of the 
general public. 
Contracting authorities, other relevant authorities, and 
concessionaires are obliged to listen to the opinions and advice 
presented by the Committee, and a decision not to adopt such opinions 
and advice must be justified and recorded. A rejection of such 
supervision and opinions may lead to administrative discipline, or 
even criminal liability in cases where the rejection results in serious 
accidents.537
In the Shenzhen Regulation, there is an additional requirement for 
the operator to present an annual report to the Committee concerning 
its operation.
 
538
                                                          
533 Xinjiang Regulation, Art. 8; and Shenzhen Regulation, Art. 5.  
 
534 ibid.  
535 Xinjiang Regulation, Art. 30.  
536 Shenzhen Regulation, Art. 51.  
537 Xinjiang Regulation, Art. 39.  
538 Shenzhen Regulation, Art. 51.  
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Thirdly, these Regulations require public participation in key 
concession decisions. For example, the Xinjiang Regulation requires 
public opinion to be heard through public hearings or other open 
means of consultation.539 All Regulations require public hearings to be 
held before a pricing decision is made.540 Representatives of the 
general public may also participate in the evaluation of the 
concession’s operation.541 Under the Shenzhen Regulation, operators 
are obliged to publish to the public their audited financial 
statements.542
 
 
 
4. The emerging regulatory framework for future PFIP in China: 
current 
 
Regulation in procurement of privately financed infrastructure reflects 
a recent global trend in private provision of infrastructure and utilities 
service.543
 
 However, can the current Regulations provide an adequate 
legal framework for PFIP? A current report on the Quality of 
Concession Legislation In Early Transition Countries presents a 
general scenario and offers comments:  
It is fair to observe that there is a tendency to avoid a 
comprehensive and transparent legal framework by 
adopting sub-law level regulations or decrees governing 
individual concessions, thus allowing a case-by-case 
approach. While such an approach is ultimately a matter 
of policy, it has some clear disadvantages in that it lacks 
stability, transparency, and unified applicability to all 
participants, thus lacking measures combating potential 
corruption. In addition to developing further legal and 
policy frameworks, all of the Early Transition Countries 
need to build up a solid institutional infrastructure 
                                                          
539 Xinjiang Regulation, Art. 10.  
540 Xinjiang Regulation, Art. 19; and Shenzhen Regulation, Art. 45.  
541 Xinjiang Regulation, Art. 29.  
542 Shenzhen Regulation, Art. 51.  
543 A brief discussion is provided on the evolution of the role of public and private 
sector in developing infrastructure in history. See UNCITRAL Guide. 
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capable of designing and implementing individual PPP 
projects. [Translation].544
 
  
The Chinese legislation on concessions has apparently gone beyond 
the phase of case-by-case regulation towards a more comprehensive 
stage of regulation. Despite the different features of each Regulation, 
the Regulations discussed here, as a whole, could contribute to an 
emerging legal framework for Chinese PFIPs. 
 
4.1 Regulatory objectives 
 
4.1.1 The achievement of the objective of balance of interest 
 
As discussed above, one of the regulatory objectives established in the 
current Regulations is the balance of various interests. However, the 
achievement of this objective has limitations. Without an appropriate 
political and policy environment, and improved procurement 
techniques, the Government’s objective of choosing a responsible 
concessionaire will be discouraged, and the Government may be 
exploited by private sector opportunism and desire for excessive 
profit, which is not difficult to observe in the Chinese context. 
Alternatively, the legal arrangement may be unfair to the private 
operator. A report has provided an adequate observation: 
 
A reverse and not infrequent case (more difficult to flag) 
is a project with sound economics but implemented 
under a badly conceived PPP agreement [emphasis 
added]. In this case, there is a high chance that the PPP 
fails to achieve its objectives: either it does not yield 
value for money for society because the private sector 
makes excessive profits out of it; or it is so unfair to 
private investors (even if a limited number of 
stakeholders may have made substantial benefits) that, 
although looking attractive to the public sector, it 
eventually generates significant costs, direct - default, 
renegotiation - and indirect - negative impact on future 
                                                          
544 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development Office of The General 
Counsel, Report on the Quality of Concession Legislation in Early Transition 
Countries, June 2005 at <www.ebrd.com/country/sector/law/index.htm> accessed 
30 November 2010. 
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PPP business. One or two cases of this kind are usually 
enough to raise scepticism among citizens and investors 
about PPPs.545
 
 
The balance of various interests is generally reflected in the 
concession agreement, despite the fact that this balance and its 
certainty depends greatly on the selection process and contract 
negotiation. The above comment reveals the importance of a sound 
procurement mechanism conducive to an agreement with an 
appropriate balance of various interests, without which public-private 
relations will be vulnerable to collapse, and the objective of the PPP 
model will be discouraged. 
 
4.1.2 The objective of marketisation: PFIP decision and SOEs 
 
As is discussed above, one debated objective during the legislation 
was the objective of infrastructure marketisation. Some Regulations 
establish this as a regulatory objective, while others do not. However, 
the attainment of this objective is also limited depending on other 
infrastructure policies, especially those concerning state owned 
enterprises (SOEs) operating in the infrastructure or utilities sectors. 
One distinctive feature of the current Regulations is that it only 
applies when the infrastructure project is provided through a 
concession. Therefore, from an extreme perspective, the Regulations 
will never be applied at all if the Government does not choose to 
employ the means of a concession for infrastructure services. 
Traditionally, the Government also employs SOEs to provide public 
services. It could be observed that this is the prevailing model of 
public service provision in the infrastructure and utilities sectors 
currently in China, and this model seems to be expanding drastically 
in the urban infrastructure sector.546
                                                          
545 P. Boeuf, ‘Public-private Partnerships for Transport Infrastructure Projects 
Annex 1’, paper delivered at ‘Transport Infrastructure Development for a Wider 
Europe’, Paris, November 27–28, 2003.  
 Several policy issues arise here 
pertinent to a concession decision.  
546 The National Development Bank, followed by other commercial banks, has 
been promoting a business of ‘bundling credit loan’ to a municipal government. As 
part of the arrangement, the municipal government is generally required to set 
up a SOE to serve as the municipal government’s platform for finance and 
investment. The municipal government then delegates the development of the 
government owned land property to the SOE, and the SOE borrow loans from the 
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First, are SOEs an extension of government arms or public service 
providers like their private counterparts? The answer may relate to 
different policy issues. When they are arms and policy tools of the 
bureaucracy, the pertinent policy issue is corporate reform of SOEs; 
when they are service providers like their private counterparts, the 
issue is similar to that of the Government employing a private sector 
concessionaire. It could be observed that many of the SOEs in the 
infrastructure and utilities sectors are actually operating on 
commercial lines and their investment in infrastructure project is 
mostly based on loans from commercial banks, which renders the 
project itself a privately financed infrastructure project. Provision of 
PFIP through SOEs may arguably leave the government with more 
means of control, through appointment of management, for example. 
However it is doubtful that they can deliver quality services and best 
value for money without adequate market pressures. The scandal 
involving the Beijing Fifth Ring Road provision could provide a good 
footnote to this argument.547
Another policy issue concerning SOEs that may discourage the 
marketisation objective of the Concession Regulations is that SOEs 
may enjoy privileges in bidding for the PFIP. Ensuring a level playing 
field for all potential bidders in a particular concession project has not 
been brought up as a regulatory issue. 
 
 
 
4.2 Determination of PIP 
 
When a concession project is decided, the preparation and approval of 
PIP becomes a key regulatory issue. However, governments are 
generally weak in dealing with PIP and other contracting issues. Thus 
some checks and co-ordination within the governments may be 
desirable; in which case, the Beijing Regulation may be a good model 
for future regulation. Besides, the allowance of public participation at 
this stage may help achieve good policy, in which case the Xinjiang 
Regulation may prove to be a good reference for future regulation. 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
Bank under the framework of ‘bundling credit loan’. It is observed that this 
practice has encouraged the establishment of more SOEs by local governments.  
547 The Beijing 5th Ring Road was provided by a SOE controlled by the Municipal 
Government based on bank loans. However, audits found that the cost for the 
construction of the road was excessively high and a later investigation disclosed a 
number of corruption cases.  
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4.3 The awarding procedure: further regulatory issues 
 
There are several regulatory issues pending, which either require 
further regulation or implementation rules, or skilful legal explanation 
of current laws and Regulations. The first one concerns the governing 
of the Chinese Bidding Law (CBL).548 On the one hand, the CBL 
claims to apply to all bidding activities within the territory of 
China;549
Secondly, another regulatory issue concerns ‘other’ fair and 
competitive procedures which could be employed to select 
concessionaires under  both the Xinjiang and Beijing Regulations. The 
two Regulations simply say nothing as to what the ‘other’ procedures 
are, or the conditions for their application. The lack of regulation of 
such important issues can give wide discretion to the contracting 
authority. For example, some of the concessionaires in one PPP 
project in Beijing have been observed to be selected de facto through 
competitive negotiation despite the legal requirement for tendering.
 on the other hand, however, the rigidity of CBL may not be 
appropriate to satisfy the requirement of complex concession project 
procurement. Possible options to solve this problem include: a 
restrictive explanation of the scope of coverage for the Chinese 
Tendering Law; amendment to the CBL; and designing a separate 
tendering procedure for concession projects in future national 
legislation. 
550 
Therefore, this ‘other awarding procedures’ is an important area for 
future regulation or specification. Other possible options are the 
design of new procedures following the advice in the UNCITRAL 
Guide;551
                                                          
548 For a detailed discussion of the Chinese Bidding Law, see C. Fuguo, ‘China’s 
Government Procurement Reform: From Tendering Law to the Public Procurement 
Law’, in S Arrowsmith and M. Trybus (eds.), Public Procurement: The Continuing 
Revolution (London: Kluwer Law International, 2003); J. Tian, ‘Public 
Procurement in China: The Way Forward’ (2001) 10 Public Procurement Law 
Review 207; P. Wang, ‘China’s Evolving Legal Framework on Public 
Procurement’ (2004) 13 Public Procurement Law Review 285.  
 competitive or sole source negotiation provided for in the 
Chinese Government procurement law; or the public solicitation 
provided in the Shenzhen Regulation, albeit that the last requires 
549 Art. 2.  
550 A strong argument was made in the case that the project could not practically be 
implemented by following the formal procedure of tendering.  
551 UNCITRAL Guide.  
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much improvement itself. Another option is to specify such ‘other’ 
procedures in the PIP documentation to satisfy the legal requirement 
for fairness and competition. 
The third issue is related to the awarding procedure when an 
unsolicited offer is involved. Recognising the need for practice in 
reality to reflect good policy concerning unsolicited offers, the 
UNCITRAL Guide provides detailed discussion and advice and 
possible legal options concerning this issue for enacting states.552
To sum up, despite the fact that current Regulations have provided 
competitive procedures for concessionaire selection, there are still 
many areas to be regulated in the future; this renders the 
implementation of these laws unpredictable to a considerable degree, 
and may have a negative impact on the transparency of concessions. 
One of the ways to fill the gap is to provide detailed procedures in the 
PIP documentation and test whether these specifications satisfy the 
legal requirement for fairness and competition (this could be done 
through public hearings or by another part of the Government apart 
from the contracting authority). However, this is a case-by-case 
solution and it is doubtful that the contracting authorities will have 
sufficient incentives to invoke such a solution. Another solution would 
to provide detailed soft or hard rules concerning such issues, as part of 
a concerted effort among different government departments. However, 
such an effort will further challenge the capacity of government co-
ordination. Of course, there is still a third option open, to regulate 
such issues in future legislation.  
 The 
discussion in the UNCITRAL Guide is relevant to the Chinese context 
in that many infrastructure or utilities projects awarded are, in reality, 
based on unsolicited offers from the private sector. During the 
discussions on the Beijing Regulation, this issue was brought up to the 
working group and later a design following the UNCITRAL Guide 
was placed in the draft Regulation by the present author. However the 
issue seemed too novel to many, and enacting such provisions will 
have to wait for the future. 
 
 
 
                                                          
552 Section E on unsolicited proposals of Pt III on the selection of concessionaire, 
UNCITRAL Guide. Articles 20–23 of the Model Provisions attached to the 
UNCITRAL Guide.   
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4.4. Public service providers 
 
It seems that a consensus is reached among current Regulations 
concerning the fundamental obligations of concessionaires to provide 
essential services. This is helpful in both attaining the objective of 
PFIP, which, in turn, enhances public confidence in private provision 
of public services, and reaching the ultimate goal of consumer 
interests. It is submitted that these provisions will provide models for 
future legislation. One pending issue is whether a new legal entity for 
public service providers is needed. Currently, all these service 
providers are incorporated under the Chinese Company Law and taken 
to be commercial companies. There seems an inherent conflict of 
interest between the commercial goal of such commercial companies 
and their commitment to provide public services. The nature of the 
new business and the many new obligations existing in the concession 
laws seems to indicate that there is a need for a new type of company 
with the special purpose of public service provision, to co-ordinate the 
inherent conflict of interest. If this is attained, the corporate 
governance of the service provider itself could also be designed to 
help satisfy its special purpose of public service provision and the 
achievement of the objectives of concession legislation. 
 
 
4.5 Regulatory institution 
 
Another pending issue for the current Regulations is that the new 
regulatory institution relies on the current administrative structure, and 
the regulatory function is not separated from the contracting authority. 
This indicates that the current regulatory institution is only a 
transitional arrangement, and that there is a need for future evaluation 
of the effectiveness of the current regulatory institution, and 
restructuring of the regulatory functions in future legislation. 
In the Beijing Regulation, despite the failure to establish the 
BMDRC as a comprehensive regulator, the BMDRC is still given 
certain supervisory function in addition to its traditional role related to 
infrastructure and pricing regulation. This institutional arrangement, 
together with its functions related to reform and development, makes 
the BMDRC an appropriate authority to counteract the possible 
conflict between the contracting and regulatory functions; review the 
effectiveness of the transitional regulatory institution; and help build 
up the government’s future regulatory capacity. 
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Future legislation could further refer to the Beijing Regulation in 
respect of the regulatory tools that it employs to attain the regulatory 
objective - both the compulsory disclosure of information and 
professional evaluation are required under the Beijing Regulation. 
On the other hand, both the Shenzhen and Xinjiang Regulations 
are distinctive in requiring the establishment of consumers’ voice 
committees. Although effective operation of such a new mechanism 
depends on further support from the Government, for example, in its 
budget, the two Regulations have provided useful as references for 
future legislation. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Some general observations can be made concerning the third wave of 
public procurement regulation in China: 
First, there has been a positive political and policy development 
towards a new model of public service provision recently in China. A 
transformation from self-sufficiency to ‘contracting’ in public 
infrastructure and utilities provision has profound implications for the 
establishment of a transparent, competitive and efficient public service 
market and a new model of public governance in China.  
Secondly, a legal framework favourable to private finance in 
infrastructure is required for this new model of public service 
provision. A review of the current Regulations indicates that a new 
legal framework for private finance in urban infrastructure and 
utilities has been taking shape in China, and the current Regulations, 
as a whole, could provide models for future Regulations to some 
extent. 
However, many loopholes also exist concerning some crucial 
aspects of a sound regulatory system, leaving much room for further 
co-ordinated efforts among competent authorities in the 
implementation and for future regulation.  
Thirdly, the legal framework alone cannot sustain this 
fundamental transformation. A new form of governance of public-
private partnerships is a prerequisite for the successful delivery of a 
concession project, in which all stakeholders’ interests are involved. 
Besides, the challenges of the new contracting and regulatory capacity 
building identified in other transitional economies are generally 
pertinent to the Chinese context and cannot be neglected. It is finally 
submitted that the implementation of the Regulations and the effective 
222 
 
delivery of the infrastructure concession project demand an 
appropriate design and implementation of an institutional 
infrastructure as well.  
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Part III 
 
 
 
Economic perspective and future 
recommendations 
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Chapter 6 
 
 
 
PPPs in an international legal, economic and political 
perspective 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This book has dealt with some general legal rules and principles 
regarding PPPs in the EU, the WTO and China. The legal focus has 
been on public procurement law on an international, regional and 
national basis. Other national public procurement rules and 
regulations will, of course, affect the use and structure of PPPs, but 
this legal perspective is not included in the book.  
The purpose of this chapter is to comment on some of the overall 
legal challenges that PPP projects will face from a legal and political 
perspective.553
                                                          
553 In regard to e.g. national rules and regulations in the EC Member States, see the 
EPEC homepage, at: 
 
 <http://www.eib.org/epec/link/index.htm?action=changeFormat&format=PRINT>  
accessed 30 November. EPEC stands for the European PPP Expertise Centre 
(EPEC), which was launched by the European Investment Bank (EIB) and 
European Commission on 16 September 2008. EPEC is a collaboration between 
the EIB, European Union Member and Candidate States, and the European 
Commission that is designed to strengthen the organisational capacity of the public 
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The successful procurement and implementation of a PPP depends 
on the legal public procurement procedures. The contracts between the 
parties must fulfil the demands of the public procurement law and, as 
such, there is little flexibility for the parties to negotiate further 
demands. This is a serious problem. Nutavoot Pongsiri formulates the 
problem as: 
 
Under a presumption of market incentives, public-
private partnerships seem to be more appropriate than 
hierarchical command relationships or adversarial 
regulatory processes. Nevertheless, successful 
implementation of public-private partnership depends to 
a large extent on the development of sound legal 
procedures, agreements and contracts that clearly define 
the relationship between government and private 
firms.554
 
 
The first legal challenge in respect to a full use and benefit of PPP is 
that a PPP often falls under the public procurement rules and 
legislation, and that none of those rules are set up specifically to cover 
the purpose of a PPP arrangement.  
Instead, public procurement rules and legislation are made with 
traditional public contracts in mind; these are generally based on 
different measures to the PPP. The EC Commission does not comment 
on the problem that a large part of the traditional EC procurement 
rules in the 2004/18/EC Directive555 are made to cover the traditional 
procurement arrangement and not the new construction of co-
operation between a public and private party.556
The second legal challenge is the overall ban on negotiation in the 
public procurement law regime. A PPP arrangement is an alternative 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
sector to engage in Public Private Partnership (PPP) transactions. EU Member 
States and candidate countries can share experience and expertise, analysis and best 
practice relating to PPP transactions.  
554 N. Pongsiri, ‘Regulation and public private partnership’ (2002) 15 (2) 
International Journal of Public Sector Management 487-495, p. 489. 
555 See Council Directive (EC) 2004/18 on the co-ordination of procedures for the 
award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service 
contracts [2004] OJ L134/114, as amended. 
556 See Commission (EC), ‘Communication on Public-Private Partnerships and 
Community Law on Public Procurement and Concessions’ (Communication) COM 
(2005) 569 final, 15th November 2005, section 2.3.  
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to a traditional public procurement arrangement. In a PPP, the focus is 
on co-operation and effectiveness compared to a traditional 
arrangement.  Negotiation is an important issue when two or more 
parties wish to create a model for co-operation, but the public 
procurement law does not reflect this need. The reason is to be found 
in the objectives behind the public procurement law. It needs to be 
ascertained whether these objectives are strong enough to prevent 
negotiation, and whether another procedure would be more efficient in 
regard to PPP? 
These legal challenges are interrelated, and the solutions point in 
the same direction. This will be discussed, and some 
recommendations will be presented, in this chapter. 
 
2. The content of a PPP contract 
 
In this section some important elements in the PPP contract and 
collaboration are defined for later use in this chapter. 
 
1. A PPP has a relatively long duration and involves some kind of 
co-operation between the public partner and the private partner 
on different aspects of a planned project.  
2. The private party will normally finance the project, sometimes 
by means of complex arrangements between the various 
players. In some situations public funds can be added to the 
private funds.  
3. The economic operator, who participates at different stages in 
the project (design, completion, implementation, funding), 
holds an important role. The public partner concentrates 
primarily on defining the objectives to be attained in terms of 
public interest, quality of services provided and pricing policy, 
and it takes responsibility for monitoring compliance with these 
objectives.  
4. The distribution of risks between the public partner and the 
private partner is different than in traditional public projects. In 
a PPP, the risk normally borne by the public sector is 
transferred to the private party.557
                                                          
557 The Commission notes that a PPP does not necessarily entail that the private 
partner assumes all the risks, or even the major share of the risks, linked to the 
project. The precise distribution of risk is determined case by case, according to the 
respective ability of the parties concerned to assess, control and cope with this risk. 
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5. As mentioned above in this book, a PPP can be characterised558
6. The asset or service is entrusted to the private sector, and a part 
of or all of the funding comes from the private sector. The latter 
means that the private party in a PPP holds all equity and 
handles the works, operation and maintenance of the project.
 
as a long-term contract (for a period of 20 to 30 years) between 
a public authority and a consortium of private parties based on 
co-operation, aiming to provide a mechanism for developing 
public service provision involving significant assets or services 
for a long period of time.   
559
7. The PPP contract focuses on needs and functions,
  
560
 
 and it must 
be built on trust, transparency by open books, and co-operation 
between the parties.  
In the end, all of these factors can fulfill the main scope of a PPP 
agreement, which is to ensure joint utility between the parties, thereby 
ensuring the most efficient product at the lowest price. 
A PPP therefore has more to it than just its financing element. The 
relationship has to build on co-operation, trust and demands so that the 
parties can create the best and most efficient product.  
Therefore, in a general legal context, a Public Private Partnership 
(PPP) can be characterised as a long-term contract arrangement 
between a public authority and a consortium of private parties.  
                                                          
558 See Commission (EC), ‘Green Paper on public-private partnerships and 
Community Law on Public Contracts and Concessions’ (Green Paper), COM 
(2004) 327 final, 30th April 2004. 
559 See S. Arrowsmith, ‘Public Private Partnerships and the European Procurement 
Rules: EU Policies in Conflict?’ (2000) 37 Common Market Law Review 709-737, 
p. 709; and S. Arrowsmith, The Law of Public and Utilities Procurement, (2nd edn., 
London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2005), p. 415. See also Commission (EC), ‘Green 
Paper on public-private partnerships and Community Law on Public Contracts and 
Concessions’ (Green Paper), COM (2004) 327 final, 30th April 2004. 
560 The private party is responsible for the funding, design, completion, 
implementation, service, and maintenance. The incentive to build to reduce the cost 
of service and maintenance in the long run is changed because the PPP concept 
provides the contractor with a compelling reason to create the cheapest building or 
infrastructure. In contrast to a traditional public contract, it is the contractor who 
has the obligation to provide services and operations. The PPP contract must run 
for a period equal to the time it takes for the private party to regain the investment. 
This is the main reason for the long duration in PPP projects.  
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From an inter-contractual perspective, a PPP must be based on co-
operation, because the aim of a PPP is to provide a mechanism for 
developing a public service provision involving significant assets or 
services over a relatively long period of time. From an institutional 
perspective, a PPP focuses on turning around the parties’ traditional 
incentives to create more and better value for the tax money,561
The PPP objectives result in a shift of content in the contract. 
Normally, a traditional public contract is based on demands and 
concrete descriptions. To fulfil the objectives, the PPP contract 
focuses on needs and functions, and it must be built on trust, 
transparency by open books. and co-operation between the parties.  
 by, for 
example, basing the contract on needs instead of demands. For 
example, in a PPP to build a school, the public authority points out the 
learning strategy, teaching environment and the differences in the 
learning abilities of pupils instead of specifying numbers of class 
rooms, etc. As mentioned in chapter two, this is different from a 
traditional public procurement project. In a PPP, such reflections are 
left to the private parties.  
Since the private party is responsible for the funding, design, 
completion, implementation, service and maintenance,562
In contrast to a traditional public contract, it is the contractor who 
has the obligation to provide services and operations. The PPP 
contract must run for a period equal to the time it takes for the private 
party to regain the investment. This is the main reason behind the long 
duration in PPP projects.  
 the incentive 
to build to reduce the cost of service and maintenance in the long run 
is changed. Thus, the PPP concept provides the contractor with a 
compelling reason to create the cheapest building or infrastructure for 
a period of 20 to 30 years.  
As mentioned above, some legal challenges occur in regard to 
PPP. One is the lack of legal definition, as analysed in subsection 3 
below; another is the ban on negotiation, as analysed in subsection 4 
below. 
 
                                                          
561 See also M. Burnett, Public-Private-Partnerships (PPP) – a Decision Maker’s 
Guide (Maastricht: Institut Européen d’Administration Publique, 2008). 
562 See Commission (EC), ‘Green Paper on public-private partnerships and 
Community Law on Public Contracts and Concessions’ (Green Paper), COM 
(2004) 327 final, 30th April 2004. 
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3. The lack of a legal definition  
 
EU law, the WTO and Chinese law have not considered the need of a 
legal definition of PPP.563
The WTO and the GPA
 All three legal systems lack a legal 
definition of PPP. 
564 are based on the legal principles of 
transparency and non-discrimination principles.565 The GPA is a 
plurilateral treaty including the WTO Members that are Parties to the 
GPA and thus have rights and obligations under the Agreement,566 
including public procurement rules. Also, the GPA enforces rules 
guaranteeing fair and non-discriminatory conditions for international 
competition.567
The EU procurement law is based on the common market and the 
elimination of barriers to trade in goods between Member States and 
barriers to movement in business, labour and capital. The political and 
economic reasoning behind the common market is based on the 
economic theory of comparative advantages.
  
568
                                                          
563 The same problem occurs in UNCITRAL. 
  
564 As analysed in chapter 4, the Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) is 
to date the only legally binding agreement in the WTO focusing on the subject of 
government procurement. The WTO Agreement on Government Procurement 
(GPA) from the 4th of October 2006 establishes a set of rules which, on the one 
hand, govern the procurement activities of its Parties,and, on the other hand, enable 
the Agreement to function as an international one. The GPA is a plurilateral treaty 
administered by a Committee on Government Procurement, which includes the 
WTO Members that are Parties to the GPA, and thus have rights and obligations 
under the Agreement. 
565 Article III of the GPA. 
566 Government procurement is an important aspect of international trade, given the 
considerable size of the procurement market (often 10 to 15 percent of GDP) and 
the benefits for domestic and foreign stakeholders in terms of increased 
competition. Many WTO Members use their purchasing decisions to achieve 
domestic policy goals, such as the promotion of specific local industry sectors or 
social groups. Open, transparent and non-discriminatory procurement is generally 
considered to be the best tool to achieve ‘value for money’, as it optimises 
competition among suppliers. 
567 For example, governments will be required to put in place domestic procedures 
by which aggrieved private bidders can challenge procurement decisions and 
obtain redress in the event such decisions were made inconsistently with the rules 
of the agreement. 
568 See P. Krugmann and M. Obstfeld, International Economics, Theory and Policy 
(6th ed., London: Addison-Weslet, 2003), part I. 
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The purpose of the EU Procurement law is to ensure opening up 
of the public procurement market, not to promote PPP.569
The EU Treaty and the procurement directives set out principles, 
rules and procedures which must be followed before awarding a 
contract when its value exceeds set thresholds. The EU rules do not 
lay down any specific rules only applying to PPP.
   
570
 
 
 
3.1. The EU public procurement objectives 
 
There are many positive elements to the EU procurement rules. One is 
the possibility to eliminate a corrupt governmental practice; another is 
that effective public procurement is essential for good public services 
and good government.  
The procurement rules ensure that the government applies the 
highest professional standards when it spends money on behalf of 
taxpayers. This procedure helps to ensure competition as the 
cornerstone of public sector procurement, and to maintain market 
interest – particularly where a well-established and competitive 
market does not already exist.  
In markets with limited or no competition, the procurement rules 
can undertake market soundings; be prepared to adapt the 
requirements to the capacity and capabilities of the marketplace; and 
advertise and market contracting opportunities as broadly as possible.  
The objectives of the specific EU public procurement directives 
are to ensure fairness and equal treatment; better procurement 
practices; open up the competition; and lower the overall prices. The 
basic principles to obtain these goals are transparency, non-
discrimination, equal treatment, proportionality and competition.  
                                                          
569 S. Arrowsmith, The Law of Public and Utilities Procurement, (2nd edn., London: 
Sweet & Maxwell, 2005), p. 121. See also S. Arrowsmith, ‘Public Private 
Partnerships and the European Procurement Rules: EU Policies in Conflict?’ 
(2000) 37 Common Market Law Review 709-737, p. 709; and S. Arrowsmith, The 
Law of Public and Utilities Procurement (2nd edn., London: Sweet & Maxwell, 
2005); M. Burnett, Public-Private-Partnerships (PPP) – A Decision Maker’s 
Guide (Maastricht: Institut Européen d’Administration Publique, 2008); S. E. 
Hjelmborg, P. S. Jakobsen and S. T. Poulsen, Public procurement law – the EU 
Directive on public contracts (Copenhagen: Djøf, 2006); R. Nielsen, Udbud af 
offentlige kontrakter (Copenhagen: Jurist- og Økonomforbundets Forlag, 2005). 
570 C. H. Bovis, EU Public Procurement Law (Cheltenham: Elgar European Law, 
2007),, p. 52. 
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All these public procurement rules cover PPP, and, for this reason, 
the PPP has its difficulties.571
 
 A PPP must of course adhere to the 
principles and objectives of the public procurement rules, but it must 
also be based on some additional principles that ensures the specific 
characteristics of the PPP. This will require a legal PPP definition, 
which does not exist today. 
 
3.2 A legal definition of PPP in the EU 
 
In COM (2004) 327572 the Commission states that ‘PPP is not defined 
at Community level’. The reason for this lack of a definition is to be 
found in the legal tradition. If the Commission instead sets up a legal 
definition of PPP, it would allow a long list of projects that would not 
be covered by this definition and the EU public procurement rules.
Instead of a legal definition, the Commission explains PPP in 
general as:  
  
 
... forms of co-operation between public authorities and 
the world of business which aim to ensure funding, 
construction, renovation, management or maintenance of 
an infrastructure or the provision of a service.573
 
  
The Commission makes it clear574 that PPPs in general qualify as a 
‘public contract’ under Directive 2004/18.575
                                                          
571 See S. Arrowsmith, ‘Public Private Partnerships and the European Procurement 
Rules: EU Policies in Conflict?’ (2000) 37 Common Market Law Review 709-737. 
In this article, Sue Arrowsmith argues that there are many difficulties in relation to 
PPP and the EU procurement rules.  
 The procedure for the 
572 Commission (EC), ‘Green Paper on public-private partnerships and Community 
Law on Public Contracts and Concessions’ (Green Paper), COM (2004) 327 final, 
30th April 2004. 
573 Commission (EC), ‘Green Paper on public-private partnerships and Community 
Law on Public Contracts and Concessions’ (Green Paper), COM (2004) 327 final, 
30th April 2004, subsection 1.1.1. 
574 Commission (EC), ‘Communication on Public-Private Partnerships and 
Community Law on Public Procurement and Concessions’ (Communication) COM 
(2005) 569 final, 15th November 2005, on Public-Private Partnerships and 
Community Law on Public Procurement and Concessions. 
575 Council Directive (EC) 2004/18 on the co-ordination of procedures for the 
award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service 
contracts [2004] OJ L134/114, as amended. 
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award of the PPP must comply with the detailed provisions of the 
Directive, while also abiding by the rules and principles of the EU 
Treaty: the free movement rules, and the principles of transparency, 
equal treatment, proportionality and mutual recognition.576
By using this specific legal method, the Commission ensures the 
use of the EU procurement rules in a large amount of PPPs. The 
European Commission identifies two types of PPP used in the 
Member States: Public Private Partnerships of a purely contractual 
nature;
  
577 and Public Private Partnerships of an Institutional nature, in 
which the public and private parties establish a joint public limited 
company.578
In accordance with COM 2004/327, several Member States 
indicated that there was a need for a common set of EU rules on PPPs. 
The European Commission has participated in the discussion, but it 
does not agree that the lack of specific rules is a problem. The result 
of the Green Paper,
  
579
                                                          
576 If the situation is that EU procurement rules are an advantage for PPPs, then the 
Commission’s decision not to provide a definition can be a sound idea legally. 
Hence, many PPPs will be governed by the procurement rules and principles in the 
EU treaty, the procurement Directives and the relevant case-law. If, on the other 
hand, the procurement rules are a disadvantage for PPPs, the lack of definition can 
have negative implications because it may result in reduced use of PPPs in general. 
The reason for a low number of PPP is because the transaction costs are too high; 
this is caused by the high amount of uncertainty. 
 however, demonstrated a need in the Member 
States for clarification on the use of PPP under the EU public 
577 In some situations a PPP has been, and probably will be, set up as a concession. 
If the PPP can be legally defined as a concession, there are only few provisions of 
secondary legislation to coordinate this type of PPP. These provisions are Article 
3(1) of Council Directive (EC) 93/37 concerning the co-ordination of procedures 
for the award of public works contracts [1993] OJ L199/54; and Articles 56 to 59 
in Council Directive (EC) 2004/18 on the co-ordination of procedures for the 
award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service 
contracts [2004] OJ L134/114. See also C. H. Bovis, EU Public Procurement Law 
(Cheltenham: Elgar European Law, 2007), pp. 53-54.   
578 See also C. H. Bovis, EU Public Procurement Law (Cheltenham: Elgar 
European Law, 2007), p. 52. In accordance with Commission (EC), ‘Green Paper 
on public-private partnerships and Community Law on Public Contracts and 
Concessions’ (Green Paper), COM (2004) 327 final, 30th April 2004, PPPs of a 
purely contractual nature are, in general, the most common PPP solution in most 
Member States.  
579 See Commission (EC), ‘Green Paper on public-private partnerships and 
Community Law on Public Contracts and Concessions’ (Green Paper), COM 
(2004) 327 final, 30th April 2004.. 
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procurement rules.580
The Commission stated in COM (2005) 569 that a non-binding 
initiative would provide the required guidance to address the 
perceived uncertainties with regards to institutionalised PPPs (IPPPs). 
The lack of a legal definition of an IPPP at Community level was most 
recently addressed in C (2007) 6661 and the Memo/08/95 of 18
 Nevertheless, in COM (2005) 569 the 
Commission did not consider this necessary and has subsequently 
made several announcements regarding the interpretation of Public 
Private Partnerships. Hence, the Commission is not at this time 
planning to create any legislative PPP rules.  
th 
February 2008.581
The Commission has published an interpretative communication 
C (2007) 6661
   
582 that, according to the Commission, will clarify ‘the 
rule of the game’ in relation to IPPPs, but not to PPP in general. The 
difference between an IPPP and a PPP is basically the formation of a 
joint company in an IPPP versus a purely contractual arrangement in a 
PPP.583
                                                          
580 In addition, the European Parliament asked for some guidelines and relevant 
clarifications in connection with the award of IPPP. Parliament (EU), Resolution 
on public-private partnerships and Community law on public procurement and 
concessions (2006/2043(INI)),26 October 2006. 
 
581 A legal definition of IPPP and specific rules concerning IPPPs are not to be 
found at Community level; see the Commission (EC), ‘Interpretative 
Communication on the Application of Community Law on Public Procurement and 
Concessions to Institutionalised Public-Private Partnerships (PPP)’ 
(Communication) C (2007) 6661, 5th February 2008; cf. Commission (EC), 
‘Communication on Public-Private Partnerships and Community Law on Public 
Procurement and Concessions’ (Communication) COM (2005) 569 final, 15th 
November 2005, section 4.1., in which the Commission stated that an Interpretative 
Communication would be the best way to encourage competition and to provide 
legal certainty. The Commission stated in COM(2005)569 that a non-binding 
initiative would provide the required guidance to address perceived uncertainties in 
regard to IPPPs. The lack of legal definition of an IPPP at Community level is 
addressed again in C (2007) 6661 and Commission (EC), ‘Public Procurement: 
Commission issues guidance on setting up Institutionalised Public-Private 
Partnerships – Frequently Asked Questions’ (Memo) MEMO/08/95, 18th February 
2008.. See also Parliament (EU), Resolution on public-private partnerships and 
Community law on public procurement and concessions (2006/2043(INI)),26 
October 2006. 
582 Commission (EC), ‘Interpretative Communication on the Application of 
Community Law on Public Procurement and Concessions to Institutionalised 
Public-Private Partnerships (PPP)’ (Communication) C (2007) 6661, 5th February 
2008 
583 See Chapter 2 above for the definitions of PPP and IPPP. 
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The Commission concludes that the aim of the interpretative 
communication was to enhance legal certainty and alleviate the 
concerns that procurement rules and EU law in general would make 
IPPPs unattractive or impossible to carry out.584
The perceived lack of legal certainty in the Member States in 
relation to the involvement of private partners, and the risk of the 
IPPP being non-compliant with EU Law, were the reasons for 
publishing the IPPP interpretation communication C (2007) 6661.
  
585
The same lack of legal certainty can be claimed in regard to PPP. 
The Committee of the Regions states that given the lack of definition 
of PPP, the fact that adequate legislation is not yet in place, and the 
lack of experience in the Member States, mostly the new Member 
States, there is a need for an interpretative communication covering all 
forms of PPP agreements. Thus, the Committee asks for a 
communication covering more than the aim of COM (2007) 6661, 
which only covers the IPPP.
  
586
                                                          
584 R. William, ‘The Commission Interpretative Communication on the Application 
of Community Law on Public Procurement and Concessions to Institutionalised 
Public Private Partnerships (IPPPs)’ (2008) 17 (4) Public Procurement Law Review 
NA116. 
 
585 This legal uncertainty and risk can discourage both public authorities and 
private parties from entering into an IPPP. This risk is a problem since public 
authorities at all levels are interested in types of co-operations with the private 
sector, and this interest is increasing in the Member States. The interest in forming 
IPPPs is increasing because of national needs for ensuring infrastructure and 
services; see Commission (EC), ‘Public Procurement: Commission issues guidance 
on setting up Institutionalised Public-Private Partnerships – Frequently Asked 
Questions’ (Memo) MEMO/08/95, 18th February 2008.. The IPPP interpretation 
communication therefore sets out the Commission’s understanding of how the 
Community provisions on most types of public procurement and concessions are to 
be applied to the funding and operation of an IPPP as a legal guidance to the 
Member States. The interpretation communication does not create new rules 
concerning IPPPs; it only reflects the Commission’s understanding of the rules in 
the procurement Directive and the EU treaty, and the relevant case law by the ECJ. 
586 The European Parliament in Parliament (EU), Resolution on public-private 
partnerships and Community law on public procurement and concessions 
(2006/2043(INI)),26 October 2006., see General comments, no.2,  considers it 
premature to assess the effects of the public procurement directives and is, 
therefore, against a review of these directives. It also opposes the creation of a 
separate legal regime for PPPs but considers that there is a need for legislative 
initiatives in the areas of concessions, respecting the principles of the internal 
market and threshold values, providing simple rules for tendering procedures, and 
for clarification with regards to institutionalised public-private partnerships 
(IPPPs). 
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One objective in providing this interpretative communication 
would to ensure legal certainty in regard to IPPP; another would be to 
open up to a more efficient use of PPP. In relation to PPP there is a 
need of both legal certainty and rules that ensure more efficiency, 
which is discussed right below.  
 
 
4. The economics terms of PPP   
 
As mentioned above in chapter two, PPP was invented in the 1990s as 
a new method of public service and works delivery in order to 
improve the value for money, and as a potential method of bringing 
private finance to the public sector.587 In the mid 1990s, many 
governments experienced pressure of fiscal deficits and an increasing 
public debt burden.588 At the same time the governments were facing a 
pressure to expand and improve public facilities and services.589 PPP 
was invented as a tool to implement EU policies and aims to fill the 
gap between the public needs and the need of financing.590
The idea behind the PPP can be found in the private market 
contract arrangement as a result of globalisation. The private market 
already had experience in using strategic alliances to increase quality 
and decrease the cost, and, therefore, increase the value for money. 
The motivation for making a strategic alliance was, and still is, to 
make a business arrangement that creates dynamism, collaboration, 
and mutual learning among the parties. Therefore, initial agreements 
   
                                                          
587 The United Kingdom and Australia were the first countries in OECD to set up 
this mode of service delivery. Now France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Portugal, Spain, Turkey, Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, Poland, Denmark, 
Portugal, Hungary, Netherlands, and several other countries have introduced PPP. 
See OECD, Public-Private Partnerships, in pursuit of risk sharing and value for 
money (Paris: OECD, 2008), p. 11; and D. Grimsey and M. Lewis, Public-Private 
Partnerships, The worldwide Revolution in infrastructure provision and project 
finance (Cheltenham: Elgar, 2007), pp. 3-5. 
588 See OECD, Public-Private Partnerships, in pursuit of risk sharing and value for 
money (Paris: OECD, 2008), p. 11. 
589 D. Grimsey and M. Lewis, Public-Private Partnerships, The worldwide 
Revolution in infrastructure provision and project finance (Cheltenham: Elgar, 
2007), p. 19. 
590 M. Burnett, Public-Private-Partnerships (PPP) – A Decision Maker’s Guide 
(Maastricht: Institut Européen d’Administration Publique, 2008)p. 1. 
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have less to do with success than adaptability to changes in the market 
and in consumer needs.591
The private sector met the consumer demand with new types of 
contracts including collaboration. The PPP contract used today in 
many EU Member States aims to fulfil this need.
 
592 The governmental 
attention to market mechanisms and the success of privatisation 
efforts in several countries increased the interest in PPP.593
PPPs have received a boost in various countries undergoing a 
process of significant economic growth. By using PPP, it is possible to 
provide additional capital; to set up alternative management 
procedures and implementation skills; to provide value added to the 
consumer and the public at large; and to provide better identification 
of needs and optimal use of resources.
  
594
The market for PPP, and co-operation between the public and 
private sectors for the development and operation of infrastructure for 
a wide range of economic activities, has increased. Years ago, PPP 
arrangements were often driven by limitations in public funds to cover 
investment needs. Today, PPP is also driven by interest in increasing 
the quality and efficiency of public services in infrastructure projects, 
e.g. in sectors such as technology, water, prisons, welfare, transport, 
public health, schools, urban regeneration, and national security
 
595
A PPP must deliver infrastructures, buildings and services from a 
value for money perspective. This means that a significant part of 
establishing a PPP arrangement is that the output will be better than a 
 and 
providing a wide range of public services, like telecommunication, 
plants, financial support, innovative financing, general public services, 
education, and research.  
                                                          
591 Y. L. Dos and G. Hamel, Alliance Advantage, The art of creating value through 
Partnering (Boston, Massachusetts: Harvard Business School Press, 1998), 
Introduction p. 15. 
592 C. D. Tvarnø, ‘Public private partnership in the European Union’, in R. Nielsen and S. 
Treumer (eds.), The New EU Public Procurement Directives (Copenhagen: Djøf, 2005), 
pp. 183-194. 
593 N. Pongsiri, ‘Regulation and public private partnership’ (2002) 15(6) 
International Journal of Public Sector Management 487-495, pp. 487-495. 
594 See Commission (EC), ‘Guidelines for Successful Public Private Partnerships’ 
March 2003, p. 4. 
595 D. Grimsey and M. Lewis, Public-Private Partnerships, The worldwide 
Revolution in infrastructure provision and project finance (Cheltenham: Elgar, 
2007), pp. 8-10. 
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similar traditional public project.596
The PPPs can achieve additional value compared with other 
approaches if there is an effective implementation structure, and if the 
objectives of all parties can be met within the partnership between the 
public and the private parties. 
 Value for money means: reducing 
the cost and price; increasing the quality; reducing the risks and 
failures; improving the co-ordination; and sharing responsibility and 
capacity. Those objectives result in a shift of content in the contract.  
In a world of imperfect and incomplete contracts, it is still 
possible to gain some significant values from a properly structured 
PPP project.597 The benefits or advantages of setting up a well 
functioning PPP are:598
 Acceleration of infrastructure provision; 
 
 Faster implementation;  
 Reduced whole life costs;  
 More optimal risk allocation;  
 Improvement of the incentives to perform;  
 Improve the quality of service; 
 Generation of additional revenues in the private sectors; 
 Transferring responsibility; 
 Enhanced public management;  
 Increasing investments in general; 
 Higher efficiency in the use of resources by joint utilities; 
 Generating commercial value from public sector assets by joint 
utilities. 
 
In the end, all these factors can fulfill the main scope of a PPP 
agreement, which is to ensure joint utility between the parties, thereby 
ensuring the most efficient product at the lowest price. 
The first priority is to achieve the goal of common utility. The 
common utility can be explained by this following example, an 
                                                          
596 OECD, Public-Private Partnerships, in pursuit of risk sharing and value for 
money (Paris: OECD, 2008), p. 36. 
597 See also D. Grimsey and M. Lewis, Public-Private Partnerships, The worldwide 
Revolution in infrastructure provision and project finance (Cheltenham: Elgar, 
2007), p. 247. 
598 See also OECD, Public-Private Partnerships, in pursuit of risk sharing and 
value for money (Paris: OECD, 2008), p. 37 and Commission (EC), ‘Guidelines for 
Successful Public Private Partnerships’ March 2003, pp. 15-16. 
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example using applied economics and not evolving economic 
theory:599
 
 
 
Farmer A lives next to farmer B. Farmer A grows corn on some of her 
land and leaves some of the land uncultivated. Farmer B runs cattle on 
all his land.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: C. Tvarnø based on R. Cooter and T. Ulen, Law and Economics, (5th edn., 
London: Addison-Wesley, 2008), p. 88.600
 
 
 
There is no fence between the two ranches, but the boundary is clear. 
Thus, from time to time farmer B’s cattle wander into farmer A’s 
property and damage farmer A’s corn.  
                                                          
599 The application of this economic example does not include all conditions and 
presumptions in the Coase Theorem. 
600 In regard to definitions, conditions and presumptions in the Coase Theorem look 
further in R. Cooter and T. Ulen, Law and Economics, (5th edn., London: Addison-
Wesley, 2008). 
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From a legal point of view, farmer B would then have to pay 
farmer A for the damage to the corn. With regards to future damage, 
farmer B must build a fence around his land to keep the cattle inside 
his own property and, by that measure, ensure that future damage will 
not occur.  
If instead the two farmers, in a world without transaction cost, 
used another approach than the traditional legal solution, one could 
imagine a solution where the two farmers fell in love and got married. 
Such a decision would imply that the farmers combined their business 
interests, and, therefore, their joint profits. The joint profit would then 
be highest if they were to build a small fence around the cornfield. 
This would be the best value for money in this specific situation and 
the optimal joint solution.601 If the farmers did not fall in love but 
were just neighbours deciding to negotiate the best value for money, 
in a world without transaction cost, the two farmers still could end up 
with a more efficient solution than the legal solution if they 
negotiated. This idea of negotiation is fundamental in relation to 
optimal contracts in, for example, strategic alliances,602
As stated above, more value for money requires that the parties 
negotiate and co-operate with joint utility as their focus. The purpose 
of the PPP contract is, by using the idea of joint utility, to: 
 partnering 
contracts, and PPP. 
 
x Reduce the cost and price 
x Increase the quality 
x Reduce the risk 
x Reduce the failures 
x Improve the co-ordination 
x Share capacity with the private party 
 
The important role of the economic operator participates at different 
stages in the project (design, completion, implementation, funding). 
The public partner concentrates primarily on defining the objectives to 
be attained in terms of public interest, the quality of services provided, 
                                                          
601 See further R. Cooter and T. Ulen, Law and Economics, (5th edn., London: Addison-
Wesley, 2008), p. 88. 
602 See, for example, I. Macneil, The New Social Contract (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 1980); and K. W. Artz and T. H. Bruch, ‘Asset specificity, 
uncertainty and relational norms’ (2000) 41 Journal of Economic Behavior & 
Organization 337-362. 
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and the pricing policy, and it takes responsibility for monitoring 
compliance with these objectives. 
The distribution of risks between the public partner and the 
private partner is different. The risks generally borne by the public 
sector are transferred to the private party if this is efficient with 
regards to the transaction and the project.603 A well-functioning PPP is 
highly reliant on the ability of the parties to set up the incentive 
structure in the right way. One part of a workable incentive scheme is 
when the supplier bears the right amount of risks, on the grounds that 
those with money at stake have an incentive to make the efficient 
decision.604
The parties are the best placed to negotiate the risk and the value 
of this risk. If the public party in the tender notice already sets up the 
distribution of the risk as demanded by the public procurement law, 
the project cannot create the best value for money. 
  
 
 
4.1 Co-operation as a key element in PPP 
 
The lack of a legal definition of PPP is a serious problem because EU 
law does not consider co-operation and negotiation as key elements to 
a successful PPP.  
Both parties must have influence on the PPP project. However, 
the public procurement rules request that the public party sets up the 
conditions to the contract and the co-operation almost single-
handedly. Only very minor matters can be changed after the award, 
otherwise a new procedure must be set up.  
The competitive dialogue sets up a procedure in which a certain 
amount of dialogue becomes possible. It is not the aim of this chapter 
to discuss this procedure. A single remark related to the competitive 
dialogue is that it does not open up for a negotiation between the 
parties in the PPP but instead for a dialogue between all parties, which 
is an altogether different matter. 
                                                          
603 The Commission notes that a PPP does not necessarily entail that the private 
partner assumes all the risks, or even the major share of the risks linked to the 
project. The precise distribution of risk is determined case by case, according to the 
respective ability of the parties concerned to assess, control and cope with this risk. 
604 See also D. Grimsey and M. Lewis, Public-Private Partnerships, The worldwide 
Revolution in infrastructure provision and project finance (Cheltenham: Elgar, 
2007),, p. 247. 
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The EU public procurement rules in general do not promote and 
support the idea of co-operation. The Commission believes that the 
existing public procurement rules can accommodate all new ideas and 
needs, to create new types of co-operation between public and private 
parties, and to cover all situations created by the market.  
However, the Commission does not take in consideration that 
PPPs have very specific characteristics with regard to the co-operation 
and output that are not reflected in the EU public procurement rules. 
The lack of acknowledgement of the need for co-operation and 
negotiation between the parties is troublesome.  
The main priority of the present legislation is equal treatment, 
transparency, and free movement, all fundamental principles in the 
European Union. But the citizens, the private parties, and the public 
authorities must also be given the possibility to achieve the most 
efficient agreement and outcome of a PPP.  
Hence, the principles of the procurement rules are to ensure 
competition, equal treatment, and transparency, but not co-operation. 
Instead, there is a general legal ban on negotiation, which will be 
discussed below in subsection 4. 
 
 
4.2 Solutions to an efficient PPP 
 
The aim of specific PPP rules must be to enhance legal certainty and 
alleviate concerns that traditional procurement rules might make PPPs 
unattractive or impossible to carry out. With regards to the legal 
uncertainty, there are two approaches,  
One approach is that existing public procurement rules and 
principles cover all PPPs, rendering a definition of PPP unnecessary. 
This is the natural legal solution. The existing rules cover all new 
ideas, all needs to create new types of co-operation between public 
and private parties, and all situations created by the market. However, 
this traditional legal solution does not take into consideration that a 
PPP has very specific characteristics with regard to the co-operation 
and output needed to create an efficient PPP.  
Another approach is to let the public authorities use the option of 
co-operating with private parties under conditions similar to market 
conditions. This solution is in conflict with the procurement procedure 
in general.  
A simple solution is to set up specific PPP rules in the public 
procurement regulation and legally define exactly what a PPP is; how 
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a PPP has to be set up; how to ensure a fair and transparent 
competition when selecting the private parties; and how to run a PPP. 
When this is accomplished, the PPP can use a different set of 
procurement rules which acknowledge the special aim of the PPP; the 
public service operate in market conditions with the benefits related to 
the market; and co-operation can be prioritised.  
It should be emphasised that the aim and purpose of the EU public 
procurement law is generally good, but not when there is a particular 
need or market for new types of co-operation between public and 
private parties. While also subject to special procedural rules, the PPP 
rules should allow the special turnaround in the traditional incentive 
procurement structures necessary for PPP. PPP has the intention of 
achieving greater economic efficiency by changing the incentive 
structure of co-operation.  
Thus, since the EU public procurement law does not specify 
concrete PPP rules and definitions, barriers to the use of PPP as an 
alternative and more efficient procurement model can be a serious 
reality.  
The lack of rules and definitions might create barriers that 
increase the transaction costs in connection with the public 
procurement of PPP projects. PPP can provide a significant economic 
advantage, and beside the existing objectives regarding transparency 
and equal treatment, the EU public procurement rules should also 
address the economic efficiency of PPP. 
At this point, the general development, and more than ten years 
worth of knowledge concerning PPP, should make it possible to 
introduce a specific definition of PPP into not only the current EU 
Public Procurement Directives, but also the WTO and the GPA. 
Specific PPP rules can help create a functioning PPP market with the 
economic benefits that a market can create; this is necessary in the EU 
and internationally.  
 
 
4.3 A tight PPP definition 
 
Specific PPP rules could contain a tight definition stating which PPP 
arrangements are covered by these rules. Under such a definition, only 
PPP arrangements falling within the definition would be covered by 
the special PPP rules. If a PPP project is excluded from the definition 
in the specific PPP rules, the project would, instead, be subject to the 
general procurement rules and regulations. Thus, if the PPP falls 
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outside the scope of any definition of a PPP, the traditional public 
procurement rules will apply to the set-up. Only when a strict 
definition of a PPP is fulfilled, should the specific PPP rules apply to 
the PPP.  
On the one hand, the Commission is correct in stating that the 
traditional procurement rules and principles can handle the formation 
of a PPP. On the other hand, the Commission still ought to consider 
specific PPP rules at community level in order to allow the best and 
most effective outcome of the PPPs, including a precise and tight legal 
definition of the PPP.  If a public project falls inside a tight and legally 
binding PPP definition, a more efficient output of the transaction can 
be possible  compared to traditional public projects.  
 
 
5. The problem with the ban on negotiation 
 
A PPP is a collaborative contract and should, as such, be based on a 
high degree of negotiation between the parties. The principles 
surrounding a PPP contract are trust, corporation, open books, joint 
utility, and positive incentives. These factors are agreed upon between 
the parties - the building owner, the architect, the engineer and the 
constructor. Some degree of negotiation in collaborative contracts is 
an important tool for obtaining the objective of the contract, which is 
better and cheaper results. 
In general, public procurement law does not lay down any special 
rules covering the different types of collaborative PPP contracts, and 
the question must be how can a contract based on negotiation, co-
operation, trust, openness and common utility be possible within the 
public procurement law?  
When for example a public authority in the EU entrusts the 
provision of an economic activity to a private party, the EC internal 
market rules and principles must be followed. The general legal 
principles derived from the treaty are: transparency, equality, 
proportionality and mutual recognition. The public procurement law 
sets out a long list of rules in the public procurement directives. The 
principle of the ban on negotiation can be derived from the directives.  
Collaborative contracts, such as the different types of PPPs 
mentioned in chapter two above, require negotiation and co-operation 
to work. Otherwise it is difficult, if not impossible, to gain better value 
and lower cost. The ban on negotiation prevents this gain. 
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Public procurement law protects some main objectives: 
 
x An open market 
x Competition 
x Equal treatment 
x Elimination of corruption 
x Transparency 
x Non-discrimination 
x Proportionality 
x Effective public procurement  
x Application of the highest professional standards  
x Maintaining market interest 
x Increasing prices 
 
The positive experience seen in the private sector regarding 
collaborative contract arrangement605
Neither the WTO nor the EU gives room for using negotiation, 
nor do they set up a procedure that allows negotiation in regard to 
traditional works or service projects. The competitive dialogue sets up 
a procedure that allows the public party to discuss the same question 
with all tenderers at the same conditions. But this is not the same as 
negotiation.
 (e.g. the creation of dynamism, 
new incentives, co-operation, risk diversity, efficient use of core 
competencies, and mutual learning among the parties) cannot be 
created in regard to PPP under the procurement rules because of the 
objectives and idea behind the ban on negotiation. 
606
                                                          
605 When private parties set up a strategic alliance, they negotiate the contract. A 
strategic alliance contract between private parties could, for example, be 
implemented as the well-known partnering contract used in connection with 
strategic alliances and in the building industry. This contract is also based on trust, 
co-operation, and negotiation between the parties, and is used when the need for 
co-operation is distinct; see further: A. Deering and A. Murphy, The Difference 
Engine: Achieving Powerful and Sustainable Partnering (Aldershot: Gower, 
1998); J. Barlow, M. Cohen, A. Jasphapara and Y. Simpson, Towards Positive 
Partnering: Revealing the Realities in the Construction Industry (Bristol: The 
Policy Press, 1997); and Y. L. Dos and G. Hamel, Alliance Advantage, The art of 
creating value through Partnering (Boston, Massachusetts: Harvard Business 
School Press, 1998). 
  
606 According to the Commission, the competitive dialogue will provide the 
necessary flexibility in the discussions with the tenderers on all aspects of the PPP 
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5.1 PPP, negotiation and game theory 
 
The optimal PPP is dependent on negotiation and a well-functioning 
interrelationship between the parties. The interrelationship depends on 
both the task, and the contract regarding the project. 
Regardless of the contract type, economic theory considers 
contracts as (Pareto) optimal if the following conditions are in place. 
Given a set of alternative allocations of goods or outcomes for a set of 
individuals, a change from one allocation to another that can make at 
least one individual better off without making any other individual 
worse off, is called a ‘Pareto improvement’. An allocation is defined 
as ‘Pareto efficient’ or ‘Pareto optimal’ when no further Pareto 
improvements can be made.607
Game theory can be used to argue that  
   
 
“for individuals pursuing their own self-interest, 
incentives for co-operation will be greater than for 
selfish behavior … under a wide variety of 
circumstances, including when the “partners” are 
hostile”.608
 
  
Within game theory, the prisoner’s dilemma can explain the problems 
between common utility and negotiation. In 1950, Albert W. Tucker 
defined a fundamental problem in the game theory, showing that two 
persons choose not to co-operate even though they both can see the 
common interest in collaborating.609
                                                                                                                                                    
contract during the set-up phase. At the same time, this procedure will ensure that 
the dialogue is conducted in compliance with the principles of transparency and 
equality of treatment, and the EC Treaty principles.  
 Game Theory and the prisoner’s 
606 See also Commission (EC), ‘Green Paper on public-private partnerships and 
Community Law on Public Contracts and Concessions’ (Green Paper), COM 
(2004) 327 final, 30th April 2004.section 25. 
607 Steven Shavell, ‘Contracts’, in P. Newman (ed.), The New Palgrave Dictionary 
of Economics and the Law (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998), p. 436. 
608 R. W. McQuaid, ‘The theory of partnerships: why have partnership?’, in S. P. 
Osborne (ed), Public-Private Partnerships: Theory and Practice in International 
Perspective (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 27. 
609 See A. Rapoport, ‘Prisoners’ Dilemma and Game Theory’, in P. Newman (ed.), 
The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 1998),, p. 100. 
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dilemma can be explained by this following example, an example 
using applied economics and not involving economic theory:610 
Two people have been arrested in possession of some stolen 
goods. The prosecutor has enough evidence to have them prosecuted 
and convicted for possession of stolen goods, unless one or both of 
them confess to burglary. If the prosecutor only prosecutes the persons 
for being in possession of stolen property, it will lead to a lower 
penalty than the burglaries. The two people, now known as the 
prisoners, are put in isolation and therefore cannot talk to each other.  
 
Each prisoner is visited by the prosecutor, and each gets the same 
deal. If the prisoner confesses and by that also gives evidence about 
the other prisoner, he himself will go free while the other receives the 
maximum sentence of four years. If both prisoners confess, they will 
each get two years in prison for burglary. If neither confesses, each 
prisoner will get a half year in prison for possession of stolen goods 
because the break-in cannot be proved.  
The prisoner’s dilemma can also be described as follows:611
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
610 The application of this economic example does not include all conditions and 
presumptions in the prisoner’s dilemma game and the game theory. 
611 R. Cooter and T. Ulen, Law and Economics, (5th edn., London: Addison-
Wesley, 2008), p. 38-40. 
Prisoner 1 
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‘Confession’ is the dominant strategy because ‘confession’ is the 
optimal choice for each player, regardless of what the other player 
does. Prisoners 1 and 2 are in the same situation and have the same 
information. Thus, the game ends by both payers spending two years 
in prison instead of only half a year. 612 
The prisoner's dilemma can be seen as an illustration of the 
difference between individual and collective rationality. Decisions that 
are rational from the individual's hand are bad when seen with 
common eyes, even though an outsider can see the rational gains from 
a common perspective.613
The objectives regarding PPP can be explained by the game 
theory. The collaborative contracts were introduced as an alternative 
to traditional construction contracts. The aim was to ensure that the 
parties would optimise the transaction instead of their own profit. 
Thus, the parties must optimise the joint utility and not only their own 
utility. To obtain this objective, the parties must share all information 
relevant to the project and work with open books and calculations. 
The relationship must be built on co-operation and trust. 
 
If a PPP relationship is based on these economic factors, it is 
possible to move the output from the Nash equilibrium to the Pareto 
optimal situation in the matrix. But the parties need legal solutions to 
obtain this situation. 
 
 
5.2 A contract law perspective 
 
From a contractual point of view, it is a general rule in civil law and 
common law countries that parties have contractual freedom. The 
reason behind the freedom of contract is individual autonomy and 
public benefit. The contract is binding upon the parties and determines 
the rights and liabilities.614
The principle is a product of a liberalist belief that when the 
individual is free from historical constraints and authorities, the 
  
                                                          
612 R. Cooter and T. Ulen, Law and Economics, (5th edn., London: Addison-Wesley, 2008), 
p. 40. 
613 A. Rapoport, ‘Prisoners’ Dilemma and Game Theory’, in P. Newman (ed.), The 
New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 1998),,, p. 100.  
614 W. Flume, The General Part of Civil Law, Vol. 2: The Transaction, (4th edn., 
Berlin: Springer,1992), p. 7 
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individual is capable of determining his acts and responsibilities, and 
thereby the person can decide whether or not to make a contract.615
 
  
 
5.2.1 The basic clauses in a well-functioning PPP  
 
 
The basis of PPP contracts is to create more value for money, and a 
well-functioning PPP contract should implement the following 
contract elements:616
 
 
 
 
Legally binding clauses 
 
Process-based clauses 
 
The parties share all information.  
They have open books and accounts. 
 
 
The parties optimise the transaction, 
which means they optimise joint utility 
and not their own utility. 
 
 
At the beginning of the relationship,  
The parties do not  know the final  
product. Instead, the parties’ demands  
are in focus. 
 
 
The relationship is built on co-operation  
and trust. 
 
The parties share the responsibility 
and cost of failures. 
The process is more important than  
the product because the process  
facilitates the creation  of the best and  
most efficient product. 
 
 
 
The Governments should617
                                                          
615 K. Zweigert and H. Kötz, An introduction to comparative law (3 edn., Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1998), p. 324. 
 implement the above-mentioned elements 
into the PPP contract because it can result in a significant turn in the 
616 See also Christina D. Tvarnø, ‘Law and Regulatory Aspects of Public–Private 
Partnerships: Contract Law and Public Procurement Law’, in G. Hodge, A. Hodge, 
C. Greve and A. Boardman (eds.), International Handbook On Public–Private 
Partnerships (Cheltenham: Elgar, 2010), chapter 10. 
617 The public authority also will face a number of other challenges. See for this 
subject M. Burnett, Public-Private-Partnerships (PPP) – A Decision Maker’s Guide 
(Maastricht: Institut Européen d’Administration Publique, 2008)p. 116. 
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incentives on a long term basis; a shift of focus to needs instead of 
demands; improvement of co-ordination; a better use of core 
competencies; shared capacity with the private party; an increase in 
quality; a reduction of risk and failures; shared risks; and a reduction 
in cost and price. 618
The aim is that both the public and the private party benefit from 
such a contractual relationship if the performance is based on needs 
instead of demands. Thus, the contract should not state exactly what 
the private party must perform; rather, it should state which needs the 
end product must fulfil.  
 
This can be ensured if the public party defines the needs and 
objectives of the public interest instead of the traditional definition of 
demands. It will then be up to the private party to create the design, 
completion, implementation, services, and funding, as these are all 
core competences of a private party.619
From a contractual point of view, a PPP can be set up as one 
single contract running until the investment has been returned, or as 
two separate contracts – one concerning the works agreement and one 
concerning the service, maintenance and operation agreement. In the 
long term, the private party runs the building or infrastructure, and the 
public party provides the typical public service – e.g. the learning and 
teaching in a school in regard to the PPP project.
  
620
                                                          
618 J. Barlow, M. Cohen, A. Jasphapara and Y. Simpson, Towards Positive Partnering: 
Revealing the Realities in the Construction Industry (Bristol: The Policy Press, 1997); Y. 
L. Dos and G. Hamel, Alliance Advantage, The art of creating value through 
Partnering (Boston, Massachusetts: Harvard Business School Press, 1998); and E. 
E. Scheuing, The Power of Strategic Partnering (Portland: Productivity Press, 
1995).  
 
619 For further discussions and analyses of Danish PPP arrangements, see C. D. 
Tvarnø, ‘Public-Private Partnerships from a Danish perspective’ (2006) Public 
Procurement Law Review NA98; C. D. Tvarnø, PPP and Public service 
Broadcasting (Copenhagen: Julebog, 2005), pp. 181-201; C. D. Tvarnø, ‘Public 
private partnership in the European Union’, in R. Nielsen and S. Treumer (eds.), 
The New EU Public Procurement Directives (Copenhagen: Djøf, 2005), pp. 183-
194. 
620 Great Britain was the first EU Member State to use partnering agreements. The 
British government uses partnering agreements to build schools, roads, office 
buildings etc, and has done so for more than ten years.  See:  
http://www.ogc.gov.uk/procurement_policy_and_application_of_eu_rules_uk_regu
lations_.asp and http://www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si2006/20060005.htm accessed 30 
November 2010; and: 
<http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/ppp_standardised_contracts.htm> accessed 30 
November 2010; and other documentation on: 
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In regard to two private parties, this contractual freedom means 
that the parties can agree on what they want. To some extent, private 
law principles also covers public contracts. The legal regulation of 
public contracts usually adheres closely to the ordinary private law.621
Pursuant to Article 1(2)(a) in the EC Directive 2004/18/EC, public 
contracts are contracts for pecuniary interests, concluded in writing, 
between one or more economic operators and one or more contracting 
authorities, and having as their object the execution of works,
 
But when a public party contracts with private parties, the public 
procurement rules and principles must be followed when setting up 
the procurement procedure and choosing the private party.  
622 
supply623 and the provision of services.624,625
Thus, in accordance with the public procurement rules in the 
procurement Directive, or in the GPA, the public contracting authority 
in a PPP must choose the private contracting party by a tender 
procedure, and the contract must be concluded on the basis of the draft 
contract laid down in the tender documents without any scope for 
amendments and negotiations.
 
626
On the one hand, public procurement law does not define the 
content of the contract, and the content of the PPP contract is not 
covered by the public procurement rules. But on the other hand, the 
parties cannot negotiate the terms of the contracts as freely as two 
private parties. The public procurement regulation and the tender 
procedures set restrictions on negotiations similar to private contracts.  
 
These rules and principles mentioned above result in a contract 
situation where the public party must tender out the contract terms in 
such a way that all potential bidders can see the terms and bid on the 
same terms. This results in a situation where the public contract 
cannot take into account the evolution of a product or service over a 
longer duration period.  
                                                                                                                                                    
<http://www.4ps.gov.uk/PageContent.aspx?id=2&tp=Y&s=0&title=ppp&Type=1
&searchbtn=Go&x=31&y=15&p=93> accessed 30 November 2010; and: 
<http://www.4ps.gov.uk/PageContent.aspx?id=2&tp=Y&s=0&title=ppp&Type=1
&searchbtn=Go&x=31&y=15&p=88>  accessed 30 November 2010. 
621 H Collins, Regulating Contracts (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 304. 
622 Article 1(2)(b) in  Directive 2004/18/EC. 
623 Article 1(2)(c) in Directive 2004/18/EC. 
624 Article 1(2)(d) in Directive 2004/18/EC. 
625 See C. H. Bovis, EU Public Procurement Law (Cheltenham: Elgar European 
Law, 2007), p. 157. 
626 See S. E. Hjelmborg, P. S. Jakobsen and S. T. Poulsen, Public procurement law – the 
EU Directive on public contracts (Copenhagen: Djøf, 2006), p. 201. 
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5.3 PPP, negotiation and a legal policy perspective 
 
Collaborative contracts were invented to address a need for new 
contract models. The public sector is keen on a new contract model, 
but cannot benefit from the PPP model due to the EU public 
procurement law and the ban on negotiation.  
In order to gain the economic benefits from the collaborative 
contracts, the parties must have access to negotiation and co-operation 
under the EU public procurement law. On the contrary, the purpose of 
the WTO, EU and the Chinese public procurement law is to ensure a 
transparent, proportionally, competitive open market for public 
procurement.627
Both the WTO and the EU must accept the fact that a PPP is an 
alternative to a traditional public transaction and this alternative 
cannot develop in the same legal environment as traditional public 
arrangements. The WTO and the EU must acknowledge the need of 
negotiation and collaboration. Both systems prevent negotiation and 
do not set up an alternative procedure in favour of more efficient PPP 
contracts. 
 These main objectives do not support the idea of 
negotiation and common utility, which is the main objective behind 
collaborative contracts. 
The public procurement regulation and the tender procedures set 
out serious restrictions preventing negotiation and collaboration. A 
public contract cannot be negotiated by the parties in the same way as 
a private contract. The public procurement rules result in a contract 
situation where the public party must tender out the contract terms in 
such way that all potential bidders can see the terms and bid on the 
same terms.  
PPP contracts can create better and cheaper buildings and 
services. 16 percent of the GDP in the EU is spent on public contracts, 
and the main rule is that the parties cannot negotiate. Thus, a public 
contract cannot achieve the benefit of negotiation as offered by a 
private contract. Public contracts, because of this restriction, tend to 
be incomplete by design in situations where the product is not typical 
                                                          
627 S. Arrowsmith, The Law of Public and Utilities Procurement, (2nd edn., London: 
Sweet & Maxwell, 2005), p. 121; C. H. Bovis, EU Public Procurement Law 
(Cheltenham: Elgar European Law, 2007), p. 52; and M. Burnett, Public-Private-
Partnerships (PPP) – A Decision Maker’s Guide (Maastricht: Institut Européen 
d’Administration Publique, 2008) 
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or easy to define.628
However, the EC procurement rules must take into account the 
need of specific rules regarding collaborative contracts. Otherwise, the 
public sector will not receive the economic benefits arising from 
negotiation and collaboration. 
 In such situations, negotiation is extremely 
relevant. 
 
 
5.4 Proposal of a new PPP procedure 
 
One way to ensure a more efficient PPP transaction is to recognise the 
need for negotiation by setting up a new procedure allowing some 
degree of negotiation by acknowledging PPP as an alternative project 
type. This new procedure must be combined with the above proposed 
tight legal definition of a PPP arrangement. Only PPP arrangements 
falling under this tight legal definition can be allowed to use the PPP 
procedure for negotiation. 
Another, and maybe more easy way, is to allow PPP procurement 
to use the existing negotiation procedure in the EU Utilities Directives 
in Articles 9, 40 and 54.629
 
 In accordance with Article 1(9) (c), the 
negotiated procedures require that the contracting entity consults the 
economic operators of its choice and negotiates the terms of the 
contract with one or more of them. In accordance with Article 1(9) (c), 
the negotiated procedures require that the contracting entity consults 
the economic operators of its choice and negotiates the terms of the 
contract with one or more of them.  
 
6. The competitive dialogue – not a solution to the negotiation 
problem 
 
When awarding a PPP contract through the competitive dialogue 
procedure, the contract must be awarded on the sole basis of the award 
criterion for the most economically advantageous tender, pursuant to 
Article 29(1), and the public party must set up the needs and demands 
in the notice document, pursuant to Article 29(2).  
                                                          
628 See also H Collins, Regulating Contracts (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 
pp. 308. 
629 Council Directive 2004/17 of 31 March 2004 coordinating the procurement 
procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services 
sectors OJ L134/1-113. 
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The public party opens a dialogue with the tenders, after the 
selection in accordance with Article 44 to 52. The aim of the dialogue 
is to identify and define the means best suited to satisfy the complex 
needs of the public party.  The public party may discuss all aspects of 
the contract during this dialogue as long as the public party ensures 
equality of treatment among all tenders according to Article 29(3). 
630
Hence, the Member States have a legal obligation to fulfil the 
requirements of EU Procurement Law by paying constant attention to 
the restraints flowing from the ban on negotiations in the EC 
Procurement Directives.  
 When the dialogue is concluded, the tenders submit their final 
tenders based on the solution specified during the dialogue; see Article 
29(6).The public party then assesses the tenders on the basis of the 
most economically advantageous tender, pursuant to Article 29(7). 
According to the Commission, the competitive dialogue will 
provide the necessary flexibility in the discussions with the tenders on 
all aspects of the PPP contract during the set-up phase. At the same 
time, this procedure will ensure that the dialogue is conducted in 
compliance with the principles of transparency, equality of treatment, 
and the EC Treaty principles.631
The competitive dialogue is not enough to gain the economic 
benefits from a PPP. The key legal challenges with regards to PPP in 
the EU are that it is necessary, in order to benefit fully from a PPP, 
that the parties can include a high degree of negotiation and 
collaboration, a measure that, to some extent, is prohibited by the 
Public Service Directive 2004/18/EC and by the EC legal principle 
concerning to the ban on negotiation. The competitive dialogue does 
not allow negotiation. As mentioned above, negotiation in a PPP 
arrangement is necessary in order to obtain joint utility which is 
fundamental for achieving more value for money. 
  
  
                                                          
630 Contracting authorities may not reveal to the other participants solutions 
proposed or other confidential information communicated by a candidate 
participating in the dialogue without his/her agreement, also according to Article 
29(3). 
631 Also see Commission (EC), ‘Green Paper on public-private partnerships and 
Community Law on Public Contracts and Concessions’ (Green Paper), COM 
(2004) 327 final, 30th April 2004., section 25.  
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7. Recommendations for the future PPP 
 
In a perfect world, the function of a legal framework regarding PPP 
would reduce opportunistic tendencies and opportunistic behavior 
between the parties. At the same time, the legal framework would 
reduce the fear of opportunistic behavior among the parties and align 
the interest of the partners.632
Other economic theories can explain the problems with the 
existence of a fear of opportunistic behaviour in a contractual 
relationship. In his transaction cost theory, Williamson explains that 
opportunistic behaviour is negatively related to safeguards,
 
633 and 
Gulati argues that this fear reflects a negative departure from the full 
change of co-operative relationships maintained by organisations.634
It is necessary to acknowledge that one of the key elements in a 
PPP is the co-operation between the private and public party. 
However, in general the procurement rules require that the public 
party, in the tender procedure, sets out almost all conditions, and only 
minor matters can be changed after the award.
 
635
The research literature discusses the necessity of legal support and 
clear rules of PPP arrangements. Pongsiri argues in regard to 
developing countries that: 
  
 
Regulation is a key element to maintain competitive 
market discipline in public service provisions in 
developing countries. While many governments in 
developing countries have already signed their first 
demonstration public private partnership contracts mist 
have not yet designed the legal and regulatory 
framework for monitoring the performance of private 
contractors and for ensuring contractual compliance.636
                                                          
632 J. Hennart, ‘A Transaction Cost Theory of Equity Joint Ventures’ (1998) 9 (4) 
Strategic Management Journal 361-374. 
 
633 O. Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies: analysis and antitrust implications, 
(New York: The Free Press, 1975). 
634 R Gulati, ‘The Dynamics of Alliance Formation, Dissertation’ 54 Abstract 
International 4170. 
635 See S. E. Hjelmborg, P. S. Jakobsen and S. T. Poulsen, Public procurement law – the 
EU Directive on public contracts (Copenhagen: Djøf, 2006), p. 201. 
636 N. Pongsiri, ‘Regulation and public private partnership’ (2002) 15(6) 
International Journal of Public Sector Management 487-495, p. 490. 
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Pongsiri argues further: 
 
Regulatory systems should be established as soon as 
possible to define clear rules for financial performance, 
provide practical experiences to the staff responsible for 
their implementation, and provide assurance to the 
private sector that the regulatory system includes 
protection from expropriation, arbitration of commercial 
disputes, and respect for contracts agreements.637
 
 
It can also be argued that when co-operation is such an important aim 
of the PPP, problems arise because the EU, the UN and the WTO 
procurement rules do not ensure this co-operation. Hence, the 
principles of the procurement rules are to ensure competition, equal 
treatment and transparency, but not co-operation.  
Co-operation is relying on trust to function. Trust is an indicator 
of relationship development and a key element in a PPP. Co-operation 
and trust is significant elements in relationship management. Edkins 
and Smyth argue: 
 
Relationship management offers an alternative to 
transaction approaches to exchange reversing the 
management emphasis of cost reduction and meeting 
contract condition via the minimum number of points of 
contracts to management.638
 
 
Relationship management is a significant part of the PPP arrangement, 
and includes perceived value, service satisfaction, customer loyalty, 
relationship value, and profitability.639
In a PPP contract encouraging relational contracting, the 
organisational systems and procedures would be expected to provide 
some scope for relationship development when using the principles 
from the relationship management paradigm.  
 
                                                          
637 N. Pongsiri, ‘Regulation and public private partnership’ (2002) 15(6) 
International Journal of Public Sector Management 487-495, p. 490. 
638 A. J. Edkins and H. J. Smyth, ‘Contractual Management in PPP Projects’ (2006) 
Journal of Professional Issues in Engineering Education and Practice 82-93, at p. 
83. 
639 D. Ford, H. Håkansson and I. Snehota, Managing Business Relationships 
(London: Wiley, 2003). 
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Edkins and Smyth argue: 
 
This will theoretically create high trust environments, 
which are sustainable providing all parties show a 
willingness to trust and invest in relationship 
development at both individual and organisational 
levels.640
 
 
Co-operation and clear legal rules regarding PPP are not only needs in 
developing countries; they are general needs at governmental level in 
all countries. The law must ensure the possibility of establishing 
efficient collaborations between the public and the private sector. 
If the legal framework is not working in favor of PPP, legalistic 
behavior can occur. This situation occurs when the parties bring the 
‘baggage’ from past legal arrangements into the PPP project. This 
baggage consists of the knowledge of procedures, rules, contract 
terms, etc., based on traditional procurement projects. It can result in a 
situation in which the service provider is ‘covering his back’, acting 
more concerned with meeting the performance criteria in the contract 
than seeking real benefits. Such behavior can lead to a breakdown in 
the relationship and, therefore, the trust and co-operation 
foundation.641
Such a breakdown will lead to self interested behavior and 
opportunism, which is the opposite of the joint utility and general 
welfare that the PPP project seeks to obtain. 
 
The aim of specific PPP rules must be to enhance legal certainty 
and to avoid situations where the legal environment can create 
opportunistic behavior. Also, legal certainty can alleviate the concerns 
that traditional procurement rules might make PPPs unattractive or 
impossible to carry out.  
With regard to the legal uncertainty, two approaches are presented 
below: 
 
                                                          
640 A. J. Edkins and H. J. Smyth, ‘Contractual Management in PPP Projects’ (2006) 
Journal of Professional Issues in Engineering Education and Practice 82-93, at 
p.85. 
641 See also: A. J. Edkins and H. J. Smyth, ‘Contractual Management in PPP 
Projects’ (2006) Journal of Professional Issues in Engineering Education and 
Practice 82-93, at p.85. 
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x One approach is that existing public procurement rules and 
principles cover all PPPs, rendering a definition of PPP 
unnecessary. This is the natural legal solution. All new ideas 
and concepts designed to address the demand for new types of 
co-operation between public and private parties created by the 
market are governed by the existing rules. However, these rules 
do not take in consideration that the PPP model has very 
specific characteristics with regard to the co-operation and 
output needed to create an efficient PPP.  
 
x Another approach, as presented in chapter 6, is to let the public 
authorities use the option of co-operating with private parties 
under conditions similar to market conditions. This solution is 
in conflict with the procurement procedure in general.  
 
A simple solution is to set up specific PPP rules as part of the public 
procurement regulation – both in the EU and the WTO - and legally 
define exactly what a PPP is; how a PPP must be set up; how to 
ensure a fair and transparent competition when selecting the private 
parties; and how to run a PPP.  
When this is accomplished, the PPP can use a different set of 
procurement rules which acknowledge the special aims of the PPP; the 
public service can operate on market conditions with the benefits 
related to the market; and co-operation can be prioritised.  The 
already-known negotiation procedure from the EU utility directive 
could be an easy solution. 
Thus, if the PPP falls outside the scope of any definition of a PPP, 
the traditional public procurement rules will apply to the situation. 
Only when a strict definition of a PPP is fulfilled should the specific 
PPP rules apply to the PPP. 
It should be emphasised that the aim and purpose of the EU Public 
Procurement Law is good but not when there is a particular need or 
market for new types of co-operation between public and private 
parties.  
While also subject to special procedural rules, the PPP rules 
should allow for the special turnaround in the traditional incentive 
procurement structures necessary for PPP. PPP has the potential to 
achieve greater economic efficiency by changing the incentive 
structure of co-operation.  
 
  
